Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: India and New Zealand, a developing security relationship

Recently, a New Zealand delegation led by Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon visited India to discuss trade and security matters. Regular readers will know that this column sometimes discusses India’s growing presence in the Pacific.

In 1991, Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao announced ‘Look East,’ a policy that expanded the nation’s diplomatic focus to include South East Asia. Successive Indian governments championed ‘Look East,’ and its success prompted the Modi government to reinvigorate the programme in 2014.

‘Act East,’ Modi’s new policy includes funding infrastructure projects and increased security cooperation with Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. A key focus is to secure India’s trade routes through the South China Sea.

In 2024, Indian diplomats and warships visited several Pacific nations, India’s President Droupadi Murmu visited Australia and India announced its intention to build an embassy in Timor Leste. India also has a long history of working with the US, Japan, and Australia through the Quadrilateral Dialogue, a security discussion forum. This activity indicates that India has an increasing diplomatic and security interest in the Pacific. An interest that is likely to be motivated by China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy.

India’s interest in the Pacific, and its concerns about Chinese assertiveness make New Zealand a useful partner. New Zealand is a small nation but ‘punches above its weight’ in security discussions with the coalition of nations seeking to deter China. For instance, New Zealand is a member of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network, a long-standing partner of the US, UK and Europe and despite being tiny is one of NATO’s IP 4 partners. Factors that make New Zealand a useful partner to support building relationships with large powers like the US, UK, Japan and NATO. Additionally, New Zealand has strong relationships with many small Pacific nations.

New Zealand has an interesting and unique position in the world’s security architecture, making it an attractive security partner. New Zealand’s membership of ‘Five Eyes’ is a good example of this position. A tiny nation that belongs to the most powerful intelligence network on Earth. Many nations would like access to the network’s intelligence product, including India that hosted ‘Five Eyes’ representatives at a global intelligence conference in Delhi. and on 16 March 2025. Building a good relationship with New Zealand may help dialogue with other larger partners.

Luxon and Prime Minister Modi signed a defence cooperation pact focussed on improving maritime security. This is a small step in what is likely to be an increasingly active relationship. India looking for more influence with New Zealand’s larger security partners, and the smaller nation looking for a larger nation able to support its interests now that US foreign commitments are uncertain.

US Marine Rotational Force arrives in Darwin

On 17 March, this year’s annual rotation of US Marines arrived in Darwin. A force of 2,500 soldiers and sailors arrived in Australia to train with local forces, familiarising themselves with the Australian Defence Force and with the wider region. The force is structured as a Marine Air Ground Task Force, a roughly battalion-sized manoeuvre group supported by its own armoured vehicles. artillery, aircraft, and helicopters.

The Marines will participate in 17 exercises, some in Australia and others in Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and New Caledonia. An interesting selection of nations that the US and Australia are keen to demonstrate their resolve to protect like Philippines, to exclude Chinese influence from like Papua New Guinea, or to build relationships with like Indonesia.

The most important exercise though is Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, Australia’s biggest exercise since World War Two. This exercise is scheduled in July, and includes participants from 19 nations. A large European presence is noteworthy, the UK sending a carrier task group based on HMS Prince of Wales and Norway sending warships. Germany and France are also involved but their commitment is not published yet.

The US Marine Rotational Force and other partners and allies will engage in series of exercises that are essentially rehearsals for potential conflict. Practicing skills together, like live fire drills, amphibious landings, and other multi-domain operations. In lay terms, Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 is a rehearsal for conflict, Australia providing the administrative and logistics infrastructure for a worldwide group of partners and allies to deploy to, and concentrate force in northern Australia ready to deploy into the wider region.

It is noteworthy because its size and range of participants, especially that it includes NATO countries. In these columns we have noted that NATO is becoming increasingly engaged in the Pacific. NATO countries participating in Exercise Talisman Sabre 2023, two sending approximately two dozen warplanes to Exercise Pitch Black 2024 that is also hosted by Australia. The increasing size of exercises and their complexity indicates how seriously Australia and its partners and allies are taking the task of deterring Chinese aggression.

And, a key element of that deterrence is the knowledge, relationships and local knowledge that the Marine Rotational Force build each year deploying to Australia.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Bougainville’s independence

Bougainville is a large island sitting between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Island, between 1988 and 1999 its inhabitants fought a bloody civil war. Although little known outside Melanesia the war destroyed many lives and wrecked the island’s civil and economic infrastructure. A 2018 article in The Interpreter, the Lowry Institute’s blog states that “Up to 20,000 people, or 10% of the population at the time, lost their lives. Accounts of the conflict include reports of massacres, extra-judicial killings, torture, mass rapes, and disappearances.”

In 2001, a peace deal was signed that established a pathway for the island to assume independence. It included the establishment of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) to represent the island during the process. Part of the process was a non-binding independence referendum held in 2019, and 97.7% of Bougainvillians voted for independence, demonstrating the community’s desire for independence. This response is not surprising because even twenty-five years after fighting ceased emotions remain high in Bougainville.

History explains why Bougainville feels this way, a key trigger for the war was environmental damage caused by the enormous Panguna copper mine. A recent The Diplomat article describes “Close to a billion tonnes of mine waste was released into local rivers, contaminating water sources and disrupting vulnerable ecosystems.” Bougainville’s people and environment suffered enormously as profits from the mine disappeared offshore, leading them to take up arms.

The 2022 Era Kone Agreement established a pathway for settling the outstanding issue of independence by 2027. Starting with the 2019 referendum results being tabled in the Papua New Guinea parliament by 2023. A deadline that has passed, Papua New Guinea and the ABG arguing about the majority required in a parliamentary vote for independence before the report is tabled. The ABG arguing a simple majority, and Papua New Guinea arguing for a larger percentage.

Sir Jerry Mateparae, a former New Zealand Chief of Defence Force and governor-general, who played a key leadership role in the Australia and New Zealand peace-keeping mission that established the original truce was appointed to mediate the situation. Mateparae is a very well-respected person in the region and was jointly appointed by both Papua New Guinea and the ABG.

Bougainville is an important area to study for anybody interested in Pacific security and stability. The Papua New Guinea government faces a difficult decision because Bougainville is rich in minerals, and Papua New Guinea desperately needs income. Additionally, giving Bougainville independence may encourage other separatist movements that exist in East Britain, New Ireland, and Enga Provinces to increase their demands for greater autonomy.

Further, with a population of only around 300,000 people Bougainville’s ability to raise revenue and create a sustainable government is limited. This factor means that an independent Bougainville will require external support, either from Papua New Guinea or from a foreign partner. And, it is noteworthy that that Papua New Guines is already providing more autonomy. The 2021 Sharpe Agreement delegating a range of powers to the ABG.

The key question is whether Papua New Guinea is willing to cede independence. If it does it loses access to the island’s valuable economic resources, and risks more provinces seeking independence. Likewise, Papua New Guinea’s partner Australia may not support independence, worried about the risk of a small, new nation in Melanesia being influenced by China.

Sitting at the junction point between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, Bougainville is strategically located for any confrontation between China and Australia. Currently, the ABG appears to be inclined towards the US, but Trump’s cuts to foreign aid may change that opinion.

So, we should study Sino-American activity in the area as the situation develops. Now the independence process is being facilitated by a well-respected statesman (Mateparae), and with the Papua New Guinea government devolving authority to the ABG it is unlikely that this situation will evolve into conflict. However, the small risk and considerable importance of Bougainville to Australia mean that I recommend keeping a close eye on Bougainville.

Port Moresby hosts large security conference

Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea hosted the seventh annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security (JHoPS) meeting from 18 to 20 March 2025.

Since, 2019 JHoPs brings together the chiefs of police, immigration, customs and defence services of 24 Pacific nations. Japan and the US are observers. This year’s meeting involves, drafting a Regional Operations Deployment Framework, discussing maritime law enforcement and tabletop exercises to improve inter-operability and collaboration.

Forums like JHops provide the mechanisms by which the nations of the Pacific develop security inter-operability. For example, how larger powers like Australia and New Zealand works together with smaller nations to combat the Pacific drug trade or to monitor maritime economic zones. Senior leaders from participant nations meeting and building relationships that become the basis for inter-operability.

Vanuatu to revisit security arrangement with Australia

Earlier this month, Vanuatu’s new Prime Minister, Jotham Napat declared that the 2022 security agreement with Australia needs to be reviewed. Climate change is a key security issue for most small South West Pacific nations, and the Napat explains his position as follows “Climate change for us is a security issue that is not reflected in the security agreement.”

Small Pacific nations that are rapidly shrinking as sea-levels rise, or are dealing with more extreme cyclones and storms are very concerned about climate change. Unlike the US and Australia that tend to see security discussions in terms of countering Chinese influence, or securing territory for a future conflict these nations are advocating for climate action and disaster response support to be the key security commitments larger nations make to the Pacific.

Although, this attitude is changing as both the US and Australia’s militaries train and organise for disaster relief operations, as well as war, it still creates a divide that must be overcome. Specifically, as the new Whitehouse does not see climate change as a credible threat, and is cutting USAID programmes supporting Pacific nations.

Strategically, this may see China developing more influence in the Pacific as it presents a regime willing to listen to these concerns. If the US and Australia want to compete in the South West Pacific they need to listen to Pacific leaders like Napat, and acknowledge their concerns. And, if the US is unwilling to change then maybe it is time for larger Pacific nations to start working more closely with the European Union, or with countries like Japan, South Korea and Canada.

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack