BEN MORGAN: Pokrovsk, it looks like General Syrskyi has bad news for Russia

The advance on Pokrovsk continues, and in recent days Ukraine has sent reserves into the area, stopping Russian progress.  This small town is fast becoming the decisive point in this year’s campaign. Its loss does not guarantee Russia victory, but would make Ukraine’s defence of Donetsk much harder. However, Ukraine may have bigger plans that are bad news for Russia, and the question now is which side will have the strength to finish the job. Will Russia have the numbers and momentum to break the line and take Pokrovsk?  Or will Ukraine hold them until the autumn rain makes movement impossible? Or does Ukraine have the reserves available to counter-attack Russia’s salient?  

Questions that will be answered soon because Ukraine’s first frosts are predicted in mid-September, the first sign of autumnal weather. The frost is soon followed by rain that makes the ground boggy and travel difficult, and then winter snow.  Ukraine’s winters are harsh temperatures plummet making military operations difficult. So, the clock is ticking for both sides as they try to make the most of the last few weeks of summer to secure advantages that they can consolidate during winter. 

General Syrskyi provides an operational-level insight

This week General Syrskyi, commander of the Ukrainian armed forces was interviewed by CNN, provided some insight into the campaign.  The interview was noteworthy because he discussed operational-level planning, and how Russia is caught in a dilemma between dealing with Ukraine’s Kursk offensive and attacking Pokrovsk. The impact of which is that, at the operational-level of the campaign, Russia is now ‘fixed.’  Essentially, that Russia’s resources are all committed to either Kursk or Pokrovsk, and there is no ‘bandwidth’ for new operations. 

In my opinion the general is correct, and evidence for this position includes Russian activity slowing down across the frontline as reserve troops are pulled away to reinforce either Kursk or Pokrovsk.  We are also seeing better units appearing near Kursk. The Institute for the Study of War reported on 6 September that elements of elite units from garrisons in the south like the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment are believed to be in Kursk. Likewise, Deep State’s map shows strong units like 56th VDV Regiment, 155th Separate Marine Brigade and 11th Air Assault Brigade in the area.  Evidence that rather than forming reserves in the south, experienced units are being drawn north, into the fight for Kursk.

Russia is building new defensive lines to block a Ukrainian advance towards the region’s capital.  It is noteworthy that the lines are a considerable distance from current Ukrainian positions, roughly 40kms.  Well behind where the units listed above are operating and this indicates that Russian commanders expect further advances, and probably do not have reserves available for immediate counter attacks. So, instead they plan a slow withdrawal, trading ground for time, as they move to the new trench lines. Evidence that Russia does not have enough resource available to mount large counter attacks in Kursk. 

Considering General Syrskyi’s words and this evidence, there must be an intent behind ‘fixing’ Russia at the operational-level.  So, what next?  Essentially, there are two options when an enemy is ‘fixed’ they can either;

• Be held in place and destroyed; or 

 

• New avenues for manoeuvre can be opened. 

In my opinion, the first option is the most likely because Ukraine has less total combat power. So, Ukraine is most likely to want to economically inflict attrition on Russia. Perhaps as a prelude to later manoeuvre. Further, winter is coming and the weather will slow down movement, meaning there is a limited time for either side to manoeuvre. 

The Ukrainian Centre for Strategic Studies stated this week that: “The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk will be the climax of the enemy’s offensive operation in the southwestern theater of operations in 2024.”  I agree with this statement but think this battle is also the culmination of Ukraine’s operational-level plan.  Essentially, the Kursk offensive is drawing away the reserves Russia needs to take Pokrovsk.  Worse, without reserves Russia cannot withdraw, remember any withdrawal needs to be covered by spoiling attacks that allow the retreating force to break contact. 

The Russian soldiers fighting at Pokrovsk are isolated, 35km from the nearest rail head. At the end of a salient, their supply lines subject to constant drone, missile and artillery attack.  And this is the crux of the situation developing at Pokrovsk because without reserves Russia cannot advance or go backwards. Instead, the attacking force is stuck, or ‘fixed’ at the end of the salient ready to be reduced by indirect fire (bombs, missiles, artillery and drones) and counter-attacks.   

 

Pokrovsk, the current situation

This week Russia initially attacked east trying to break through Ukraine’s defensive line near Novohrodivka (circled in red on the map below). Early in the week, there were reports that Ukraine evacuated Novohrodivka, and soon after Ukraine deployed reserve brigades into the battle. Securing the frontline, that has not moved since 2 September. 

Russia responded by attacking south towards Selydove, gaining ground.  An immediate Ukrainian counter attack drove the Russian attack back and Ukraine recaptured some of the ground taken.  This indicates Russia’s advance west is stalling and that Ukraine’s deployment of the Kara-Dag National Guard Brigade, 12th Azov Brigade and 93rd Mechanized Brigade well-supported by artillery, drones and other equipment has slowed or stopped Russian progress.  

Ukraine’s battle plan this week, was to contain the advance. Russia has spent many weeks trying to push north near Vozdvyshenka, but Ukraine occupies high ground and is containing these attacks.  The Russian advance is therefore channelled south towards Novohrodivka and Selydove.  The M04 Highway becoming the rough axis of advance, and any ‘turning movement’ or attempt to outflank the Ukrainian line must be made by pushing further south. A manoeuvre that Ukraine blocked near Selydove this week, reducing Russian options to either, pushing forwards into the Ukraine’s engagement area or withdrawing. 

Talking tactics at Pokrovsk, what next? 

Ukraine’s deployment of reserves appears to have stopped Russia’s current advance and stabilised the situation by preventing an attempt to turn the defensive line’s southern flank.  However, the size of the Ukrainian deployment is not enough to win the battle using manoeuvre.  But after considering General Syrskyi’s interview the fight many not need to be won with manoeuvre. Instead, I think the defence will develop into a battle of attrition.  Ukraine containing Russian forces, then using indirect fire and small local attacks to destroy the troops in the salient.  

Looking at Pokrovsk in more detail, a clear defensive scheme is apparent, Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove provide a first line of defence anchored on geographic features like urban areas, high ground and water courses. Behind this line is the urban area created by Pokrovsk and the neighbouring town of Myrnohrad.  Together these towns provide a dense belt of urban terrain, situated on high ground that overlooks the lower, more open ground between these towns and Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove.  The open ground provides an engagement area, from which Ukraine can use direct and indirect fire to engage Russian soldiers crossing the open ground. 

Directly behind Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad is Rodynske, another small town that is well-located to provide mutual support, protecting Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad’s rear and covering potential withdrawal routes.  

The most interesting indication of Ukraine’s plan is that they appear to be channelling Russia’s advance into their engagement areas.  The only place Russia is advancing is at Novohrodivka, in the centre of the first-line of defence. If Russian forces are successful here and advance toward Pokrovsk, they are in Ukraine’s next engagement area. It is noteworthy that this is the only area Russia is making progress. 

Russia’s move towards Selydove, on the other hand was immediately counter-attacked because this town anchors defence’s southern flank. Additionally, Selydove’s position allows it to fire into the Ukrainian engagement from the east. This means that if Russian forces break the centre of the Ukrainian line near Novohrodivka, without first capturing Seldove, they will be attacked from three sides.  

Looking at the ground and recent activity my predictions are that:

• Russia will not take Pokrovsk. 

 

• Ukraine’s objective in this phase of the battle is to channel the lead Russian forces into a well-planned attritional battle. Ukraine using indirect fire (bombs, missiles, artillery and drones) to destroy Russian forces concentrating at the tip of the salient.  Russian supply lines will also be targeted and when the Russians are weak enough Ukraine will start counter-attacking to win back ground. 

 

• The battle will either be fought in current locations or if Russian troops have enough momentum to push through near Novohrodivka, closer to Pokrovsk. Where they will be channelled into well-planned engagement areas subject to both indirect and direct fire. Russian planners will be assessing their options are realising the danger of entering Ukraine’s engagement areas. 

 

• The most likely course of action is that Russia will try to turn the flank, so expect to see more Russian activity near Selydove. And, more Ukrainian counter-attacks because a failure at Selydove opens an opportunity for Russia to arc south-west and avoid the well-planned fire in Ukraine’s engagement areas as they envelop Pokrovsk. 

Summary

Last week, I said keep watching Pokrovsk, and the battle here is developing into the summer’s key battle. Ukraine’s advance into Kursk is important because it helps shape this battle, but it is not a battle that will seriously attrit Russian combat power.  Pokrovsk is a such a battle. In Soviet tactics, defence was seen as phase of war designed to attrit the enemy.  Destroying their resources to make future manoeuvre possible, this battle appears to be a set piece designed to do just that to Russia.  

A historical example of a similar tactic is the battle of Stalingrad. The Soviets defended the city relentlessly, reducing the combat power of the German attackers, before launching a massive counter offensive.  The city’s defence was used to grind down Germany’s forces and weaken them so that when the Soviets were ready to manoeuvre, they faced a weak opponent. 

At this stage, Ukraine looks like it plans to do the same, to let the Russians be ‘fixed’ at Pokrovsk and then wear down their forces.  A plan that if executed effectively, could significantly change the nature of next year’s campaign.  Russia’s equipment and pool of volunteers are rapidly running out.  So, keep watching Pokrovsk because this battle may have bigger consequences than expected.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack