BEN MORGAN: Russia trades ground for time, retaining its focus on Donetsk

Roughly two weeks since Ukrainian troops crossed the border, Russia appears to be trading ground in Kursk for time in Donetsk. Ukraine achieved surprise and significant advances into Russia but now rather than rushing reserve units from Donetsk to Kursk, they appear to be maintaining their focus on Pokrovsk. 

Is Ukraine’s operational-level manoeuvre working?  

The invasion of Kursk is an operational-level manoeuvre. An attack designed to influence events in Donetsk, 360km to the south-east. Looking at events, Ukraine is clearly winning the information battle. The attack on Kursk re-invigorating supporters and demonstrating Ukrainian military capability.  Further, the operation is certain to be impacting psychologically and politically on Putin.  However, I am cautious about overestimating this impact because Putin has already suffered an embarrassing and significant setback, Prigozhin’s mutiny and march on Moscow. The precedent seems to be that providing he can organise an effective response it is unlikely this operation will undermine him enough politically to either remove him from power, or force ceasefire negotiations. Instead, like Prigozhin’s mutiny this operation may strengthen his hold on power.  A display of calm, stoic and effective leadership under pressure encouraging his supporters in Russia to close ranks around him.

It is likely that the offensive’s main object is drawing Russian reserves away from the current focus of the land campaign, Russia’s advance on Pokrovsk. On Thursday, CNN reported that National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby had said “It is apparent to us that Mr. Putin and the Russian military are diverting some resources, some units, towards the Kursk Oblast to ostensibly counter what the Ukrainians are doing.” The reports estimated several thousand troops have been diverted from Donetsk to Kursk, probably fewer than Ukraine needs for operational-level success. 

Since, the attack on Kursk started, Russia has managed to maintain a continuous, incremental advance on Pokrovsk and on 18 August was engaging the Ukrainian defence line that runs roughly through the towns of Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove, where ground and urban areas combine to strengthen the defensive line.  

This is not necessarily a sign of failure because it was always unlikely that the Kursk offensive would significantly slow down this advance.  Russia is not going to remove troops from Donetsk that are already committed to the battle for Pokrovsk.  Instead, Ukraine’s attack is aiming to draw away troops in Russia’s second echelon, the reserves that are held further back ready to exploit the situation if the defensive line breaks.  

And, this is the key point upon which the success of the Kursk operation needs to be judged. Not on how much ground is taken, or news agency reports praising Ukrainian manoeuvre but rather on whether Ukraine can stop Russia from exploiting a collapse of their line in Donetsk.  In the next few weeks, we will find out and the indicators to watch for are:

• If Russia crosses the line demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka and Selydove.

 

• The speed of Russia’s advance from any breakthrough on that line, east to Pokrovsk. 

 

• Can Russia take Pokrovsk? 

Ukraine’s autumn starts in September and runs into November, it is notable for heavy rain that makes the ground muddy and impassable, limiting off-road movement. The effect of this weather on Russia’s campaign is to make large-scale movements like exploiting a breakthrough or a collapse of the defensive line much harder.  If Russia has not broken through before the rain it will have to wait, and that period can be used by Ukraine to reinforce their lines in Donetsk. 

If Ukraine’s operation in Kursk strips away reserves from Russia’s force in Donetsk so that a breakthrough cannot be exploited, it wins the operational-level battle.  However, if Russia maintains its focus on Donetsk and does not redeploy its reserves it may breakthrough and the win a victory in Donetsk regardless of Ukraine’s offensive.  

The current situation in Kursk

After two weeks of rapid advances, Ukraine’s forces are slowing down and appear to be expanding the base of the salient, seeking to create a defensible perimeter.  On 15 August, Ukraine announced it has captured the border town of Sudzha. Although Sudzha’s population is only about 7,000 people it sits opposite Sumy on the Russian side of the border, and on the main road east to Kursk.  Russian soldiers continue to surrender in large numbers and resistance is piecemeal and poorly coordinated.  Additionally, Ukraine has broken another of Putin’s ‘red lines’ by crossing the border and the lack of an escalatory response will empower international supporters to release more aid. 

President Zelensky has stated, on Telegram that Ukraine is preparing to hold ground. The president also praised Ukraine’s soldiers and their leader, General Syrskyi. The statement followed Ukrainian strikes that destroyed two bridges in Glushkovo district on 16 August. One of the bridges crosses the large, Syem River and this attack on a piece of useful logistics infrastructure could indicate Ukraine is preparing to hold ground. 

Russia’s response, trading time for ground

Russia’s response may seem slow and somewhat piece meal but we must be careful not to misinterpret their intent. Russia’s slow reaction may result from poor leadership or lack of resources but we must also consider another more dangerous reason for the situation, and my assessment is that Russia is trading time for ground. The area Ukraine is operating in is sparsely populated and the city of Kursk is still 60-70 km away from Ukrainian forces.  Russia can feed second-tier units into the battle slowing Ukraine’s advance, build defences in depth and maintain resources at the point of main effort for the overall campaign, Pokrovsk.  

Russia is already starting a process of circumvallation, building trenches and physical structures to contain the offensive. Trenches and minefields allow the defensive perimeter to be held by a smaller force of lower quality soldiers, and provide a secure base from which future offensive operations can be prepared.  Providing there is sufficient time and space to build earthworks this is an economic defensive tactic.  

Another observation of the battle in Kursk is the relative ineffectiveness of Russian airpower, early in the offensive my assessment was that Russia’s air force would soon be in action, bombing the attackers mercilessly.  This has not happened, indicating that either Ukraine has managed to provide air denial over its lodgement, or that Russia is not prioritising airpower’s use to help defeat the attack. 

Many previous generations of Russian commanders have traded ground for time, using this strategy to beat better tacticians. Napolean’s Grand Armee and the Wehrmacht both succumbing to it. This means Ukraine’s key issue how to defeat Russia’s strategy. The best way to achieve this goal is by creating sufficient threat in Kursk that Putin and his generals are forced to reduce the strength of their reserves in Donetsk. Unfortunately, at this stage, we cannot say whether this threat is sufficient to draw sufficient Russian reserves away from Donetsk, or if Ukraine needs to advance further and threaten a target like the Kursk nuclear power station or advance far enough that its artillery is in range of Kursk city. 

Logistics, Ukraine’s key consideration

At this stage logistics is probably Ukraine’s key consideration because to guarantee the withdrawal of Russian reserves from Donetsk, they need to ensure that there is a credible threat that compels redeployment of resources to Kursk.  The Ukrainian force’s threat is based on its ability to manoeuvre, the potential to advance towards Kursk for instance.  Manoeuvre describes the application of fire and movement together to achieve a result on the battlefield. It is enabled by the logisticians who make sure fuel, ammunition and other supplies are at the right place, at the right time so vehicles can move and guns can shoot. 

Currently, Ukraine has a logistics problem because the distance from Sumy to the forward edge of battle is reported to be 60-70 km.  A distance that does not seem great in the civilian world, perhaps an hour’s drive on good roads.  But in an operational environment subjected to artillery fire and direct attack, using damaged roads it is a long way. 

Ukraine’s force is reported to be three to four brigades strong, each brigade having two or three battalions.  FM 100 – 2-3, an old US field manual that provides information about Soviet Army organisations estimates that a mechanised battalion with about 100 armoured vehicles requires roughly 25 trucks to carry the extra ammunition, fuel, spare parts and the other goods required for day-to-day operations.  The battalion plans to replenish roughly every 24 hours and can probably extend operations for 72 hours with external resupply. 

Sitting behind each battalion are support units with hundreds more trucks bringing forwards ammunition, fuel, spare parts and moving casualties backwards for treatment.  Additionally, the artillery supporting the operation will have its own logistics train.  Probably, there are hundreds of trucks allocated to just bringing artillery ammunition forward.  A carefully synchronised web of vehicle movements that are making sure soldiers on the frontline get the ‘stuff’ they need to keep fighting.  This web of moving vehicles needs to be protected from enemy aircraft, drones, artillery and direct fire. 

This is a complex situation that gets harder every time the frontline advances. So, Ukrainian staff officers will currently be furiously trying to work out exactly how far they extend their salient into Russia, balancing the risk of losses against the need to create enough of a threat to ensure that Russia moves reserves from Donetsk to Kursk. 

Summary

Currently, the campaign is at a very significant point, Ukraine’s offensive has achieved surprise and caught Russia off guard. The attack’s intent is to draw Russian resources away from the fighting near Pokrovsk. At this stage, it is impossible to say whether this objective has been achieved because it appears that Russia is trading ground for time, responding slowly to the Kursk attack and concentrating instead on its main effort, taking Pokrovsk.  

If this proves to be true Ukraine’s offensive may not achieve its objective and Russia may be successful in Donetsk, capturing Pokrovsk or breaking through the line close by. Unfortunately, it will take time to find out the actual situation.

But my guess is that Ukrainian planners have considered this contingency and in the next few days and weeks we will see; either Russia’s advance slow down in Donetsk, or more activity in Kursk that forces the redeployment of Russian reserves.  

 

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack