Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: South Korea, Japan and US foreign policy instability

Last week’s US foreign policy disasters, starting with voting alongside countries like Belarus, Russia and North Korea opposing a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  A terribly sad situation that was followed by the awful Oval Office meeting with Ukraine’s president. Both these incidents indicate American foreign policy is volatile and unstable. A dangerous trend for the Pacific, especially because two of the US’s most important local allies, South Korea and Japan are also managing periods of political instability. 

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol was recently impeached, and is currently awaiting a ruling of the nation’s Constitutional Court that may remove him from office. Additionally, he faces criminal charges for insurrection after imposing martial law on the capital.  It is a difficult and divisive period in South Korean history, the nation split over the president’s case. A key impact of South Korea’s political drama is that it makes it difficult for the US to engage effectively at a policy level.  

Meanwhile, the Japanese coalition government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) holds a minority of seats in parliament, requiring support from opposition parties for every decision. A situation that creates political uncertainty, and requires careful management. 

Initially, meetings between President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba seemed positive, both sides discussing a new ‘golden age’ in relations between the nations. However, on 10 February the Whitehouse announced tariffs on Japanese steel imports that will probably be a key point for discussion the next time the two leaders meet.  The economic impacts of the tariffs may mean that Japan’s planned increases in defence spending are slowed down. 

Essentially, two large and powerful nations that are the cornerstones of US collective security arrangements in the Northern Pacific are facing internal political challenges that may impact on their foreign policy.  The situation is exacerbated by the current Whitehouse re-writing historic expectations for US behaviour.  Leaders in both Japan and South Korea will be nervous about – What comes next? And, whether they can rely on US support.

This uncertainty may impact further away, Japan finances aid programmes in the South Pacific supporting governance and providing economic support.  If there is a withdrawal of Japanese support to small Pacific nations there will be implications for security. 

Likewise, both nations have powerful militaries that make a significant contribution to collective security, and any weakening of these relationship could impact deterrence. Specifically, Japan and South Korea contribute the deterring a Chinese intervention in Taiwan, so any weakening of the tri-partite relationship is cause for concern. 

Taiwanese digital undersea cable damaged

On Tuesday 25 February, the Taiwanese Coast Guard detained a Togolese flagged ship, crewed by Chinese nationals that they allege damaged an undersea digital cable. The cable links Taiwan to the Penghu Islands, located about 50km west of Taiwan’s main island, in the Taiwan Strait. The Penghu Islands are an important military base providing early warning, and an advanced base for the defence of Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard was cautious about attributing any blame before a full investigation stating that “The cause of the underwater cable break, whether it was due to intentional sabotage or simply an accident, is still pending further investigation for clarification.”  But also raised the possibility of the damage being deliberate with the following statement “All eight crew members are Chinese nationals and [we] are not ruling out the possibility of grey zone harassment.” 

So far this year, five similar incidents have been reported, and damaging submarine cables has become an international trend. NATO stepping up security operations in the Baltic because of recent incidents in that area. 

Protecting undersea digital infrastructure, and developing resilience against this form of attack should be an important aspect of future defence strategy in the Pacific region.  Damaging undersea cables is easily achieved, a ship dragging its anchor across them is enough, and is easily deniable.  Further, all countries rely on digital data and losing a cable could easily cripple a small economy.  For example, most New Zealand banks are headquartered in Australia so there is a constant flow of digital information between the nations. Damage to a submarine cable could significantly impact the economy of both nations. 

US Marine Littoral Regiment undergoes first test in Hawaii

The US is currently developing new close combat capabilities and techniques to defeat Chinese ‘area denial’ tactics.  Essentially, China’s plan to defeat the US in a potential future conflict involves using large numbers of accurate, long-range missiles to deny areas to US forces.  For example, using anti-ship missiles to prevent US carrier or amphibious task groups getting close enough to an operational area to be effective. Or using similar missile technology on land to stop US forces concentrating for offensive operations.

Part of the US response is developing Marine Littoral Regiments that fight dispersed, operating stealthily in small groups. China’s tactics rely on surveillance, or having ‘sensors’ like radar stations, electronic listening posts and observers spread throughout the operational area identifying targets for long range missiles.

The Marine Littoral Regiment is trained to fight in small units that can ‘slip’ under China’s surveillance network, and attack the network of ‘sensors,’ destroying radar stations, electronic listening posts and observers.  Once the surveillance network is compromised, larger more powerful US units can be deployed to close with Chinese forces. 

The development of the Marine Littoral Regiment is noteworthy because it provides lessons for other militaries in the region. The first lesson is that a key part of modern war is area-denial. Whether using drones like we see in Ukraine, or with China’s long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles a key part of modern war is using these weapons to deny key areas to the enemy.  

This means that all militaries need to be developing tactics to defeat area-denial, and the Marine Littoral Regiment is a response worth studying. Last month, 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment successfully completed a series of realistic combat rehearsals in Hawaii, to test its preparedness. This is the unit’s first Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation, and it included:

• Establishing advanced bases in hostile areas.
• Providing surveillance to support naval operations, for example pushing radar and electronic listening posts deep into enemy territory. 
• Attacking ships using ground-based missiles.
• Raiding and attacking enemy targets.
• Supporting information operations.
• Defence against aircraft and missiles.
• Crisis response. 

The exercise demonstrates the range of capabilities a Marine Littoral Regiment has and provides blueprint for other nations that may look to work with the US. How do their capabilities fit with US Marine Corps capabilities?  For instance, Japan and Australia are buying long-range missiles like Harpoon and Tomahawk that in a possible future conflict could hit targets located by US Marines.  The military calls these relationships inter-operability and it is a key element of effective collective security. 

Chinese naval vessels near Australia, an update

China’s small naval task force remains close to Australia. The Australian Defence Force reporting on 4 March that the task group is about 300km south-west of Perth. Recent media coverage discussed whether the task group was accompanied by a submarine.  The reality is that unless the military confirms there is a submarine with the task group, we need to accept that these reports are speculative. However, doctrinally surface task groups are often supported by the submarines, meaning it is possible.

Maritime operations are very three dimensional and a naval task group will often be supported by submarines, aircraft and even by dedicated satellite surveillance. All of which contribute to the task group’s situational awareness and ability to locate targets. 

Additionally, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported on 4 March, that during their passage through Melanesia one of the Chinese warships is believed to have flown a drone over Papua New Guinea.  The drones activity was spotted over Mabaduan on the north coast of Torres Strait. 

The most likely explanation is that the Chinese warship used the drone to survey the local area and provide more information that can be used to plan operations in the area. Probably, another aim of operating a drone in this area is to test local air defence surveillance.  

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Solomon Islands considers new ship registry 

Radio New Zealand reported this week that Solomon Islands is considering creating a ship registry.  Ships must register their ownership in a specific country, and when travelling fly that nation’s flag.  Countries charge for the use of their flag and can make income from registering ships. Panama and Liberia being good examples.

However, in some cases small nations with limited resources are used by unscrupulous owners for registering their ships that may be conducting illegal activities.  Recently, a Russian ship sailing under the Cook Islands flag was interned in the Baltic by Finland.  An incident that rings alarm bells about how the Cook Islands register is governed because the Finns allege the vessel is part of Russia’s shadow fleet used to export oil out of the country.

Solomon Islands is an independent nation so can create a register. Perhaps the best option for concerned neighbours is to support the smaller nation to create a legitimate and well-governed register. 

Concern about US commitments to Timor Leste

Timor Leste may be far away from America but receives aid and security support from the US.  The Biden administration’s November 2024 Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia discussed increasing aid to Southeast Asia generally and specifically highlighted increased US security support for the small nation. 

A nation that countries like Australia, New Zealand and Japan are supporting to become an interoperable security partner.  In 2024, the 13th Exercise Hari’i Hamutuk involved participants from all three nations, working together to improve Timor Leste’s defence capabilities. The US has also contributed to building Timor Leste’s defence force’s air service, including upgrading the Baucau airfield.

Current Whitehouse foreign policy is unpredictable and the previous administration’s funding may disappear creating a diplomatic vacuum that may be filled by China, or even India. The latter is building an embassy in Timor Leste, and seeks a stronger relationship with the nation.  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack