BEN MORGAN: Weather, North Korean support, and the US election shaping the campaign

Russia continues its ‘full court press’ against Ukraine’s defences, and is advancing in Donetsk. Along the Donetsk frontline, Russian attacks continue and Ukrainian defences in the region are being tested. Last week, Selydove fell, an important tactical-level victory for Russia. Selydove is part of Pokrovsk’s defensive architecture and its loss may provide opportunities Russia can captilise on.

Strategically, the current level of Russian offensive activity correlates with the forthcoming US election.  Putin appears keen to demonstrate to whoever is elected president, that backing Ukraine is a futile gesture. Ukraine’s weather is helping with this goal, relatively mild autumn weather allowing high-intensity operations to continue longer than expected. Additionally, Russia’s campaign is likely to receive an injection of manpower at a critical time.

The situation at operational-level, how strategy effects the campaign

At operational-level, both sides are engaged in a large ‘tuning movement.’ Russia focussed on the east, trying to capture all of Donetsk, while Ukraine tries to draw their forces away from that objective by attacking into Russian territory near Kursk.

The campaign’s essential structure is simple, but behind this operational-level ‘see-saw’ there is a strategic battle being fiercely contested. Ukraine does not have anywhere near the manpower that Russia has, so is fighting a slow battle of withdrawal.  Holding key points, specifically small towns on high ground dominating road junctions like Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk or Selydove. Solidly constructed, Soviet era apartment blocks and factories becoming fortresses.

Ukraine’s aim is attrition

Ukraine’s aim is to attrit Russia’s army, specifically its material (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery etc) and it is doing this by fighting a series of defensive battles.  Armies fighting in defence suffer far less casualties than their attackers, and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources demonstrate the enormous number of tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and trucks that are being lost.

Russia can replace its human losses, but Ukraine has appreciated that it cannot replace its lost equipment.  I believe Ukraine’s strategic objective is to wear down Russia’s ability to manoeuvre.  Any large-scale manoeuvre requires equipment, artillery pieces to provide fire support and vehicles to fight from or to bring forward ammunition, food and fuel. Ukraine’s intelligence chief, General Kyrylo Budanov, Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and many commentators believe that Russia’s existing war stocks will be exhausted by 2025/26.

Likewise, Ukraine’s depth attacks on Russian logistics and air-defence networks continue, including seven strikes on air-defence missile launchers and radars on 20/12 October. This week, Ukrainian drones also hit Russian fuel facilities in Azov, Voronezh, Belgorod and Novoshakhtinsk.  Attacks intended to reduce Russia’s combat power by attacking fuel and ammunition supply infra-structure and to create opportunities for more drone attacks by degrading Russian air-defences.

Attrition is exacerbated by offensive action, in October the New York Times reported that Russia has captured 414 square kms of Ukrainian territory but the cost of this activity has been high.  On 25 October, Janek Kesselmann, Deputy Commander of Estonia’s Military Intelligence Centre estimated that Russian casualties for the month would reach approximately 40,000.  Along with the human casualties, Russia lost vehicles and artillery. On 6 October, the Institute for the Study of War estimated that between October 2023 and October 2024 the Russian army had lost five divisions worth of tanks, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles and trucks. And, in fight near Pokrovsk “Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles.”

Ukraine believes the Russian defence industry cannot produce replacement equipment quickly enough to sustain the campaign. So, as Russia’s equipment runs out, it will lose the ability to manoeuvre.  Meanwhile, Ukraine is building its capacity preparing to transition to offensive operations. However, Ukraine needs to maintain its cohesion, fighting long enough in each town to inflict casualties, then giving ground slowly. Inflicting attrition on the Russians while preserving their own forces.  A difficult and dangerous plan, if Ukraine loses its cohesion, Russia could take advantage of the situation and make large advances.

Russia’s aim is to capture ground

Putin’s strategy is predicated on his belief that Ukraine is part of Russia, and on his opinion of the West. He believes that Europe, the US and liberal democracies supporting Ukraine are weak and that sheer will, and willingness to sacrifice will undermine Ukraine’s international supporters.  Russia’s current strategy is the current ‘full court press,’ using large numbers of soldiers to maintain constant pressure, small attack after small attack slowly capturing ground.

Putin’s plan is to inflict break the will of Ukraine’s people and their international supporters, to present Russia as an unbeatable military machine for which victory is inevitable.  Putin knows that without international support, Ukraine does not have the capacity to drive Russia out of Donbas, Crimea of the ‘land bridge’ it has occupied.  He also knows that domestically the Ukrainian people are tired and there is growing discontent, a situation he hopes to exploit.

‘Lines on the map’ versus attrition

Essentially, Russia is fighting for ‘lines on the map,’ capturing ground to demonstrate that Ukraine is fighting a losing battle. Ukraine on the other hand, is aiming to cripple Russia’s ability to manoeuvre. Limiting Russia’s ability advance quickly and shaping opportunities to re-take occupied territory.

Ukraine’s government recently introduced conscription, aiming to expand the army by about 160,000. Since May 2024, Ukraine has quietly been forming ten new brigades, training either in Ukraine or overseas.  In October, Ukraine has introduced new nomenclature, designating the 17^thMechanised a ‘heavy’ brigade. This little reported change that could indicate wider doctrinal changes, in preparation for offensive action. It appears that Ukraine is delicately balancing the reality of fighting a grim defensive battle against plans for future offensive operations.

At this stage, it is impossible to state which side will be successful, but we can look and some key aspects of last week’s fighting and deduce how the campaign is set to evolve.

Tactical-level operations

Kursk

Ukraine committed roughly 10,000 soldiers to this operation and captured approximately 1,100 square km of Russian territory, forcing Russia to deploy about 50,000 soldiers to the area. Ukraine and Russia continue to trade blows in the Kursk area and the salient has reduced in size by about 40%.  This was to be expected, it is unlikely that Ukraine aimed to hold all the ground it took. Instead, behind the frontline, follow-on forces will be building defensive positions and securing a smaller defensive perimeter.

Last week, both sides continued trade blows in positional fighting with limited changes in the frontline. Ukraine has some of it best units in the area including 8^th Special Purpose Regiment, and 82^nd Air Assault Brigade.  In recent weeks, President Zelensky has started to include this territory in his peace plan.  An indication that politics may impact on the operation, forcing Ukraine to hold areas longer then is ideal.

Kupyansk

Russian attempts to secure more territory around Kupyansk, trying to advance to the Oskil River continued last week.  However, there has been little change in the situation of the ground.

Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka and Toretsk

Positional fighting continues in these areas, both sides trading small amounts of land in a persistent cycle of attacks and counter-attacks.

Vuledhar, Kurakhove and Voznesenka

A couple of weeks ago Russia captured Vuledhar, and since then has been slowly advancing north and east around Kurakhove and Voznesenka. This operation is linked to activity further north near Pokrovsk, Russia slowly closing off the Ukrainian salient south of town between the Kurakhove Reservoir and Selydove.

Although there was limited movement this week, Kurakhove is under considerable pressure the commander of the 79^th Separate Air Assault Brigade recently quoted in the media describing the battle as follows, “The situation is really tense.”  This pressure is likely to continue so expect Ukraine forces to slowly ‘step back’ from this salient, and take positions further north and west.

Pokrovsk

This week Russia maintained pressure on Pokrovsk, but has not advanced significantly. My appreciation is that Russia is currently focussed on shaping conditions for a future attack on the town. Slowly but surely closing off salients north. and south of the town, flattening out the frontline to minimise weak points.

It is noteworthy, that the fall of Selydove did not initiate immediate Russian exploitation operations, for instance an aggressive pursuit of Ukrainian’s withdrawing forces. This may indicate that Russia lacks reserves, or that Russian forces are bidding their time waiting for the battlefield situation to evolve. What remains to be seen is what that evolution will look like?  Does Russia have the capacity to attack Pokrovsk quickly? Possibly to shape US political in the period immediately post-election.

In my opinion, Pokrovsk will be a tough position to take, and may be beyond Russia’s current capacity. However, my observation of the war leads me to believe that the decision to attack will be made politically rather than tactically, so expect pressure on Pokrovsk to intensify.

The impact of North Korean troops

Although there is plenty of media discussion about the geo-political impact of North Korea’s decision to send soldiers to Ukraine, I intend to confine my observations to the direct impact on the campaign. Tactically, the impact of North Korean troops on the battlefield is likely to minimal. North Korea’s military has not been involved in combat since the 1950s.  Its equipment is generally obsolescent and being a conscript army, levels of training are low. Further, imagine the language difficulties of conducting complex, combined arms operations with North Korean and Russian soldiers. So, it seems most likely that these soldiers will suffer large casualties and there are already reports of North Korean casualties.

The size of the potential deployment is not confirmed, but indications are that numbers will be large, in the tens of thousands. Although these troops are not highly effective, there impact is already being felt.  Russia’s offensive sustained by the influx of new manpower. Putin is keen to influence the new US president and Ukrainian morale, so is taking advantage of this new source of potential manpower, and recent good weather to press the offensive.  A dangerous situation for Ukraine because it is already under considerable pressure, the respite provided by autumn rain is late.

Summary

This week’s key observation is that we are witnessing an intense battle of wills, Ukraine on the defensive inflicting attrition on Russia. Balancing its resources, trying to keep enough force on the frontline to attrit Russia and giving ground slowly while new units are generated for future offensive operations. Meanwhile, Putin is throwing manpower at the campaign hoping to inflict a defeat that will break both Ukrainian morale and the commitment of the next US presidential administration.

The cost of Putin’s strategy is huge, casualties approaching 600,000 and the Russian government recently announcing it plans to spend USD $ 147 billion in 2025, a figure the Institute for the Study of War estimates at approximately 41% of total government expenditure.  A huge financial burden, that Ukraine is betting will become unsustainable.  A question that will be answered in the next few months.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack