Ben Morgan: Russia’s offensive appears to be culminating, can Ukraine punch back?

The situation in Ukraine is developing quickly. At strategic-level, the US is putting unexpected pressure on Putin. President Trump’s desire to end the war quickly combined with Putin’s negotiating tactics mean that the US position is hardening.

A recent example of this trend is the release the remaining billion US dollars of aid authorised by President Biden. After taking office, Trump stopped the flow of aid that his predecessor had established, using the Presidential Drawdown Authority. On 3 February, Reuters reported that although no new aid has been approved, Whitehouse policy has changed. Additionally, on 7 February Trump stated he would continue to support Ukraine in exchange for a trade deal on rare metals mined in the country, opening the door for his Whitehouse to release more support.

This news is a strategic blow for Russia, and is likely to be because of Putin’s negotiating tactics. He appears to have misread the situation, and his ability to manipulate the new president. But Putin faces another threat, last week the US handed leadership of NATO’s committee tasked with supporting Ukraine to the UK. To-date the UK has been Ukraine’s most committed supporter and it looks increasingly likely that the US will continue to provide some support. Aid that will be coordinated through this UK led committee, and combined with strong local leadership, I believe this means support for Ukraine will increase.

Then, on 6 February, Ukraine launched an offensive in the Kursk region. So far, the offensive is successful, driving up-to 5km deep into Russian territory. It is worth watching to see how the situation develops because every step forward demonstrates Russia’s military weakness. A factor that in turn influences strategic negotiations.

My assessment is that this situation is likely to get worse for Russia, because Putin does not appear to have the self-awareness to reflect on his position, and accept the need to negotiate. The Russian economy is starting show signs that it is collapsing. For instance, around the world inflation is generally tracking down, but in Russia is still high. Putin even admitting in a television interview on 7 February that inflation is a challenge.

Russian Central Bank Governor, Elvira Nabiullina is fighting a desperate battle to pull inflation down raising the institution’s base rate to a staggering 21% in October last year, and probably wants to go higher. The Moscow Times reported that “At its December meeting, the Central Bank unexpectedly held its key interest rate steady at 21% after Governor Elvira Nabiullina was reportedly pressured by Russia’s elites to not raise rates further.” The bank’s next meeting to set interest rates is on 14 February, and we should expect further hikes.

The Russian Central Bank reports that sanctions, a poor harvest and the declining value of the ruble are all contributing factors. And it is not difficult to see how these factors are linked to the Ukraine War. Meanwhile, Ukrainian airstrikes continue to degrade Russia’s oil production capacity, further damaging the economy.

On the battlefield, Putin’s forces are failing. Key Donetsk transport and logistic hubs Pokrovsk and Kostantiantynivka remain in Ukranian hands, and further north Ukraine’s Kursk salient remains intact. Generally, Russia’s offensive tempo is slowing down, an indication that manpower may be declining. The Kremlin appears politically unwilling to risk another round of mass mobilisation, meaning that there may be a requirement to conserve manpower.

Essentially, Russia’s war has been poorly executed and gone on too long. Enormous stocks of key equipment like tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and trucks have been destroyed, and Russian weak economy cannot replace them. Putin’s response was to throw human lives at the problem sacrificing huge numbers of young men to maintain offensive tempo. This tactic has captured plenty of farmland but none of the ground he needs to take Sloviansk or Kramatorsk, the last large Donetsk cities in Ukrainian hands.

Yet, Putin refuses to see the writing in the wall, stalling negotiations while his prominent associates let the world know Russian is unwilling to negotiate.

The operational-level situation

At operational-level, aside from Ukraine’s attack in Kursk on 6 February the campaign remains static. The mechanics of the campaign remains unchanged. Russia continuing to try and seize the transport infra-structure it needs to attack Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. So far Russia’s main effort has been Pokrovsk, but it could now be shifting from there to Kostantianynivka. The recent capture of Toretsk, and increased attacks on Chasiv Yar supporting this assessment.

Ukraine meanwhile, continues to draw forces away from the battle in Donetsk by attacking in Kursk. This reduces Russia’s ability to concentrate combat power at places like Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. Reducing Russia’s offensive combat power in Donetsk is an important Ukrainian goal because a smaller attacking force is liable to take more casualties than a larger one that can overwhelm the enemy’s defences.

The situation indicates that Ukraine remains committed to General Oleksandr Syrskyi’s ‘defend and attrit’ plan. In recent weeks there are indications that the plan is working and that a combination of deep strikes on economic and military targets combined with battlefield attrition are degrading Russian combat power. For instance:

• Russian progress taking key urban area like Pokrovsk and Kostianivkya is minimal.
• Daily Russian casualties reported by Ukraine are falling, indicating less offensive activity.
• The average daily rate of Russian attacks is falling Open Source Intelligence Sources (OSINT) counts recording the following daily averages: 

  November 2024 – 174.

  December 2024 – 202.

  January 2025 – 164.

  So far in February 2025 – 95.

Although we can only speculate, this information appears to indicate that Russia’s land campaign is slowing down.

Ukraine’s Kursk 2024 offensive appears to be successful

Six months ago, Ukrainian forces crossed the Russian border and captured a significant hunk of territory. Most of which they still hold. On 6 February, Ukraine celebrated this achievement with series of battalion-sized attacks near Sudzha.

At operational-level this attack appears to have been successful, drawing Russian combat power away from Russia’s main effort. Currently, Russia has around 70-80,000 soldiers in the area containing the Ukrainian salient. A substantial commitment, that is so large Russia had to ask North Korea for additional soldiers. A request that damaged Russia’s international reputation, and led to about a third of the 12,000 North Korean solider being killed of seriously wounded. After this mauling the North Koreans rotated out of the frontline, leaving a gap for Russia to fill.

The Kursk offensive means Russia could not, and cannot build sufficient combat power in Donetsk to achieve its goal of capturing places like Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar or Toretsk. Granted, Russia has taken plenty of farmland and some important areas like Vuledhar and Velyka Novosilika but nothing that is significant at an operational level. The price of its campaign has been enormous in lost lives, equipment and logistics capacity. Now it appears that this attrition is starting to take its toll, as Russia’s offensive activity slows down.

Ukraine’s recent attack in Kursk

Meanwhile, the question of what Ukraine plans in Kursk remains to be seen. On 6 February several Ukrainian battalions or about 1,000 – 1,500 soldiers with hundreds of armoured vehicles attacked in a south-easterly direction, and to-date have advanced about 5km. See the map below.

Although the initial success of these attacks is noteworthy because of the distance covered, the size of the Ukrainian formation should also be noted. The Ukrainians are operating formations that are large for this stage of the conflict. Constant surveillance and swarming drones have shrunk the size of manoeuvre units. Most assaults now consist of small groups of infantry soldiers, normally only a couple of dozen soldiers. Company-sized attacks of roughly 100 men and a dozen vehicles are rare. So, the fact that Ukraine can throw battalion-sized battlegroups around is worth noting.

It indicates that Ukraine has been able to suppress the drone and air threat in the area they are targeting, at least for a short period of time. An important capability for if Ukraine has bigger plans, the ability to protect a manoeuvre force from drones is the key to success in modern war. Additionally, the area Ukraine has chosen allows for exploitation and expansion of the salient, so we may see more activity here soon. Finally, the success of the operation could indicate a weakness of Russian forces in the area, perhaps due to the North Koreans withdrawal.

Summary

At strategic-level, sanctions, Ukrainian attacks, and attrition are impacting on Russia’s war-fighting capacity. Additionally, they are engaged in a significant negotiation with the new US president. A process that is not going well, as Trump switches aid back on and President Zelensky builds trust with the new regime.

Putin’s response is to ‘play games,’ trying to tough out the situation with Trump. Probably, banking on Trump’s often cited admiration. However, it has been a long-time since Putin was a credible international strongman. He is failing militarily in Ukraine, his ‘redlines’ are a joke and the Russian economy is collapsing. The Whitehouse is surrounded by smart people who will be making sure the president knows this and can see through Putin’s bluster.

This is a critical point in campaign, and I think that it is likely that the recent attack in Kursk will increase in tempo. Strategically, it makes sense for Ukraine to switch to offensive operations. Russia running out of steam, and negotiations with US are at a critical stage so a demonstration of Ukrainian capability would be useful to reinforce that the country can win, with the right support. So, expect Ukraine to take this opportunity to inflict another defeat on Russia,