GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the Crimean attacks – Important?

In the three weeks since we predicted that the Russians were exhausted, the front line has stabilised as predicted, a tired Russia army unable to advance. Since the last article, Russia has not made any significant gains and although the Ukrainians are maintaining pressure near Kherson, they are not gaining ground. Instead, fighting a battle of attrition aiming to isolate and defeat the Russians in that area.  This week, the action is a far from the front lines, and can be broken down into the following activities:

• Russia’s covert mobilisation.
• Hybrid operations.
• Ukraine’s Crimean gambit.
• Plans for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. 

Currently, the most topical of which is the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.  The facility is being shelled creating lots of media commentary.  Although the situation is of considerable concern, it does not appear to be of much relevance to the campaign.  It is more likely that this is an example of the ‘fog of war’. The Ukrainians claiming that Russia is using the plant to store military equipment; and the Russians blaming the Ukrainians for shelling it.  It seems unlikely that the Russians would intentionally endanger a piece of infra-structure vital for a newly annexed Zaporizhzhian Republic. In fact there are unconfirmed reports that it is being wired into the Russian national grid.  Likewise, the Ukrainians are unlikely to want the plant to be damaged. It is most likely that this is an example of misadventure, the Russians storing equipment there and the Ukrainians shelling the area near the plant.  The shelling hitting the plant could even be a mistake.  

And, at this time there is much more important activity happening elsewhere in the campaign.  The most interesting of which is the attack on Saki Airfield in Crimea on 9 August 2022. The airfield is approximately 220km from the nearest Ukrainian forces and is a base for aircraft that support the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. Yesterday, the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence assessed that loss of these aircraft will have a significant impact on Russian naval operations in the area.

However, the focus of interest is the attack’s distance behind Russian lines because it demonstrates a previously unreported Ukrainian capability that could be:

• Long-range ground launched missiles, possibly a Ukrainian development of the Tochka system increasing its range. 
• The capability to conduct either guided missile or bombing attack launched from an aircraft. 
• Long-range drones.
• Special forces or partisans. 

Satellite photos were published a few days after the attack and provide useful information confirming the destruction of Russian aircraft and providing some clues about how the attack was carried out.  At this stage it appears to have been an operation conducted either infiltrated special forces or by local partisans.  Two factors support this hypothesis:

• Russian air defence was defeated.  It seems unlikely that the Russia’s relatively advanced air defence network in Crimea was defeated, during daylight without being filmed. Some media commentators have linked this attack to United States anti-radar missiles being used by Ukraine. However, if missile and radar sites had been targeted during the daylight attack it is highly likely that there would be video evidence available.  It seems likely that a drone strike would have been captured on film too. 
• The pattern of damage.  The satellite photos show that the airfield’s central ammunition storage area and maintenance area was attacked and that individual aircraft were targeted on the ground. The blast damage across these areas is vastly different in size. The aircraft appearing to have been targeted individually with small bombs. This pattern indicates a sabotage attack.

The operation appears to be a ground attack, leaving us to conclude that Ukraine either has a competent special forces capability or a strong and capable local partisan network in Crimea.  The former is more likely, remember that since 2014 Ukraine has been trained by the United States and the United Kingdom both nations with a long history of using special forces.  Further, Soviet SPETZNAZ soldiers trained extensively in sabotage of airfields, it was a counter to NATO’s air superiority and it is unlikely that this type of operation has been forgotten in the Ukrainian military.  Given time, an operation like this would be relatively easy for competent special forces well-versed in the local culture to conduct. Crimea is physically easy to infiltrate from Ukraine, there is good intelligence and there are likely to be sympathetic locals.  

Strategically, this attack is very important because it escalates the war.  Crimea was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014 and to-date has not been impacted by the war.   The attack challenges Russia.  An attack on Crimea is an attack on part of the Russian homeland sending a message to Putin that Ukraine is willing to attack any annexed areas.  The attack is also a message to potential collaborators that Russia is not a ‘safe bet’, that even if an area is annexed that Ukraine still has the capability and the will to fight for it.  A clear counter to Russian hybrid war plans for annexation of conquered territory.  

In the last article we discussed the Manoeuvrist idea of ‘simultaneity’, or using your own operations to overwhelm the enemy’s ability to make good decisions.  This attack contributes significantly to forcing the Russians into a state of simultaneity. Russian planners currently having to contend with a large Ukrainian push near Kherson, maintaining pressure from the east against the Donbas, keeping pressure on Kharkov, countering Ukrainian local attacks in both areas that threaten the Belgorod to Izyum supply line and now needing to contemplate potential attacks in Crimea.  It is a big task.  Russian planners will be thinking hard about the Kerch Bridge that links Crimea to Russia because woe betide the Russia commander who lets that bridge be successfully attacked.  

The direct military effect on the campaign of this attack is that Russia now needs to divert more resources away from the frontline to protect Crimea.  At a strategic level, this attack is a way of countering Russia’s rapidly advancing plans to annex parts of Ukraine. For example, on 11 August 2022 the pro-Russian government in Zaporizhzhia passed a motion to run a plebiscite in September about becoming part of Russia.  Countering Russia’s hybrid war, or their use of political tools to support the military campaign is vitally important. By demonstrating that Ukraine intends to fight for all of its historic territory; and more importantly has the capability to do so, tells people in occupied areas to think twice about supporting puppet regimes.  In turn, this forces further resource burden on Russian military planners because if people in occupied areas have hope, they are motivated to resist tying more of the occupation force down in rear area security operations far from the frontline. 

The final point of note at this time, is Russia’s increasingly desperate search for more soldiers.  This trend tells us a great deal about Putin’s situation and that he is concerned about his political support at home.  It is interesting; and likely a positive sign, that he feels he cannot escalate and mobilise fully so needs to work covertly hiring mercenaries and creating volunteer battalions. More importantly, if he does not have the support to mobilise, he is unlikely to have the support for using nuclear weapons.  It is unlikely that the continuing covert mobilisation will impact on the campaign.  Russia needs well trained technically competent soldiers and modern weapons rather than more ‘cannon fodder’.  At this stage in the war it would be more sensible to support the covert mobilisation with a ‘real’ operational pause to allow for training, reconstitution and reorganisation.  Further, this week North Korea offered Russia military assistance.  North Korea offering your regime help could be interpreted as a strategic indicator that you are losing.  

In summary this week look out for the following activity and these predictions:

• In the north, Russian forces will continue to threaten Kharkov maintaining pressure on Ukraine. It is very unlikely that they will achieve anything more that shelling the city. 
• The Ukrainians will continue to hold their positions near Sloviansk. This week there were unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian advances north towards Izyum. It is likely that over time more details will be confirmed, however it is not likely that this will be a significant advance. Instead, the Ukrainians are probing north using the Siverts-Donetsky River to protect their right flank the aim is to contribute to Russian uncertainty, forcing them to keep combat power in this area rather than in the south.  Ukraine’s operation in the east is about fixing a large part of Russia’s combat power in one place far away from the decisive battle. 
• This week it is reported that Russia has approximately 25,000 soldiers into the area around Kherson.  It is likely that they have taken the troops from nearby areas like Mariupol or Melitopol.  The attack in Crimea will force them to reconsider this movement and may stop them sending more troops to Kherson or even draw troops away from the frontline to provide security.  
• Keep watching the south. The Russian counter attack near Kherson has not pushed the Ukrainians out of the area, in fact there are reports that all of the bridges over the Dnipro River are now compromised, effectively isolating Russian forces in this area.  If this is true then it may set the conditions for a significant Russian defeat. 
• The movement of troops west towards Kherson and the need to protect targets like the Kerch Bridge and intimidate the local population will weaken the forces defending Russia’s northern boundary roughly along a line through the following towns and villages; Kamainska, Orikhiv, Huliapole and Vuledhar. This may open the possibility for a Ukrainian attack in this area. 
• Russia’s response to the Crimean attack needs to be observed carefully, at the moment it is disorganised and confused, initially claiming the attack was an accident. However, it could be used as a ‘pivot’ for Russian escalation.  Crimea was annexed. The Russians claim it as rightfully part of Russia so and attack on it is an attack on their homeland.  So it is important watch their considered response will they; ignore it, retaliate with more attacks on Ukrainian cities, throw around more nuclear threats, call for mobilisation.  We don’t yet but it may change the campaign significantly.

The European summer is hot and dry, good conditions for mechanised warfare. The Ukrainians are active around Kherson and appear to have defeated the initial Russian counter attack and now appear to be shaping conditions for the isolation and defeat of a large Russian force west of the Dnipro River. The question remains though whether they have the strength to take the offensive elsewhere. 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.