Ben Morgan: Why Ukraine attacked Russia

The land campaign took another unexpected twist last week.  Ukraine crossed the international border, advancing into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Last article, we indicated that after a recent command restructure Russia’s Central Group of Forces (CGF) were becoming more effective. Russia’s operations between roughly Chasiv Yar in the north and Vuledhar in the south were evolving quickly. Russia testing Ukraine’s lines, avoiding strong sections and changing the point of its main effort to target weaker sectors.  A level of tactical acumen that Russia has not previously demonstrated. This change was successful and when last week’s article was published, Ukraine was under considerable pressure on this section of the frontline. 

Suddenly, on 6 August the situation changed. Ukraine attacking from near Sumy, east into Kursk Oblast. The attack achieved complete surprise and the rate of advance has been rapid, Ukrainian units advancing around 10-15km into Russia and capturing approximately 135 square kilometres of territory.  Further reports indicate there may be deeper advances, some approximately 30-40km from the border. 

At this stage there is little detail available about the operation, Ukraine maintaining tight operational security.  We do know that this is more than a cross-border raid, the large size and heavy equipment of the attacking force indicate that there is a bigger plan. Exactly what that plan is, has not been revealed. 

The rapid rate of advance is not surprising, Russia has most of its military in Ukraine. This means that much of the border is lightly defended. By 10 August, when this article was written Ukraine’s attack appeared to be slowing down as Russia rushes forces to the area; and Putin tries to reassure the Russian public that the situation is under control.  In Russia, the attack is being described as a terrorist operation, playing down its significance. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) opining in 10 August that “The Kremlin notably did not elect to declare a formal state of war against Ukraine or martial law — more serious responses that would marshal greater Russian state resources through wider, and more domestically disruptive, mobilization.” Instead, the government is trying to manage the situation using internal security forces. The FSB, Russia’s domestic security agency has implemented a ‘counter terrorism’ regime in Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod Oblasts.  

However, the situation is far from normal, TASS a state news agency stating that “More than 76,000 people have been temporarily relocated to safe places.”  Essentially, Russia will be rushing every spare FSB internal security soldier, reservist and regular army soldier to the area trying to stop the advance. Kursk is a large and important city, and although around 100km from the fighting the political implications of the attack are significant. 

What is motivating Ukraine to risk an attack into Russia?  

Currently, my appreciation is that Russia’s key objective is to capture Donetsk Oblast. An objective that is politically, rather than tactically motivated. Putin understands that he needs to demonstrate benefit for the losses that Russia is incurring and probably also understands that complete regime change, or in his terminology ‘de-Nazification’ is a goal he cannot achieve.  It is politically difficult to pursue an unsuccessful war, even in an autocratic regime.  So, Putin needs to demonstrate success. So far, the war has secured a ‘land bridge’ to Crimea, and capturing all of Donetsk Oblast provides another win helping to secure political support for the war. 

However, claiming Donetsk Oblast requires the capture of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the two largest cities remaining in Ukrainian hands. If these cities are captured, Putin has more political ‘capital’ possibly enough to declare victory and start negotiating a peace deal, or to ask the Russian people and his siloviki (strongmen that support him) for more resources to continue the war; either way, Putin needs a victory.  War is always driven by political requirements and this shapes campaigns. In this case by focussing the campaign’s efforts on a potentially achievable goal, capturing Donetsk Oblast. 

Russia’s forces operating in Donetsk have recently been re-organised under one command structure. A change that confirms Russia’s focus on this area; and that has produced a much more dynamic and effective pattern of operation. After capturing Bakhmut, Russia started pushing west trying to capture Chasiv Yar, a town on high ground near a major road junction at Kostyantynivka, between them these towns could provide a firm base for a Russian attack on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.  However, to date Russia has been unsuccessful in its attempt to capture Chasiv Yar. Based on historic precedent this battle could have developed into a long and brutal slugging match. 

Instead, Russia’s focus quickly shifted from Chasiv Yar, further south and on interdicting the motorway network that supplies Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Since late-July their operations have focussed on capturing the junction town of Pokrovsk, and they are making good progress. Essentially, Russia’s command re-structure and better tactics are working, and threatening a break through. Capturing Pokrovsk, is not operationally significant in and of itself but if Russia has the reserves to exploit the situation and follow up with an advance north that makes Sloviansk and Kramatorsk untenable, Ukraine faces a significant defeat.

What is the aim of Ukraine’s attack?  

In my opinion; this attack is about drawing Russian reserves away from the Donetsk region. Specifically, until the rasputitsa (autumn mud season) starts and Russia’s ability to exploit a breakthrough is limited by the weather.  Ukraine’s force is large (about a thousand soldiers) mechanised, covered by swarms of drones and well-equipped. For instance, last week Russia reported it had destroyed a German supplied Fuchs anti-aircraft vehicle, a rare and effective piece of equipment.  Additionally, this force has achieved surprise which tells us that it is also a well-planned operation. 

In fact, it is likely that Ukraine has been planning this operation for some time, either as a contingency plan in the event of Russian success or to exploit the culmination of Russia’s offensive.  Based on the current situation and Russia’s recent success it is most likely to be the former. Ukraine’s objective being to force the redeployment of Russian reserves and airpower from Donetsk to Kursk. 

Aircraft can change their area of operational focus almost immediately, and Russia’s soldiers need glide bombs to advance. Every bomber that is diverted from Donetsk to Kursk slows the advance on Pokrovsk down but Ukraine’s most important goal is reducing the number of reserves available to support a breakthrough. 

In tactical terms, this attack creates a dilemma that forces Russian commanders to make hasty, poorly thought-out decisions.  Specifically, Ukraine is aiming to reduce Russia’s ability to successfully exploit a breakthrough.  For instance, Russian commanders in Donetsk are probably already being asked to transfer resources to assist in Kursk. The ISW reported on 10 August that “Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 and 10 that Russian forces began laterally redeploying some units from elsewhere on the frontline and transferring reserves to defend in Kursk Oblast, with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces are redeploying up to nine unspecified brigades to Kursk Oblast.” The troops and equipment they send to Kursk is not going to be available to support exploitation of a breakthrough in Donetsk. Reports indicate that some of the units being redeployed to Kursk include elite Chechens, VDV (airborne) and marine units all of which would be extremely useful for exploiting a failure of Ukraine’s defences.  Reports like this indicate this attack is already drawing away Russian reserves, reducing the chance of successfully exploiting a victory at Pokrovsk or Chasiv Yar.  

The attack provides insight into Ukraine’s capabilities

In April this year, I discussed the 2023 offensive and opined that “By not concentrating force Ukraine limited its chance of achieving a local overmatch but preserved its combat power.  At no point during 2023 did Ukraine suffer a crippling defeat.  Instead, Ukraine’s forces probed slowly forwards and eventually culminated.  Ukraine’s decision limited the 2023 offensive’s potential but probably preserved significant Ukrainian combat power.”  (See ‘Russia’s tactical evolution. What next?’ dated 15 Apr 2024). More recently, in July I made similar points discussing the possibility of a Ukrainian attack when the current Russian offensive culminates. (See – ‘Russian offensive slowing down. Should Ukraine attack or wait?’ dated 21 June 2024).

This attack appears to reinforce this assessment, demonstrating that Ukraine does have reserves of combat power available.  The question now is how the attack will develop.  Will the Ukrainian force ‘dig in’ and make the Russians take casualties driving them out? Or is the operation a ‘hit and run’ attack designed to draw key Russian assets away from the frontline for a short time? Perhaps the first in a series of similar operations designed to ‘bring the war home’ for Russians?  We do not know yet.

However, something concrete that this operation tells us about Ukraine is that the nation is ready to broaden the boundaries of the war. Initially, the West’s support was predicated on ‘fighting the war in Ukraine.’  During the war this boundary has slowly but surely expanded, for instance Ukraine’s drone offensive has consistently extended the war into Russia. More recently, when the US issued authority to use Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against targets in Russia during the Kharkiv Offensive tolerance for operations within Russia increased again. This attack has moved that boundary again demonstrating that Ukrainian planners feel that they have the support and the combat capability to plan and undertake operations in Russia. 

Summary

Ukraine’s attack on Kursk Oblast is a very interesting development. The attack is an excellent example of the adage that ‘the best defence is a good offence,’ Ukraine’s attack striking hard and forcing Russian commanders to reallocate force.  A transfer of resources that may reduce pressure on Ukraine’s defensive line in Donetsk, and will certainly reduce Russia’s ability to exploit a tactical victory. 

At this stage it is hard to tell how successful the diversion will be but it certainly demonstrates that Ukraine has reserves of combat power and is willing to use them audaciously to shape Russian capability elsewhere.  Currently, Russia has defined Pokrov as the schwerpunkt or the ‘point of decision’ for its campaign in Donetsk.  Ukraine’s attack is designed to shape Russia at this point; by drawing away reserves so exploitation of any breakthrough becomes impossible. Ensuring that a Russian tactical victory does not escalate into an operationally significant moment that changes the course of the campaign.  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack