Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: US reviewing the AUKUS submarine deal

The Trump Whitehouse has started a review of the AUKUS submarine deal. The US$ 245 billion tripartite deal between Australia, the UK and the US creates a plan for these nations to collaborate and develop the next generation of nuclear-powered attack submarines. AUKUS is an historic agreement because if it is delivered, it will provide Australia’s first nuclear-powered submarine fleet.

However, it has recently been announced that the US plans to review the deal. The Guardian quoted an unnamed Pentagon official, stating that “The department is reviewing AUKUS as part of ensuring that this initiative of the previous administration is aligned with the president’s ‘America first’ agenda.”

It is not unusual for large strategic procurements to be periodically reviewed, but Politico reports that this review will be led by US Undersecretary of Defence, Elbridge Colby, who is an AUKUS skeptic. A situation causing concern in partner nations, the UK and Australia have invested large amounts in the programme. For instance, this year Australia committed US$ 520 million to speed up US submarine construction, and the UK recently announced an investment of US$ 7.45 billion in the nation’s nuclear industry to support the programme.

Australia and the UK are both relying on AUKUS to upgrade their submarine fleets. Nuclear-powered attack submarines are enormously expensive and require a large, sophisticated tech and nuclear industrial complex to support them. The UK already operates nuclear submarines but is acutely aware of the increasing cost of competing with larger nations like China and Russia. Australia’s goal is to establish not only a new fleet but the industrial base required to build and support their submarines.

AUKUS includes the development of the infrastructure required to repair and maintain nuclear submarines in Australia. So, supporting the deal makes sense strategically for the US because it increases the resilience of the US submarine fleet. In a future conflict, US submarines could use Australian bases for repairs during conflict. A situation that helps mitigate the risk of a pre-emptive strike damaging key submarine bases.

Further, the Trump administration is clearly stating that it sees China as its most important competitor, and that the Pacific is its security focus. Therefore, working with Australia to develop an inter-operable submarine fleet is a sensible way to expand the combat power of any future US coalition in the region.

However, the Trump administration’s foreign policy is marked by inconsistency, and although they are playing down the review, we can be sure that both the UK and Australian governments will be very worried by the situation. Australia in particular stands to lose a great deal, it has committed entirely to the programme and if AUKUS fails Australia will be needing to rethink its naval strategy.

The future of naval power in the Pacific is ‘area-denial,’ or controlling large swathes of ocean using long-range missiles to attack any surface vessel that comes within range. China is already able to deny large areas of ocean using a range of long-range missiles designed to attack US carriers and their supporting task groups. Nuclear-powered submarines are one of the few methods for projecting naval power into an area of ocean denied to surface ships in this manner.

In summary, the as well as causing concern in the UK and Australia; China, Russia and North Korea will be following the debate with interest. If AUKUS fails it will politically and militarily weaken any future US coalition in the Pacific. From a military perspective, failure of the programme will reduce the number of nuclear-powered submarines the US and its allies can field. And, politically other nations like Japan, Philippines and South Korea will be observing to see if a US commitment can still be trusted.

More on the Shangri-La Dialogue – Peter Hegseth speaks

Asia’s largest annual security conference is the Shangri-La Dialogue. It started on 29 May and finished early this month. Emannuel Macron, France’s president opened the conference making a powerful statement about like-minded nations in Europe and Asia working together to maintain the international rules-based order.

On 31 May, Peter Hegseth US Secretary of Defence spoke. He pledged US support and asked allies and partners to increase defence spending in response to China’s expanding military budget. Hegseth’s speech is noteworthy because of its bluntness. The Defence Secretary reinforcing the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ policy and its focus on the Indo-Pacific.

Hegseth clearly identified that the Indo-Pacific is America’s strategic focus, stating “That starts with deterring aggression around the world and here in the Indo-Pacific, here in our priority theatre” and he reinforce the US commitment stating that “America is proud to be back in the Indo-Pacific — and we’re here to stay. The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation.”

Notably, Hegseth made it very clear that the US does not seek military conflict with China but his speech clearly positioned China as the opposition, the Defence Secretary stating that “China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including grey zone tactics and hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region’s status quo.”

However, a policy of ‘peace through strength’ requires diplomacy and measured communication. It is easy to talk tough and un-necessarily escalate tension, likewise poor communication can undermine a strong position and incentivise escalation. For example, the President recently ‘talked tough’ about sanctioning Russia during the Ukraine War negotiations, but did not follow through. This example incentivises other nations to escalate quickly when negotiating with the US because they assume the Whitehouse does not have a well-considered plan, so is likely to step back.

Essentially, a foreign policy that does not shy away from confrontation must be communicated, clearly and consistently in a manner that captures nuance. Hegseth’s speech and wider US foreign policy does not exhibit these qualities.

For example, Hegseth’s statement that the “The United States stands ready to work with any country that is willing to step up and preserve the global and regional peace that we all hold dear” immediately raises questions about US commitments to NATO and Ukraine. Indo-Pacific nations can clearly see US commitment to NATO sliding, and the question mark Trump’s Ukraine policy leaves regarding US commitments to oppose unlawful military aggression. Nuance that appears lost in Hegseth’s world-view, a disconnect clearly communicated, when he said “President Trump is leading European allies to step up in their own defense.” A statement that will be ironic to many of the well-informed members of the audience.

Another feature of Hegseth’s speech is his informality and colloquial turn of phrase, for instance using General Cane’s nickname, or referring to Admiral Paparo as “America’s fighting general in the Pacific.” It is unusual to hear senior military leaders speak glibly like this in public, reinforcing a perception that Hegseth lacks maturity. It is these small things that diplomats, academics and senior military officers will note, and will shape their nation’s views of the US.

Finally, Hegseth’s speech raises an important question; Do the different branches of US government have an integrated plan for foreign policy engagement? For example, as Hegseth spoke the US is threatening punishing tariffs on close allies, and is initiating a review of AUKUS. Actions that seem at odds with the sentiments he expressed in his speech. A paradox that undermines trust and confidence in US foreign policy.

Australia to test new autonomous submarines at RIMPAC 2025

Exercise RIMPAC 2025, the largest annual naval exercise in the Pacific is rapidly approaching. The exercise is an opportunity for the US, its allies and partners to gather their forces and practice working together. This year’s exercise is notable because Australia will be testing its new uncrewed submarine, Ghost Shark.

This submarine is a large autonomous vessel that can operate thousands of kilometres from its base and contact a range of tasks including surveillance and attack missions. Large, long-range uncrewed vessels like Ghost Shark will change naval combat. Uncrewed vessels can be built smaller and are cheaper than conventional submarines but have similar surveillance and attack capabilities. Further, their operational parameters are larger than crewed vessel and they can patrol for longer, and dive deeper. For example, Ghost Shark is reported to be able to operate 6km below the surface, and can operate for 10 days autonomously. Detecting a small vessel that far underwater, moving without communicating will be very difficult for an enemy force.

Ghost Shark is part of a rapidly progressing Australian programme delivering new uncrewed naval vessels and aircraft. The test at RIMPAC 2025 confirmed that Ghost Shark is ahead of schedule, meaning that we can predict that these vessels will enter service in years rather than decades.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Solomon Islands tensions still exist

More than 20 years ago war broke out in the Solomon Islands. In 2023, a Pacific peace-keeping force called the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) landed in Solomon Islands quickly and disarmed the factions, establishing a secure environment for reconciliation and rebuilding the nation. RAMSI remained operational until 2017 providing security, aid and assistance with governance.

RAMSI is generally regarded as a successful peace-keeping intervention. However, a recent article in The Strategist, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s blog raises concerns about RAMSI ‘s effectiveness. The article raises concerns about whether the underlying issues that started the war; “land disputes, regional inequality and political marginalisation” have been adequately addressed. It states “These unresolved issues continue to manifest in calls for provincial autonomy, public distrust of central government, and periodic unrest, such as the riots in Honiara in 2021.”

The article is a reminder that across the South West Pacific there are numerous political and ethnic tensions that although not well-reported in mainstream media, certainly impact on politics and security across the region.

Here is link to full article – www.aspistrategist.org.au/22-years-after-ramsi-solomon-islands-social-political-fractures-persist

ASEAN and Melanesia

The 46^th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kula Lumpur last month included some noteworthy discussion about Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste.

Historically, Indonesia is a strong supporter of both nations becoming members, and in 2023 an agreement was signed that initiated a pathway for Timor Leste to join by October 2025.

Papua New Guinea’s application is not well-advanced with all but one ASEAN member, Indonesia, opposing the nation’s membership. ASEAN members are concerned about Papua New Guinea’s internal security issues and governance.

However, the issue was addressed in Kula Lumpur when Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto spoke in support of Papua New Guinean membership stating that “Also, we would like to propose the participation of a close neighbour of ours, that is, Papua New Guinea.” ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn also spoke about Papua New Guinea’s situation stating that accession would require agreement of all partners and a change to the organisation’s charter, to increase the number of members.

ASEAN and Indonesia’s relationship with Melanesia is important because although the association is not military it does play an important political and security role in the Pacific. An ASEAN extension into Melanesia would bring its membership into greater contact with the Pacific. For example, Papua New Guinea is a member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and Indonesia is an observer. So, a closer relationship between ASEAN and the PIF would be a potential outcome of Papua New Guinean membership.

Additionally, both Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea sit on a geopolitical fault line between China and US ally Australia. A region in which both parties are keen to extend their influence, and where Indonesia also appears to be seeking political sway by supporting these nations to apply for ASEAN membership. A situation that may increase competitive tensions in the region.