BEN MORGAN: Donetsk – Strategic, operational and tactical-level goals intersect

At this point in the war, both sides strategic, operational and tactical-level goals are intersecting in the last 20% of Donetsk still held by Ukraine. A small area of land, that Russia is trying desperately to capture because of its military value but that at the same time holds strategic value. If Russia can capture the remainder of Donetsk, or threatens to do so, or can win it by negotiation there will significant implications for Ukraine.

In Alaska, Putin re-iterated that the “root causes” of the war remain extant, and that Russia is unwilling to ceasefire until they are dealt with, specifically, that Ukraine is disarmed and cannot join NATO. Putin’s position is that until these conditions are met the two sides cannot start discussing land exchanges and ceasefires.

If the “root causes” are addressed, Russia’s proposed land exchanges are detrimental to Ukraine, the Guardian reporting that “Putin on Friday demanded Ukraine withdraw from Donetsk and Luhansk as a condition for ending the war, but offered Trump a freeze along the remaining frontline, two sources with direct knowledge of the talks said.” Luhansk is already in Russian hands, but if the remainder of Donetsk is exchanged, Ukraine would suffer a significant military setback.

The current situation provides an example of Russo-Soviet negotiation tactics. Negotiators holding out until the last minute, on an unreasonable set of conditions, then offering a sudden concession. A pattern that we have seen before, most recently as Trump tried to set deadlines for ceasefire negotiation. Putin ignored them until there was an imminent prospect of the US taking catastrophic action. And, at that point offered a concession, the Alaska Summit. Unfortunately, that small concession appears to have eliminated the threat of crippling US sanctions, and provided time for Russia to continue prosecuting its war. A strategic win for Putin, that may translate into operational or tactical-level victories as Russia continues to fight unhindered by US sanctions.

What is the US position?

After the Alaska Summit, President Trump met with Ukraine’s President Zelensky and with European leaders on 18 August and after a week of further diplomatic activity the results of these discussions are still confused and hard to assess, but Putin’s non-negotiables have not changed.

Putin’s statement at the post-summit press conference, appears at odds with commentary from Trump and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s recollection of the discussion. On 17 August, Witkoff told CNN that at the summit it was agreed that “Article 5-like protections” would be provided for Ukraine by the US and its allies. Witkoff was alluding to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, that commits members to respond to an attack on another member.

However, speaking to Fox News on 19 August, Trump emphatically ruled out deployment of US troops to Ukraine to help secure a peace arrangement but indicated he may support using US airpower to guarantee a deal. Trump’s position appeared to be that European nations were willing to commit troops and the US may support using other US assets and capabilities.

Europe responds to the Alaska Summit

On 19 August, European leaders met and discussed strategy, speaking afterwards Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary General was bullish about the situation. Rutte stated that the “The first layer has to be for Ukrainian armed forces to be as strong as possible to defend this proud country and nation going forward.” A clear indication that European leaders are committed to ensuring that Ukraine is not disarmed, and can defend itself against Russia. Rutte also confirmed European leaders believe security guarantees were needed to provide a “second layer” of commitments securing peace in Ukraine.

My assessment is that European leaders are committed to supporting Ukraine, and that their current strategic goal is to ‘manage’ Trump so that he does not ‘walk away.’ European leaders understand that any split of defence policy as significant as the US withdrawing completely from Ukraine would be a significant issue. Therefore, European leaders are treading carefully, speaking softly and working hard to maintain Trump’s support.

Russia’s response

Meanwhile, on the Russian side of the negotiations the war continues, business-as-usual. Putin taking advantage of the reprieve offered by negotiations to further wear down Ukraine. My belief is that Putin knows his military is worn down but continues fighting because he believes that if he can convince Witkoff and Trump he is winning, he could force the US and NATO to split over Ukraine. If this happens, Putin has won a great strategic victory burnishing his international reputation amongst his allies and partners. The summit has already allowed him to portray Russia as a power equal to the US, and by setting the tempo for future negotiations he reinforces that narrative.

On 17 August, Emily Clark and Australian Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, in Washington, summed Russia’s position up eloquently describing Putin’s situation as follows, “He does not have the same goals as the other players in his game and the longer the various iterations of meetings and summits and phone calls go on, the more his military grinds Ukraine down and the more territory it occupies.”

An assessment that echoes analysis by Emily Read on the Royal United Services Institute’s blog called ‘The Alaska Summit as Theatre: Moscow’s View Beyond Ukraine.’ Read argues that Russia’s perspective of the strategic situation is very different from the US and Europe. Instead of peace, Putin’s objectives were to demonstrate to his domestic and international audiences that Russia is an equal of the US. Read writes “Barring a few disgruntled military bloggers rueful about the prospect of territorial concessions, the consensus in the Russian media is that Alaska was an unmitigated success; with Europe and Ukraine sidelined from the conversation, the leaders of Russia and the US were portrayed as calmly assessing matters of state.” A narrative that Putin will be certain to exploit later in August when he flies to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization security bloc meeting in Tianjin, China. Read’s article can be found here – https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/alaska-summit-theatre-moscows-view-beyond-ukraine

Why Donetsk is so important?

Donetsk is evolving as the land campaign’s decision-point, the axis around which success or failure in the campaign rotates. At operational-level the land campaign involves a large turning movement, in which Donetsk is the centre. Russia has persistently applied pressure on Donetsk, fighting fierce bloody battles and capturing the towns of Avdiivka and Bakhmut. Currently, Russia is trying hard but unsuccessfully to capture Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka.

In August last year, Ukraine invaded Kursk in Russia trying to draw Russian forces away from Donetsk. A manoeuvre designed to force Russian commanders to take resources away from their main effort in Donetsk. More recently, Russia has positioned forces near Sumy and attacked across the border to draw Ukrainian forces away from Donetsk. Both sides understand the importance of Donetsk, and launched attacks in Kursk and Sumy to ‘turn their opponent’s flank’ by forcing them to switch direction north towards the new attacks rather than remain committed in Donetsk.

Donetsk is important because the piece of the oblast that Russia does not control is an area where human and geographic factors intersect to create a very important piece of ground, often called – ‘The Fortress Belt.’ The Ukraine War demonstrates the importance of urban areas in modern war, the infrastructure of a cities and towns provides concealment, protection and obstacles to enemy movement that help the defenders.

Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka are all significant urban areas, full of solidly constructed Cold War-era buildings, bomb shelters and reinforced factories. Additionally, the ground around these towns and cities is conducive to the defence. The urban fortresses are located on a series of ridgelines that make them harder to attack from the east. The high ground providing observation and making any assault physically harder.

Since Russia’s 2014 invasion, Ukraine has further fortified these cities and the Fortress Belt presents a strong barrier to any advance west. Tactically, Russia’s options are relatively limited, and can be assessed as follows:

• Attack from the north, roughly via Lyman. A Russian main attack on this axis is unlikely because the ground is difficult, requiring an attacking force to capture Lyman then cross the Donets River. Russia unsuccessfully probed in this direction earlier in the war and it is unlikely they still have the bridging assets to advance in this direction.
• Advance from the east on an axis roughly between Lyman and Chasiv Yar. Another less desirable option because it involves a long advance through tough terrain, notably this axis would be difficult to support logistically. The nature of the ground means there are less roads and they tend to run perpendicular to the direction of advance.
• Try and break into the Fortress Belt from the south by advancing along the ridgelines that dominate the area. This is the option that Russia is currently investigating by attacking between Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. If either town falls it can be used as a base for an advance on Kostyantynivka, and from there into the Fortress Belt taking advantage of the ridgelines to advance more easily.

   

 

At tactical-level, breaking into and then capturing the Fortress Belt is probably Russia’s long-term objective for their Donetsk campaign. Although capturing the Fortress Belt is highly unlikely, it would be a tactical success with a significant operational-level impact because Ukraine would require more force located nearby to prevent Russia advancing west. Soldiers and equipment fixed near the areas that are then unavailable to counter attack or advance anywhere else on the frontline.

Putin knows that the best way to capture this key piece of terrain is diplomatically, which is why Donetsk features prominently in the discussions about land exchanges. If he can manipulate strategic-level negotiations to solve a tactical problem, he will.

Likewise, the Donetsk Fortress Belt’s tactical significance is also the reason that Ukraine will never concede this area in negotiations. The Fortress Belt is a key anchor point for Ukraine’s defensive line, and to exchange it for a cease fire would mean surrendering a large tactical advantage.

Conclusion

Regardless of the Alaska Summit, Russia and Ukraine are still fighting hard on the ground and in the air. Both sides increasing the tempo of their air campaigns and showing no signs of slowing down on the ground.

At this stage, it seems unlikely that peace negotiations will develop into anything more substantial. In fact, my prediction is that the land campaign will develop suddenly, relegating the Alaska Summit to insignificance.

Russian pressure on the frontline continues but without achieving any tactically significant victory. Ukraine on the other hand, has recently defeated Russia’s attack near Sumy and simultaneously defeated another penetration near Pokrovsk, operations that indicate Ukraine has reserves available and should not be considered defeated. Notably, several Russian senior officers have recently been killed or wounded in Ukraine, historically a prelude to offensive action. Summer is almost over, autumnal rain will start in a couple of months so if either side is going to launch a surprise operation it is likely to be soon.

In conclusion, it is more likely that we will see the battlefield change dramatically in the next few weeks than any advance in the diplomatic situation.

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack