Analysing Ukraine: The fight for Pokrovsk continues, what next?

Last week US, Russian, and Ukrainian envoys met in Dubai trying to negotiate a cease fire deal. Before the meeting, President Trump announced that Putin had agreed to suspend Russian attacks on Ukraine’s power grid for a week. Unfortunately, Russia did not confirm his statement and Ukraine’s power grid and people have recently suffered some of the worst aerial bombardments of the war. 

Regardless of the peace negotiations, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s visit to Kyiv, Russia continues to bomb Ukraine.  On 3 February, Russia launched approx. 400 drones and 70 missiles into Ukraine. The attack included advanced ballistic and cruise missiles, and targeted power infra-structure.  The bombardment demonstrates Russian resolve and aims to influence cease fire discussions, and terrorise Ukraine’s people. 

Meanwhile, Putin continues his assault on Pokrovsk, and the end appears to be approaching. Recently, fog has obscured the battlefield allowing Russian troops to advance and Ukraine’s position is becoming increasingly tenuous.   Now the operational-level question is – What next? 

The situation in Pokrovsk

Ukraine’s operational-level objective is to encourage Russia to fight costly offensive battles, and destroy as much enemy combat power as possible. At Pokrovsk, Ukraine is succeeding at trading time and ground in exchange for destruction of Russian forces. It is a simple and effective strategy providing Russia continues to commit its forces to attacks on Ukraine’s defensive positions. 

Around the towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad the battle continues to progress as predicted. Russia’s two ‘Combined Arms Armies’ (CAA) continue to attack in their areas of responsibility. The 2nd CAA advancing from the south focussed on Pokrovsk, and the 51st CAA advancing from the north towards Myrnohrad. 

The nature of their attacks is constrained by the ground; open country is suicidal to cross because of the strength of Ukraine’s drone-based ‘kill web.’  Instead, soldiers from both CAAs stick to areas that provide concealment like re-entrants, shelter belts and urban areas.  The Russian envelopment of Pokrovsk is a good example of how drones have re-shaped ground warfare. Open ground used to be favoured for offensive action because it allowed for rapid movement in armoured vehicles, an attacking force could manoeuvre quickly and strike the defender where they were weakest.  Today’s manoeuvre is incremental, slow and hidden in complex terrain.  The map below shows how Russia’s soldiers use complex terrain to conceal their movement, and avoid open ground. 

And although the rate of advance is painfully slow, Russia continues to capture ground. Its forces slowly enveloping the remaining Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk. Ukrainian positions in the town are anchored on an urban area of roughly 3-4 square kilometres; a section of ground that is large enough to mean it will still take days or weeks more for Russia to completely capture the town. 

Meanwhile, 10km to the east at Myrnohrad Russian forces are making less progress.  The lack of progress is probably because Myrnohrad’s local area has more open ground and less re-entrants, treelines and other concealment that allow Russian forces to manoeuvre. Notably, the defenders still occupy the high ground near Svitle that provides them with observation over the local area. See the blue star on the map. In my opinion, capturing this position is a prerequisite for the encirclement of Myrnohrad.

In summary, Pokrovsk appears to be Russia’s focus probably because of a combination of the favourable ground, and the town’s political importance. Since, Russia’s advance remains painfully slow, and Ukraine’s determination to maintain its defence is high, it is likely that fighting in this area is far from over and that even if the Russians occupy the remainder of Pokrovsk, they must still fight their way into Myrnohrad.

What next? 

Pokrovsk is likely to fall eventually, and Russia’s plan for operations after capturing the town is likely to be turning north, and advancing towards the ‘Fortress Belt.’  The attack is most likely to focus on Kostyantynivka, the smallest urban area at the southern end of the Fortress Belt. 

Already, there may be indications that Russia is re-focussing in this direction. On 4 February the Institute for the Study of War reported that “Russian forces are intensifying their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, setting conditions for a future offensive operations against Kostyantynivka using lessons learned from Pokrovsk.”  Then on 6 February that “Russian forces have been setting conditions for future offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City directions yet have been struggling to make significant advances in the area.” 

Russia’s current focus is using glide bombs and drones to attack Ukrainian supply lines in these areas, aiming to isolate the frontline before it attacks.  The aim is to ‘shape’ the battle by slowly battering Ukraine’s logistics network and isolating frontline units from their support in preparation for a ground attack.   

Lessons from the battle

Previously, I have said that the battle for Pokrovsk provides observers with ‘front row seats’ from which to observe the evolution of tactics and in this post, we will discuss some recent lessons. 

Penguin suits

A feature of the emerging battlefield is ‘transparency’ because soldiers now operate under constant surveillance, including multi-spectrum observation.  Instead of just visual observation the modern soldier now contends with the proliferation of infrared cameras that ‘see’ heat, and are carried by soldiers, used in vehicles and mounted on drones.

Concealing movement from these devices is difficult and both sides are racing to find solutions. In October 2025, the Royal United Services Institute’s (RUSI) report ‘Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine’ reported that to counter widespread Ukrainian surveillance with thermal imagers “Russian soldiers usually infiltrate in groups of two to five Russian personnel, using thermal sheeting or tents that they hold away from their bodies with handles. The soldiers hang a radio around their necks and a torch between their legs to see their feet. The command post directs them, tracking their movement by UAV, to guide them to the position where they are expected to nest.”

A tent provides a ‘thermal break’ between a soldier’s body and the wall of the tent. So long as a soldier’s body does not touch the fabric directly, the thermal break negates an infrared camera’s ability to ‘see’ the soldier’s body heat.  Another example of a similar technique is using ‘Glad Wrap’ to cover observation slits in bunkers. The thin layer of plastic allows soldiers to see out but provides a thermal break allowing a soldier to look out of the bunker without giving themselves away. 

In recent weeks photographs emerged of the next step in the evolution of equipment to beat infrared observation. Russian soldiers were photographed in special cloaks designed to hide their movement. The outfits were christened ‘penguin suits’ because of the resemblance to the Antarctic birds. Penguin suits are obviously easier to move in and more adaptable than walking around in tents. The outfits are an example of how both sides are adapting to the current battlefield. 

Porcupine tanks

Tanks still combine movement, protection and firepower in a unique and powerful manner making them extremely useful.  However, the threat of drone attack currently keeps them back from the frontline, using their accurate, long-range guns to snipe at targets.  Meanwhile, both sides are experimenting with new ways to protect tanks and bring their fighting power back onto the frontline. 

The first experiment was the ‘Turtle Tank’ or covering a tank in a large ‘barn’ made from lightweight metal that could stop a drone.  The key disadvantage of the layout is that the main armament has a very limited arc of fire. Turtle tanks often carry electronic jamming devices for additional protection. See the picture below.  

The Russian’s have made extensive use of turtle tanks, primarily as assault vehicles; breaching minefields, bulldozing obstacles, destroying bunkers with their main gun and even carrying FPV drones close to enemy positions under their large ‘barns.’  

Now a new type of tank is being seen on the battlefield, the ‘porcupine tank.’  A tank that is covered in ‘branches’ made from untwisted steel wires, attached to mesh panels.  The forest of spikes is designed to detonate FPV drones at a safe distance from the vehicle, or to break drone propellers. An advantage of a porcupine tank is that the turret can be traversed. Like its older brothers, porcupine tanks are also fitted with electronic jamming devices. 

The porcupine tank represents an interesting evolution of the tank and appears successful because it is being copied by the Ukrainians.  It is reminder that although the current battlefield is challenging for the tank, the tank is far from dead.

If you are interested in the development of these tanks I recommend this article at the New York Times – https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-tanks-military.html 

Space control is no longer a concept, it is a key consideration of today’s battlefield

Starlink satellite internet is the backbone of both Ukrainian and Russian digital communications networks. In turn, digital data is the ‘nervous system’ of each side’s ‘kill web’ and provides capacity to move the large amount of real-time data required by modern ‘sensor’ and their supporting ‘shooters.’ 

In February 2025, a RUSI report titled ‘Tactical  Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War’ discussed the importance of satellite data, “ Generally, each UAV orbit will maintain a satellite uplink and stream its footage to the battalion and brigade command posts, where the intelligence officer, fires officer, and the commander’s representative will assess what is observed, determine options and authorise actions to be taken in response to what is observed.”

An observation that was echoed in RUSI’s October 2025‘Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine’ that states “…widespread access to space-based communications and digital tools to process and analyse returns from dispersed electronic, acoustic and other sensors allows the enemy to see and anticipate tactical actions.”

This week Ukrainian lobbying paid off when Elon Musk announced on Monday that he would cut service to Russian Starlink terminals operating in Ukraine. The BBC reporting that “On Monday Fedorov said the Ukrainian government was also preparing to implement a white list of approved Starlink satellite terminals which could operate in Ukraine.”  Ukraine would register its Starlink terminals, and the company would ensure they are the only ones that can operate in Ukraine.  

By Thursday 5 February, the Ukraine military was reporting that its terminals were starting to follow this process so that they can be identified by Starlink. And, US ‘think tank’ the Institute for the Study of War reported that “Several Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces no longer could use terminals and voiced concerns about the effects that the loss of Starlink capabilities could have on the battlefield.” 

And, on Friday 6 February Politico reported that “Russian military bloggers, who in the past have praised Musk for his anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, complained about the mass failure of terminals for the Starlink satellite service that began on the evening on Feb. 4 on the frontline in Ukraine.”

The impact of the loss of Starlink connectivity on Russian forces is difficult to predict, but this situation provides an important lesson for all militaries preparing for future conflict. The digital networks that enable real-time information sharing and transmission of data to guided weapons are a vital element of an effective ‘kill web.’  Therefore, control of satellite networks becomes a key consideration for tactical commanders. Likewise, in a future peer-to-peer conflict commanders may face a battlefield in which both sides lose their satellite connectivity and forces must rely on older technology and tactics. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the battle for Pokrovsk continues and provides useful lessons about how tactics are evolving.  But Pokrovsk is unlikely to hold on indefinitely, and this week Russian preparations for the next battle were reported.  It is likely that if Pokrovsk falls,  Russia’s main effort will switch north towards Kostyantynivka and trying to break into the southern end of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. 

However, my estimate is that the fight for Pokrovsk still has some time to run and that capturing Myrnohrad will take even longer so it will be weeks before Russia is able to divert significant effort north.