Ben Morgan: Russian offensive, a warning for Ukraine

This week, Russia maintained its offensive and kept pressure on Ukraine’s defences.  Russia appears to be taking advantage of Ukrainian manpower shortages, quickly and efficiently changing its direction of attack on the Donetsk section of the frontline. Roughly between Chasiv Yar in the north and Vuledhar in the south. In statements this week, President Zelensky noted that Ukraine is having difficulty rotating fresh troops into this sector of the frontline.  Replacement brigades are being trained and equipped but are not ready yet, creating an exploitable weakness.

Russia’s ability to increase its pressure on Ukraine is likely to be related to a recent change in how their forces are commanded in the Donetsk area.  Recently, Russia restructured its ‘Central Group of Forces,’ the element of its army fighting along the Donetsk section of the frontline. A change that appears to be having a large impact on the campaign. The situation is tense and raises questions about whether Russian activity is a last surge before the rasputitsa (autumn mud season) starts or whether there are more significant plans afoot.

Change of Russian command structure in Donetsk

Recently, command of Russian forces in Donetsk was restructured.  The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reporting on 1 August that “The Russian military recently expanded the Central Grouping of Forces AOR (Area of Operational Responsibility) to include both the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions and possibly to support select operations west and southwest of Donetsk City.” Essentially, that Russia’s forces operating in Donetsk have been re-organised under one command structure. A change that indicates a Russian focus in this area.  The different units pushing west from occupied Donetsk now brought together under the command of one headquarters.  A decision that allows rapid reallocation of resources between different axes of attack, allowing Russia to quickly take advantage of any weakness that appears in the Ukrainian defensive line.

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources indicate that this change in command structure is having an impact, Russian reserves being quickly deployed on two key axes of attack; Toretsk and Pokrovsk. Motor Rifle (infantry) units focussing on Toretsk and tank heavy, armoured units on Pokrovsk, aiming to take advantage of tactical opportunities. Russia using the new centralised command structure to move troops and resources around the area of operations.  ISW assessing that “The Central Grouping of Forces may have established a more flexible command and control (C2) structure and may be responding more quickly to potential Ukrainian tactical vulnerabilities than other Russian groupings of forces in Ukraine.”

Historically, Russian forces have deployed specific units to relatively small areas of operations, so it is easier to retain command and control. Generally, only rotating units out of an area of operations when they need to regroup, after which the reconstituted unit is redeployed. The new Central Grouping of Forces appears to using its resources more flexibly and effectively.  A capability that Russia has not demonstrated so far in the war, and that other Russian commands are not using.

This has made it hard for Russia to transfer tactical victories into operationally significant victories.  Capturing a small town like Bakhmut or Avdiivka is a tactical victory but means little if it cannot be transferred into an operationally significant operation. The recent change of command structure in Donetsk is probably designed to change this situation.  By creating a larger more unified command in Donetsk, Russian forces can work together more effectively to apply pressure and more importantly can be ready to exploit any collapse.  The extensive local rail network sitting behind the Central Group of Forces probably provides the logistics capability to support a breakthrough.

The Russians are clearly learning and developing new methods and in recent weeks are having some success.  This makes Russia’s command change worthy of further study.

The land campaign, a warning for Ukraine

Russian forces continue to attack along the length of the frontline and a common observation is that Russia’s strategy is to attack everywhere, forcing Ukraine to burn resources defending in many different directions, stopping them from building sufficient reserves to initiate offensive operations.

Looking at the frontline, Russian attacks are reported from the Dnipro River in the south-west to Kharkiv Oblast in the north. Most of this fighting is positional, or both sides vying with each other in relatively small attacks. Activity that in previous wars would not have been reported and is probably best described as the day-to-day aggressive patrolling that military forces generally undertake to dominate their surroundings.  Most of these attacks are small ranging from a couple of dozen soldiers up-to about 100. Operations that in World War Two, Korea, Vietnam or even the recent Gulf Wars would not have been reported and analysed.

At a couple of points there is larger scale fighting. In the north, the Kharkiv Offensive has been defeated and the fighting in Vovchansk will eventually finish with a Ukrainian victory. Likewise, the Kreminna-Svatove Line continues to be active and there was shelling and minor fighting in the Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts. But the Donetsk sector is where the important battles are being fought this week.

The Russian campaign in Donetsk, post capturing Bakhmut, appears to have developed as follows; it started with an attack on Chasiv Yar. An attack that persisted for some weeks but is not followed historical precedent. Based on previous Russian operations, it was likely that this battle would develop into a months long siege, like we saw at Bakhmut and Avdiivka.  However, in recent weeks we are seeing a change in Russian operational level decision-making because instead of continuing to attack Chasiv Yar Russian forces in Donetsk have shifted their effort south. Attacking the Toretsk salient, then on 24 July making a large armoured probe near Vuledhar before starting a powerful advance on Pokrovsk from about late-July.

Russian operations in the last couple of weeks are demonstrating a new and more flexible operational approach. The rapid transfer of effort from Chasiv Yar south to Toretsk and Pokrovsk is unusual, and is a warning to Ukraine that Russia may be evolving and becoming more effective. If the trend continues then Ukraine’s position is much less secure.

The advance towards Pokrovsk is currently underway, and Ukrainian sources believe this advance is now Russia’s main effort in Donetsk.  Forbes magazine recently estimated that Russia has committed approximately 20 brigades (about 40,000 soldiers) to this operation. While Ukraine has only six brigades (about 12,000 soldiers) in defence. Roughly a 4-1 superiority in numbers, so the odds are in Russia’s favour. Further, the area behind the offensive is well-serviced by rail lines providing logistics support for the advance.

The Russian advance is currently progressing rapidly. However, its forces are advancing through relatively open terrain.  The offensive’s test will come when it reaches the villages of Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove. These villages are located near high ground and water features, providing a strong defensive line.  When this article was written on 3 August, the Russians had not advanced in the previous 24 hours and it remains to be seen if they can break through this line and take Pokrovska. Then if Pokrovska falls, whether Russia has enough reserves to exploit the situation.

Ukraine’s air war continues

The first F-16s are now in Ukraine but will take time to make a meaningful impact on the battlefield.  Meanwhile, Ukraine is busy using its existing air warfare assets to continue targeting Russian aircraft, air defence radars, missile launchers and oil infrastructure. Forbes magazine noting that in July, Ukraine launched more drones against Russia than Russia fired at Ukraine.

On 2 August, a string of attacks was reported across Crimea against targets near the towns of Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yevpatoria and Balaklava. The submarine Rostov-on-Don was also reported damaged. The submarine has only just finished repairs after being damaged in 2023. Then on 3 August, Ukrainian drones successfully attack Russian oil depots and storage facilities in Rostov, Belgorod and Oryol Oblasts.

It is also noteworthy, that on 2 August Ukraine claims to have destroyed four Russian S-400 air defence missile launchers and one S-500 air defence system in Crimea. An attack that indicates Ukraine is still actively hunting down and destroying Russian air defence missiles, especially in Crimea. Consistent with this column’s assessment that degrading Russian air defence is currently a key Ukrainian objective.

Summary

This week’s activity demonstrates that Russia has not culminated. Instead, Russia has managed to make a significant operational improvement, establishing a new and more effective command structure over its forces in Donetsk. This change appears to be working and Russia’s tempo of operations, or its ability to quickly move effort from one axis to another is increasing, at least in Donetsk. Where we can observe Russia testing options and shifting its main effort in response to Ukrainian weakness, a new way of fighting.

The war will be won on land.  Ukraine is punishing Russia economically from the air and has sunk about a third of the Black Sea Fleet but it is ‘the line on the map’ that matters because it is the easiest measure the voting public in the countries supporting Ukraine understand.  Ukraine’s great weakness is that it needs the support of other nations to fight Russia, and that support requires political will that is reliant on voters believing that Ukraine can win.  This strategic situation makes Russia’s current activity very dangerous because if Pokrovsk falls the event will sadly become a demonstration of the futility of supporting Ukraine.

Therefore, Ukraine needs to heed the warnings, mobilise its resources, and prepare itself for a significant battle.  It needs to stop the Russian advance on Pokrovsk but be cognisant that Russia is demonstrating the ability to transfer main effort between different lines of advance in Donetsk. This means that Ukraine needs to be holding forces in reserve providing the flexibility to counter a Russian change in direction.

Can Ukraine stop the advance on Pokrovsk?  I do not know, only time will tell.  History has plenty of examples of defending forces holding off much larger enemy forces. A 4-1 ratio in manpower is not a guarantee of victory. And, recent reports do not indicate a Ukrainian collapse so, it seems most likely that there will be a steady fall back to a defensive line based on the villages of Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove.  A line at which this battle will be decided, whether Russia can force a breakthrough before the autumn rains start; or can turn the defender’s flank by manoeuvre. Or Ukraine may hold the Russians, inflicting a significant defeat.

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack