Ben Morgan – After a year of war in Ukraine, Russia is still losing

A year ago today, Vladimir Putin launched a three day ‘special military operation’.  Advancing on a wide frontage small, powerful Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) thrust deep into Ukrainian territory. At the time, the world thought it could see a modern network centric army; the second best in the world unleashed on Ukraine. The Pentagon predicted the fall of Ukraine in three days and the United States offered to evacuate Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  

But Putin and the Pentagon got it wrong, and the Russian Bear fell into a big, very deep hole. By D+2 (the second day of the war) this column reported that “Initial reports indicate slow Russian progress in good tank country.  This may be the first indication of a long war for the Russians.” a prediction that has proven correct as the war unmasked the weaknesses of Russia’s military. 

This week has been and will be punctuated by events marking this anniversary, starting with United States President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to Kyiv, and the announcement of another large aid package to support Ukraine’s war effort.  A gesture, designed to demonstrate the United States’ commitment to supporting Ukraine.  The next day, Putin made a long, rambling state of the nation address reiterating old lies including; “the war was started by NATO”, “Russia is de-Nazifying Ukraine” and culminated in a statement suspending the New START treaty regulating nuclear weapons testing, development and numbers between the United States and Russia.  

Putin’s speech was underwhelming and tired, a series of platitudes for his home audience.  The raging against ‘the West’ and the threatening sounding language are now a part of the Putin playbook; and like so many previous statements the ‘devil in the detail’ tells the real story.  Although, the New START treaty has been on shaky ground for some time it should be noted that Putin’s speech ‘suspended’ Russian participation rather than throwing away the treaty; and that he said Russia would not start testing again, unless the United States did so first.  It was an example of double speak; or making sure to sound threatening and aggressive enough that his ultra-nationalist political supporters are appeased while at the same time not saying anything outrageous enough to undermine his relationship with China. 

Putin will do more and we can be sure that this week there will be punishing attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilian infra-structure.  It is likely that more Russian conscripts will be slaughtered in futile attacks.  However, frontline activity in recent weeks demonstrates that Russian offensive combat power is simply not enough.  The fact is that Russia’s invasion was always a gamble, 190,000 poorly trained, badly led and unmotivated soldiers was simply not enough to conquer Ukraine. 

Putting, this invasion force into perspective 1991’s United States led invasion of Kuwait involved nearly a million coalition soldiers and was preceded by 42 days and nights of aerial attack bombing the Iraqi occupation force to smithereens.  Twelve years later, when another coalition led by the United States invaded Iraq; half a million soldiers crossed the border after surgical airstrikes and missile attacks destroyed Iraqi air defence and military communications networks.   And; Russia’s opening air and missile strikes failed to destroy; Ukraine’s air defence, military communications networks or overwhelm the Ukrainian air force.  

On D+3, Russia had not captured its key objective, Kyiv and it was clear that Russia’s BTGs would soon need resupply.  A resupply that never happened as Russia’s logistics system collapsed under the strain of Ukrainian attacks, poor planning and equipment shortages created by endemic corruption. By the end of the first week of the war it was clear that offensive was collapsing and, in these columns, it was noted on D+4 that “The Russians are over-extended, having relied on the psychological impact of multiple small groups attacking on wide fronts and are now in trouble.  Resistance is tougher than they expected and probably their small battlegroups have over reached their supply lines, are tired and are being defeated in detail”. Analysis that proved to be correct as the offensive collapsed and Russia increasingly resorted to threats including building a massive column of vehicles and equipment to threaten Kyiv; and because Putin was indulging in nuclear sabre-rattling trying scare off NATO as his invasion fell apart. 

Meanwhile, Ukrainian support coalesced around Volodymir Zelenskyy. An amazing multi-faceted person, ex-comedian and actor. A Jewish person that Putin accuses of being a Neo-Nazi, who even after narrowly escaping with his family from a coup de main by Russian paratroopers has the guts to keep fighting.  It would have been easier for him to get on a United States helicopter, guarded by special forces soldiers and flee. Instead, he stood firm and confronted the Russian Bear head on, galvanising his country and the world in opposition to Putin’s illegal war. 

Zelenskyy’s dogmatic courage became a rallying point for Ukraine, and the world; as slowly but surely the Russian offensive was ground down.  Poorly trained and lacking the logistics support they needed Russian forces were slowly but surely defeated; and then pushed back.  The United Kingdom and United States invested considerable effort in training Ukraine’s army; since the last Russian invasion in 2014.  This training built a modern force that used excellent intelligence to target key Russian assets.  Russian generals were killed in exceptional numbers and modern NATO anti-tank missiles like Javelin and NLAW were used to destroy trucks.  Without trucks, fuel and ammunition supplies dried up and Russian tanks simply stopped; their crews getting out and walking back to Russia.  

The first phase of the war culminated in early April as the vast column of military power thrusting toward Kyiv collapsed and Russian forces withdrew.  Chernihiv and Sumy, besieged towns between Kyiv and Kharkiv were liberated and Russia withdrew from the north-east of Ukraine.  In the south, the towns of Izium and Mariupol were under siege and the Russians were looking west towards Odessa. 

The next phase of the war involved a Russian re-orientation and pivot of their main effort to the east and south.  In the east, Russia’s area of focus was the cities of Lysychansk and Severodonetsk. A bloody siege of Severodonetsk followed as the Russians tried to take this city on the east bank of the Siverskyi Donets River.  During the siege the Russians advanced west, north of the river, taking Lyman and Izium.  In May, the Ukrainians withdrew across the Siverskyi Donets River and fought another defensive battle at Lysyschansk.  Russia’s already over-extended military being slowly attrited fighting through two ‘meat grinder’ defensive positions. Lysychansk would be taken eventually but by the time it fell Russia’s momentum was gone.

Then on 14 April, Ukraine achieved a staggering naval victory sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the guided missile cruiser Moskva. The ship’s loss impacted significantly on Russia and on Putin, its loss was to big to easily cover up and also meant that Russian naval operations lost their most effective anti-aircraft capability. After Moskva was sunk, the once feared Black Sea Fleet retreated to its base in Sevastopol. The Ukrainian’s rejoiced at the poetic justice implicit in the loss of the ship that had famously been told to ‘fuck itself’ by the defenders of Snake Island. 

In the south, Russia tried to advance north into Zaporizhia and tense battles were fought around the Enerhodar nuclear powerplant. But this was to be Russia’s limit advancing north along the Dnipro River. Instead the focus of operations in the south turned to the coast where the Russians eventually captured Mariupol and advanced across southern Ukraine crossing the Dnipro River, capturing Kherson and almost taking Mykolaiv.  Russian General Rustam Minnekayev stated on 22 April that Russia’s aim was to capture Odessa and link Transnistria to Russia, an indication of Putin’s unstated goals.  

The Ukrainians held Mykolaiv, and by the middle of the year were slowly pushing Russia back towards Kherson. Ukraine, had started to receive long range HIMARs missiles and was using them to deadly effect against Russia’s supply lines.  Accurate and able to hit small targets up-to 80 km away these weapons damaged bridges and destroyed ammunition dumps. Isolating Russian forces west of the Dnipro River. And; in early July Ukraine started to publicly discuss an offensive to retake Kherson. On 9 July, Ukraine’s government told people to evacuate the area to avoid being caught in the offensive operation and for the next two months Ukraine slowly increased pressure on the Russians in Kherson. Through August and September, tension increased Russian forces becoming more and more isolated on the west bank of the Dnipro River. 

Then everything changed, in the north-east near Kharkiv a Ukrainian offensive started on 6 September sweeping east, quickly retaking Izium and Lyman before culminating on a line roughly north/south through Kremina and Svatove.  An advance of approximately 100km. The Kharkiv Offensive was a surprise and Russian forces collapsed, as very mobile Ukrainian forces communicating with Starlink swarmed across north-eastern Ukraine.  Vast numbers of tanks, armoured vehicles and ammunition were captured intact in the area around Izium and Lyman, key Russian supply bases.  

Ukraine’s offensive had profound effects in Russia, the Kremlin had to admit that territory was being lost, that Russia was on the defensive.  On 21 September, Putin ordered a new mobilisation.  300,000 more soldiers to fight in Ukraine, the first of which were hurried to the front to provide cannon fodder to slow down Ukraine’s advance.  In late-September, Putin announced a plan to annex Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhia.  A referendum was conducted on whether the oblasts or regions should become part of Russia; and ‘lo and behold’, the vast majority of people wanted to be part of Russia. Therefore on 30 September signed the annexation of these oblasts into law ignoring the fact that battles raged on in all four.  Then on 9 November Russia’s force in Kherson withdrew.  

As winter set in the frontline stabilised and while Russians in the south and north dug in, at a city called Bakhmut a long battle started as a warlord called Yevgeny Prigozhin and his private army; Wagner Group tried desperately to take the town and demonstrate that they could achieve what the army couldn’t, by taking the town and regaining Russia’s offensive momentum.  Throughout the winter the Battle of Bakhmut raged, both on the ground and in social media as Prigozhin fed men into a meat grinder and filled cyberspace with propaganda.  Russia’s campaign had stalled and General Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff was appointed to take over the war and to resurrect Russia’s fortunes.  Gerasimov cleaned house, reorganised his command structures pushed Prigozhin and his forces out and reset Russia’s forces. Ready for a new offensive.  

A new offensive that appears have started but has made little progress to-date.

After a year the key lessons that we can learn from this war are:

• The importance of collective security. Ukraine, has remained independent because NATO and its allies have joined forces to support it.   This war demonstrates that Alvin Toffler’s hypothesis in the book ‘War and Anti War’ that increasing economic inter-dependence between nations ensures that state versus state warfare with conventional armies will slowly disappear because it is simply no longer ‘good business’ to fight expensive wars that impact global markets is not proven. That in fact large conventional wars may continue to be fought between states. And; the only deterrent to aggression by powerful states is a united international response.
• The cost of collective security. The cost of collective security must be paid in blood and treasure. Countries that are committed to the international rule of law must invest in training and equipping their militaries to fight.  Further, there may be times when soldiers need to be committed to foreign wars to support collective security. 
• Precision weapons dominate mass. The Revolution in Military Affairs, that I learnt about 25 years ago has arrived.  Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia is predicated on its ability to hit precision targets either at short range with guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles; and at long range with HIMARs and Neptune anti-ship missiles.  Precision guided artillery shells require less rounds to hit targets increasing lethality and reducing logistics burdens. Russia’s artillery ‘mass’ has been defeated by precision weapons destroying their ammunition dumps and trucks.  
• Precision weapons require good intelligence.  Histories of this war will highlight Ukraine’s dominance of the intelligence battle. Ukraine has targeted fleeting targets precisely; killing generals at an alarming rate and destroying ammunition dumps.  Ukraine has tracked key Russian assets at land, on the sea and in the air with lethal results.  

 

• Russian equipment and training is second rate.  This war demonstrates the weakness of Russia’s military model.  No matter how much second-rate equipment and how many conscript soldiers are available well-trained professionals with modern equipment will defeat them.  War-fighting has swung from ‘mass based’ attritional war to ‘precision based’ war that is best carried out by highly trained professional armies.  The scariest potential outcome of this war, would be NATO and Russian soldiers engaging in combat because the Russians would be destroyed so quickly that it could trigger a nuclear response. 

 

• Information war. Ukraine’s military has demonstrated the importance of Multi Domain Operations, especially domination of the information domain.  This war has the greatest transparency in history. Around the world people are watching videos, interactive maps and pundits explaining the war in close to real time.  Controlling the information domain means making sure your story is the narrative that all these media carry and the Kharkiv Offensive, is a good example of Ukrainian success. After, fixing the Russians at Lysychansk and Severodonetsk they drew attention towards Kherson so when the Ukrainian Kharkiv Offensive exploded it surprised observers everywhere.  By dominating the information domain and telling the world ‘their’ story Ukraine was able to achieve deception.  Managing the information war requires new skills that many armies will need to acquire.

 

Although this war is not over yet, it is clear that Russia does not have the combat power to win on the ground any time in the near future.  According to United Kingdom Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, Russia has deployed 97% of its combat power in Ukraine. Recent, intelligence reports show no major concentrations of Russian ground forces consistent with an attack.  The Russians appear to be spread thin and therefore lack the reserves required for a large attack.  At this point, Ukraine may not be moving but certainly holds the initiative and it is likely that the next decisive movement will be a Ukrainian offensive either:

• North into Luhansk; or 
• South into the Crimean Land Bridge.

Putin’s forces may be able to survive an initial offensive, they are dug in and concentrated.  However, there will be more offensives. Even if China throws Putin a lifeline, his only hope of capturing his four annexed oblasts is that NATO splits.  Russia has too few trained soldiers, mobilising more soldiers is academic unless they are provided with good training which Russia is demonstrably unable to provide.  Even if the Chinese supply first rate weapons, they are still being put in the hands of poorly trained and inexperienced soldiers.  Greater Chinese intervention may lengthen the war but can’t win it. 

 The story of the Ukraine War is a gambler’s tale and his bluff has been called.  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger