GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – A sudden attack of sensibleness! And; not just in Russia either!

Confirmation of Russia’s withdrawal of its forces on the west side of the Dnipro River and from Kherson city signals an important moment in the Ukrainian War.  In recent weeks, Russia appeared to be in a confused and difficult position.  Ukraine, successfully corralling Russia’s forces against the Dnipro River creating the conditions for a ‘kesselschlacht‘; or cauldron battle in which a force is encircled and slowly destroyed.  This situation has been developing for months and we discussed Russia’s dangerous situation in early-September (See – Kesselschlacht, the name for Russia’s nightmare in Kherson) and later predicted that Ukraine would take Kherson (See – Kherson, Russians are being cooked – What next?) probably forcing the Russians to withdraw without having to fight for the city.   Looking at the situation from a strictly tactical perspective, the Russians would have been smarter to withdraw sooner.

However, they didn’t and last week’s activities provide an interesting insight into the what is going on behind the walls of the Kremlin.  In recent weeks, the Russian’s withdrew heavy equipment and command infra-structure, east across the Dnipro River but were also moving newly mobilised soldiers west across the river into Kherson. It looked like the plan was to use the freshly mobilised soldiers to defend the city, hoping that winter would slow down Ukraine and give time for the more experienced soldiers evacuated from the area to rebuild Russia’s military power. Early last week, we discovered that some Russian elite units were on the west side of the Dnipro and on Friday Russia anounced it would withdraw all of its forces to the east side of the Dnipro.  An operation that is nearly finished.  

After months of looking like Russia was going to sacrifice lots of soldiers in a tough and probably unsuccessful defence of Kherson, things have changed and Russia has made a sensible tactical decision.  By withdrawing the Russians gain a number of key tactical advantages:

• The frontline is shortened; and from the coast to Erenhodar (roughly the nothern point of Russian control) is secured by a major river.  This move shrinks the current frontline from roughly 750km to about 650km of which approximately 220km is protected by the wide and deep Dnipro River. This geographical feature significantly reduces the manpower required to hold this section of frontline.  
• Approximately another 20,000 soldiers are released that can be used elsewhere. It is estimated that Russia had about 20,000 soldiers west of the Dnipro River and they can now be deployed eleswhere in the campaign. 
• Ukrainian momentum is stalled in the south.  The Dnipro River is a major obstacle and in my assessment it is unlikely that the Ukrainians have the capability (or will develop it in the short term) to make an opposed crossing of the Dnipro River. 

Russia has made a sound tactical decision.  

And; as we have often discussed the link between a tactical decision and strategy needs to be understood.  The decision indicates that Russia’s new overall commander in the Ukraine, General Surovakin has Putin’s confidence and is providing a clear vision for the war.  Recently, Russia’s conventional military has been increasingly subject to public criticism by rising ‘war lords‘; Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Both of whom control large private armies engaged in the Ukraine War; and who benefit politically and financially from undermining the conventional military.

The withdrawal from Kherson indicates that Surovakin is winning the political battle within the Kremlin.  He is aware of the political nature of war and has prepared Russian politicians and the public for the withdrawal, carefully indicating the possibility and stage managing how the public were informed.  Even forcing Prigozhin and Kadyrov to publicly support the withdrawal.  

Winning the political battle within the Kremlin must also entail a strategic vision within which the withdrawal from Kherson is justified; and contributes to a wider plan. Surovakin’s plan is likely to be simple and focussed around three key actions:

• Redefine the military aims of the campaign.  Russia is losing the campaign militarily and to retain any hope of victory it needs to carefully choose how it fights and where its resources are used. At this stage his advice is likely to be – concentrate on retaining the land bridge to Crimea by:
  • Reducing the frontage that Russia needs to defend.  Transition to a managable defensive delays defeat and by withdrawing east of the Dnipro River about a third of the new shorter frontline is almost impossible to attack. 
  • Stalling Ukrainian momentum.  Although the Ukrainians are celebrating the recapture of Kherson, the Dnipro River is a formidable obstacle and is likely to stop any offensive movement west.  Ukraine will need to try to move troops from the Kherson area elsewhere to re-establish the initiative.  And; the frontline is now much shorter, so making an offensive break through anywhere along it willl be harder.
  • Regain the initiative. Use the forces released from defending Kherson to reinforce offensive operations to capture Donetsk. If Donetsk Oblast is completely in Russian hands alongside the area currently controlled between the Dnipro and Mariupol, the land bridge to Crimea is secure and Russia’s stated aim of liberating Luhansk and Donetsk is acheived.  

 

• Continue the aerial bombardment of the Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. While the military campaign is being waged ‘on the ground‘, keep attacking Ukraine’s civilian infra-structure; to make the war as uncomfortable as possible for the Ukrainian people, hamper the re-deployment of Ukrainian military resources and to maintain ultra-nationalist political support within Russia.

 

• Strategically, continue the hybrid war against NATO and the United States aiming to split away support and force Ukraine to bargain. European and American support is not garuanteed.  If the military conflict can be extended; or appear to be an uncertain, long-term commitment Russia may be able to strip away Ukraine’s support. The gas embargo, the increased cost of security and the impact of Russian disinformation campaigns may yet create division in NATO and a withdrawal of support if the war can be prolonged. 

In summary, it appears that there has been an outbreak of sensibleness in the Kremlin.  That Surovakin is winning the internal political battle and is starting a more coordinated and tactically realistic phase of the campaign.  Many commentators this week pointed out that although Putin accepts the withdrawal from Kherson, there will be lots of pressure on Surovakin to make gains.  If Surovakin is quick; and his forces agile, then he may be able to because he now has a reserve of 20,000 soldiers that can be redeployed.  Perhaps to strengthen the offensive in Donetsk? 

On the Ukrainian side this is a period of great uncertainty. The withdrawal may rob them of the initiative and they need to quickly reassess the situation and move troops between fronts immediately.  If I was advising the Ukrainians, I would give up any notion of crossing the Dnipro River.  It will be too difficult, even large well-trained armies would struggle to ‘force’ a crossing of a river this size. Instead, I would prop and ‘dig in’ just outside artillery range on the west side.  Any Russian attempt to cross would face the same problems and be easy to defeat. The ‘Dnipro Line’ could be held with a fraction of the 60,000 soldiers estimated to be in the area and the line becomes a ‘firm base’ for Ukrainian forces to ‘pivot’ around in later offensives. Any remaining Ukrainian soldiers could then be transferred to reinforce Zaporizhzhia or Donetsk.  Ready, in case of a sudden Russian offensive or perhaps to regain the initiative with a Ukrainian thrust towards Melitopol or Mariupol; either or which could split the ‘land corridor’ to Crimea and further frustrate Russian ambitions. 

 

The Ukrainians are in a more secure position and will be encouraged by other outbreaks of sensibleness around the world. First, the United States mid-term elections did not produce the predicted ‘Red Wave’ of Trump supporting candidates. Instead, United States voters demonstrated that they are losing their interest in Trump and his divisive and un-democratic rhetoric; and as this article is being written it is possible that the Democrats may win the Senate.  An unusual mid-term election result, normally the incumbent party suffers much more during mid-term elections. The effect of this election on the war in Ukraine should not be under-estimated because Europe’s response and support for Ukraine is predicated on the United States being engaged.  It is very likely that without United States support Eastern Ukraine would now be part of Russia. The United States mid-term election results (even as they stand now) provide greater certainty for Ukraine that their strongest supporter will continue to back them.

The second outbreak of sensibleness this week is the increasing rapprochement between China and the United States.  It is clear that China’s support for Putin has waned.  In recent weeks, China’s influence on Putin is likely to have contributed to him toning down Russia’s nuclear rhetoric.  China appears to be looking for reasonable and responsible dialogue with United States.  Both countries this week announcing that they were planning ’talks about talks’ in preparation for the approaching G20 summit in Indonesia.  Realistically, there is a need for China and the United States to maintain open dialogue.  Talking is always better than fighting; and it appears that now Xi Jinping is confirmed in power, he is ready to stop sabre rattling and start talking. The United States and China working together is important for the war in Ukraine, the sooner the post-COVID economy can be built the stronger the economies supporting Ukraine will be and the less likely that Russia’s hybrid war will produce results.  

In the next few weeks it is likely that we will see:

• A stabilisation of the Kherson front along the Dnipro River, as Ukraine secures the west and Russia ‘digs in’ on the east.  It is highly unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to cross the river, so expect to see this area become more static.
• More Russian attacks on Ukrainian infra-structure.  In recent weeks issues have been raised about Ukraine’s ability to maintain its air defence operations.  Shooting down drones is exhausting their stocks of surface to air missiles so we will see the campaign continue and may start to see more Russian air force activity. 
• It seems likely that there will be a large-scale Russian offensive in or near Donetsk.  Surovakin needs to demonstrate success; and now has 20,000 soldiers available. Succeeding in doing what Prigozhin’s Wagner Group couldn’t by capturing territory in Donetsk would secure his political position and may contribute to a larger campaign plan.  Further, it makes sense, within the ‘medieval’ politics of the Kremlin, that by attacking in this area the sacrifice of Prigozhin’s men can be used to contribute to Surovakin’s plan.  
• The Ukrainians are less likely to move to the offensive in the short term.  It is likely that they are as tired as their adversaries and it will take time to reduce numbers around Kherson and move them elsewhere.  However, Ukraine has proven my predictions wrong before and if they do have the forces to open a new offensive, driving south towards Melitopol or Mariupol and splitting the land bridge the morale impact on the Russians would be enormous. 
• Instead the Ukrainians are more likely to dig in, consolidate and prepare for offensive action early in the New Year when the ground freezes.  However, expect to see lots of HIMARS and drone attacks launched from near Kherson towards Russian positions in the Crimea because even if a ground attack from that direction is unlikely this activity maintains administrative, logistic and political pressure on the Russians.

Finally, last week represents a new phase in the war, one in which political tensions inside the Kremlin may have been suppressed by the development of a tactically sensible plan for the campaign, contributing to the existing Russian strategy.  After weeks of political instability and the noise of Prigozhin, Kadyrov and ultra-nationalist military bloggers, it appears that the conventional military faction is back in control and is injecting some sensible and realistic decision-making into Russian planning. How long this will last is anybody’s guess though.

 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.