BEN MORGAN: Analysing the Kursk offensive, Ukraine’s objectives and what’s next
This is an important moment in the war, Ukraine seizing the initiative with surprise and manoeuvre. Ukraine’s force is currently estimated to be about three to four brigades strong, or around 6000 t0 8000 soldiers supported by hundreds of armoured vehicles. Additionally, Ukraine’s order of battle includes experienced units like the 22nd Mechanised, 88th Mechanised, 80th Air Assault brigades, experienced and high-performing formations. It is a sizeable force and is well-equipped with modern equipment including strong air defence and engineering assets, including mine laying equipment.
Russia is having difficulty stopping Ukraine’s advance, several sources claiming 1,000 square kilometres of territory has been captured. More than Russia has taken this year. The BBC reports that Ukraine controls 74 settlements and Kursk’s governor has reported that 121,000 people have evacuated the border region. Additionally, there are credible reports that large numbers of Russian soldiers are surrendering. It seems likely that the advance will be limited by Ukraine’s resources, rather than Russia’s response. So far, Russia’s response is proving uncoordinated and ineffective.
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Ukraine’s objective, this attack is not about ground
Currently, there is plenty of commentary about the aims of the offensive, that it is targeting airfields, Kursk nuclear power plant or Kursk city. Some commentators, and Putin, state that Ukraine is aiming to capture ground to use as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.
However, I believe that capturing ground is not the objective. Instead, Ukraine’s attack is a response to the threat it faces in Donetsk. Specifically, the recent tactical flexibility demonstrated by Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces in Donetsk, the force’s tactical evolution makes the capture of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar more likely. Additionally, the improvement increases the potential for rapid exploitation of any victory, an important town’s capture used as a ‘stepping stone’ for a large advance. This is a threat Ukraine needs to mitigate by drawing Russian reserves away from Donetsk.
Ukraine’s attack is a ‘shaping’ operation designed to reduce the combat power of Russia’s reserve echelons, reducing the chance of them exploiting tactical success. Rather than trying to take ground, Ukraine is aiming to create enough threat and uncertainty that Russian reserves are moved from Ukraine to the border oblasts. Additionally, the attack demonstrates that Ukraine has planned for this contingency, and prepared a force to execute the operation. Achieving surprise is not easy, and the fact that Ukraine did demonstrates the amount of planning and preparation.
Operational manoeuvre?
General Mick Ryan recently wrote an interesting article relating Ukraine’s attack to Soviet doctrine, noting the similarities between Ukraine’s force, its operation and the Soviet ‘Operational Manoeuvre Group’ (OMG). The OMG was a combined arms task force constituted for operations deep behind the enemy’s frontline. In the Soviet context, it was much larger, a multi-division grouping that had true operational-level impact. The OMG was designed to be a force powerful enough to advance deep behind enemy lines and influence a campaign. Despite the size difference, the OMG is a useful doctrinal model through which to interpret Ukraine’s operation.
A deep, diversionary attack into an enemy’s rear areas was a doctrinal role for an OMG. A large, balanced force able to operate in depth is very difficult to counter because it can move quickly and its targets are unknown. The OMG’s size and combined arms allowing it considerable freedom of movement. Like Ukraine’s force, OMGs always included engineers allowing it to cross rivers or difficult terrain, or to ‘dig in;’ and fight if required. The Soviet OMG’s size meant that it required a large commitment to defeat.
Ukraine’s force may not be the size of the Soviet OMG but its structure and role are close enough for comparison and consideration. And, it could be argued that this attack is an example of operational level manoeuvre. Its most important impact is not in Kursk but in how it shapes the battle for Donetsk 360 km to its south-east.
Ukraine has appreciated that Russia’s long and poorly defended border provides opportunity for manoeuvre. Challenging Russian assumptions that Ukraine’s supporters would not allow large-scale cross border operations, probably believing Putin’s nuclear threats scare Ukraine’s supporters. An assumption Ukraine gently tested in 2023, by supporting anti-Putin Russian partizans to attack across the border. Now, that Ukraine needs to manoeuvre it is taking advantage of this risky Russian assumption.
Here is a link to General Ryan’s article –
Futura DoctrinaDo not overestimate the political or propaganda success of the attack
Plenty of commentary is currently emphasising the political damage this attack is doing to Putin’s regime. I think this attack is certainly an embarrassing failure of Russia’s military but do not think it will have a strategic political impact. Putin has already ‘seen off’ Prigozhin’s mutiny and march on Moscow. Ukraine crossing the border is nowhere near as embarrassing and does not have the political potential of Prigozhin’s activity. In fact, it may strengthen Putin’s position as people’s support coalesces around the nation’s leader.
Additionally, although Ukraine is currently getting plenty of good press in mainstream media and demonstrating that it is still ‘in the fight’ the situation is still risky. Russia will eventually mobilise the resources to push Ukraine out, and is sure to throw everything at that objective. It seems unlikely that the operation was conceived to support information operations or is designed to deliver a propaganda victory, especially since there is a pressing military problem that it contributes to solving.
What to expect, Russian failure may create bigger opportunities
My assessment is that this operation will extend into months, at least until the autumn rains start and a rapid exploitation of the situation in Donetsk is less likely. However, there is an important factor that needs to be considered that could extend the time frame. Russia’s command and control of the response appears to be failing, the political decision to place the operation under FSB command complicating the military response. The Institute for the Study of War reported on 12 August that “Putin delegated overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia in the Ukrainian-Russian border area.” Evidence of this dysfunction is provided by the slow response and reports of Russian forces arriving piecemeal and being defeated.
Looking at Russia’s command performance to-date, this situation is likely to take a long time to address, so Ukraine has a ‘window of opportunity’ that it can exploit. Probably Ukraine’s military staff is coming to terms with the fact that Russia’s command paralysis means that their diversion could safely be extended into a longer operation, perhaps holding ground over the winter. My guess is that right now there are Ukrainian staff officers furiously looking for defensible lines and at the logistics of supporting a defensive battle to hold ground.
This would be a big ask though, and it is more likely that Ukraine will hold its positions in Kursk only long enough to shape the battle in Donetsk, then withdraw. Retaining sufficient force to ensure Russia needs keep stronger forces on the border, troops that will not be able to be used in Ukraine. And, that is likely to be the cold, calculus being analysed in Ukraine. Whether it is better to take advantage of Russia’s weakness to seize and hold ground, accepting more casualties. Or, if is better to limit casualties, retain combat power and withdraw. A tough question.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
Couple of points
1– Even if Ukraine withdraws their troops and material, it will force Russia to step up their border security over the full length of their border. Drawing resources it clearly has a shortage off or takes away from their Western Front (already only crawling forward at snails pace).
2– Interesting to see the captured Russian troops consists mainly of elderly volunteers (as in the photo) or very young conscripts. No many “fighting age” men defending the border. Lack of suitable manpower?
3– Ukraine will withdraw to leave an large and costly mess to clean up, but more importantly a very unsettled populace. Any Russian counter attack using mainly artillery will add to the devastation and rebuild cost.
4– The withdraw battle group (OMG) will be free to strike any border area (including Belarusia) in the future (after a regroup) and reinforces point 1. Russia cannot ignore a OMG roaming on their border region and need to deploy better troops and material to prevent future incursions. The populace living in the border regions will not feel comfortable.
5– Ukraine has troop rotation in place meaning the group is larger than envisaged by many with reserves at least the same size as the front line troops. Rotation is 48 or 72 hours.
6– Ukraine is digging defensive trenches to hinder any Russian counter offense.
7– Russia may be forced to depopulate and militarize their border regions with unmanned static defensive lines consisting mines, barbed wire and anti tank objects. Trenches ready to be occupied by border troops, even if they rotate between potential “hot spots”.
8– Kursk refugees are now offered resettlement in Russian occupied Ukraine. How safe will the refugees feel? Motherland cannot defend our homes or territory and now want us to resettle in a region that may well not be Russia in the future? Would go down like a lead balloon I would imagine.
Good comments Gerrit. Sounds like you spent some ‘op die grens’ 😉
In addition to what you said, I wouldn’t be shocked if Ukraine subsequently hit the Russians in Donetsk, now that their ranks have been thinned somewhat.
So Ben gives the Pentagon PR version. Manoeuvre warfare what what old chum. Run around some sparsely populated are shooting at locals to get a response. Like an Afrikaaner cavalry raid from the Boer war designed to draw off forces from real fronts.
So did it achieve anything other than PR? BIG PR WIN ABOUT TO BECOME MAJOR REALITY CHECK.
Did it draw off forces or relieve pressure elsewhere? FAIL, RUSSIA STILL ATTACKING.
Did it capture Kursk nuclear plant as bargaining chip or anything else worthwhile? FAIL. RUSSIA ARE MORE DETERMINED NOT TO BARGAIN.
Was the cost worth it? UKRAINES BEST UNITS AND LAST RESERVES OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT ARE BEING DESTROYED.
Hope it gave all you acolytes of Kievs cocaine addled comedian a jolly, I’m sure you think that the casualties are fine whilst they don’t include our Western people.
Nick J
1– Ukraine does not need to take the power station. Already Russia is closing down reactors (yes they claim it was scheduled for one reactor to be “retired” after 45 years service. Simply cut the surrounding electricity transmission infrastructure and they will have to stop generating.
2– Putin has nothing to bargain with. Sure some occupied provinces, that is all. His 2nd best army in the world is now the second best in Ukraine (only able to advance by a few metres at a time) and now the second best army in Russia. They no longer have the “killer blow” ability (if they ever had – for they should easily have taken Kiev in the first week some two and half years ago).
3– Last man and material reserves? Judging by the calibre off Ukrainian troops versus Russian old man volunteers and juvenile conscripts. I don’t think you can call those shots. The fact that Ukraine is rotating troops requires that a huge deal of planning has taken place.
4– Ukraine is digging trenches way beyond the breached second Russian defense line. Takes a lot of manpower and shells to dislodged dug in troops.
5– You underestimate the morale effect on the Russian people. State media in Russia is downplaying this but the discontent ripples flow irrespective. Hence they want to transport the refugees to occupied territories instead of having them in Moscow.
6– No jollies here, just observing facts. You must really hate the West, to make the West’s enemy your friend. What is that saying; My enemy’s enemy is my friend.
7– Wont be long before Russia runs out of Generals and HQ staff. Another one bites the dust and replaced by the chief of Putins personal guard.
In your dreams Gerrit, wrong on every point.
Where are you getting your information from? Your assumptions sound like fever dream delusions that only neocons in the American State Department would entertain.
Major General Apty Alaudinov, commander of the Akhmat Special Forces:
We received very interesting materials – the whole account of the operation itself, which was being prepared, by what forces, what was planned. Well, what can I say to Zel, who is overdue? On the 11th they should have taken the Kurchatov nuclear power plant. Today is the 14th. Your 11600 or 11900 men and the number of tanks that were involved did not fulfill the task. And you’re sitting there with Syrsky, listening to that turkey. The task was not accomplished. But all the resources that you more or less still had on the move, you threw them into the furnace, from where they will not come out. Most of the equipment has already been destroyed from what was thrown in our direction.
I would like to say to everyone watching me: friends, this blitzkrieg of Zelensky, which was planned with the seizure of the nuclear power plant in Kurchatov and coming to negotiations with an ultimatum that we should leave somewhere and do something, has failed. Next we will systematically destroy every fascist who got into our territory.
We have already got our teeth in and we are unlikely to let the enemy go until we rip out his ankles. Our teeth are tough, strong. Russia is a country that God loves. This is not Urina. So I’m sorry. That’s why since morning the guys have been pounding the enemy, tearing up a lot of the enemy.
To be honest, I’ve been thinking all these days – I knew that the fighting would have to end in 2024 in the fall. But I had no understanding of what would cause these all forces to somehow surrender, I couldn’t figure it out. Now I already have a clear understanding. God has done everything for these people to have their heads blown off, they all gathered together and rushed here so that we could destroy them and thus end this war.
Nothing says winning more than a Ukie wearing a Nazi helmet tormenting an elderly Russian calling him “Ivan” as evidenced by the newest clip of the brave freedom loving Ukrainians which went down like a bucket of sick in Russia, congratulations Moscow has just had 23k new people sign up.
The video/incident fingrinn is referring to is at this link … https://www.bitchute.com/video/4Z38uB2HczUg —
–“The 74-year-old grandfather from the mocking Ukrainian video has gone missing. He has not been seen for 10 days. According to the source, the video was shot on August 11 in the village of Zaoleshenka. The pensioner is a local resident Alexander Gusarov, who was looking for our [Russian] military, but got lost and came across two AFU soldiers. Gusarov’s family has been searching for him for nine days, but there are no traces.”
…. This is/should be pretty shocking, and no doubt our grandfathers will be spinning in their graves, especially if they fought against the Nazi’s in WWII ….
…. But 80 odd years after victory over the original Nazis it should come as no surprise that supporters of Israel/Zionism by and large support the neo (new) Nazis … Then, ‘How Zionists collaborated with the Nazis
… and now https://youtu.be/sMd0p24995s?list=TLPQMTUwODIwMjQBKqgqVPwG-A&t=327
What about NATO though ? …. https://mronline.org/2024/06/05/the-three-great-myths-of-nato/ ,,, “The myth of democracy and the rule of law” ,,,,, “The USA concluded bilateral security agreements with the fascist dictator of Spain, Francisco Franco, and the fascist dictatorship of Portugal is a founding member of NATO. While the secret police of the dictator António de Oliveira Salazar tortured opposition members to death and set up concentration camps in the Portuguese colonies, the USA included Portugal in the community of democrats.” ,,, “NATO is not about democracy and the rule of law, but solely about geopolitical allegiance to the USA.”
I have to disagree with you Ben over the political impact of the Kursk incursion. Now the complacent Russians who support the war are forced to confront reality. This will create ructions in Russian society and create a push against Putin in the Kremlin. If Putin is removed, recently freed historian Kara-Murza believes his successors will sue for peace.
Also don’t neglect the ability of Ukrainian forces to hit the numerous airfields located around Kursk.
If it is true that Ukraine is using this operation as a bargaining chip, then they will need to stay for quite a while. Effectively occupy the area seized.
How will Ukraine use this operation as a bargaining chip? Presumably to regain at least some of the area that Russian occupies in Ukraine. Or to ensure that Ukraine is not neutered state, that is, Ukraine is free to join NATO as the ultimate guarantor of its security. Or both.
Could the deal mean that Ukraine recovers Mariupol? That is big stretch. Ukraine would need to gain a lot more territory in Russia to achieve that level of trade-off
Wayne, it would help if Russia was prepared to bargain. From what senior Russians are saying there is nothing to bargain for with Ukraine. Russian public opinion has hardened against the West. This will drag on until Ukraine collapses or it’s people remove the comedian.
How do you know what Russian public opinion is? You haven’t a bloody clue NJ! What was that about the Kursk incursion being stopped?
Interesting to see the scope & scale of the hastily-constructed Russian defense lines around the Kursk salient.
The Shoigu Line?
I like it HF. The Shoigu Line!
It’s easy to take a large area when the defenders are unprepared and complacent, eg ISIS in Iraq or japan in ww2, holding it is a different story. This is either a bold move or a desperate move, time will tell.
“This is either a bold move or a desperate move, time will tell.”
Probably both, and I would add foolish.
Ukraine’s strategic advance marks a critical turning point in the war, with significant territorial gains and a strong, well-equipped force, while Russia struggles to mount an effective response.