GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Stalemate? Not yet, but Ukraine has strategic concerns.

In November last year, Ukrainian Colonel, Olen Zhdanov described the impact of the rasputitsa or ‘mud season’ on military operations for the Economist, stating that” Farm tracks leading to the front lines are churned into slippery swamps, armoured vehicles founder, soldiers slip and fall and sometimes break bones .“ Colonel Zhdanov’s quote captures the difficulties of fighting in Ukraine in the autumn, difficulties that tamed Hitlers’ panzers 80 years ago.  In this war, fighting will continue but it will slow down becoming limited actions fought by small forces, until the ground freezes in February next year.  Ukraine’s opportunity for a large-scale breakthrough is rapidly disappearing this year. 

Large military operations require huge amounts of support.  A mechanised infantry battalion of about 400 soldiers employs around 90 vehicles and most of its support vehicles are wheeled.  A brigade with three battalions and its supporting units employs several hundred vehicles, and as the rain falls each tank, armoured personnel carrier or truck’s movement will be confined to a limited number of formed roads. Essentially, both sides ability to bring supplies and ammunition forwards and take the wounded back reduces because instead of being able to drive cross country, use farm tracks or dirt roads all this activity will require road space.  Leaving only the infantry able to manoeuvre effectively at walking speed. Slipping and tripping in the mud. 

Time is running out to see a Ukrainian break through to the coast that cuts the Crimean Land Bridge before the rasputitsa. This is the set of strategically important motorways and rail lines that are the main supply route between Russia, Southern Zaporizhia and Crimea. It is shown as a yellow line on the map below.  If the Crimean Land Bridge is not cut then Russia’s hold on Crimea remains tenable and Ukraine’s ability to exert domestic political pressure on Vladimir Putin’s regime is low. The rasputitsa’s inherent slowing down of military operations means that it will be a milestone for observers of the war, keen to judge the success of Ukraine’s offensive. 

Currently people around the world are taking stock of the situation and asking:

• Is the offensive successful?
• Is Ukraine losing?
• Are we entering a period of stalemate indicating a long-drawn-out war?  

The best way to answer these questions start at the tactical and operational levels of the war. Later, we will discuss the strategic level.  Currently, Ukraine is committed to offensive operations on two axes:

1. The Orikhiv axis pushing south towards Tokmak and Melitopol. This axis is aimed at driving south to cut the Crimean Land Bridge. This is the most important axis and is likely to be Ukraine’s main effort.  
2. Advancing on Bakhmut, an offensive that is probably designed to hold Russian forces in this area, often call ‘fixing’ so they cannot be used to defend in the south. 

In the last two weeks, we have seen Ukraine’s rate of advance slow.  Some commentators believe that the offensive is reaching a culmination point; or that Ukraine’s offensive capability is exhausted and starting to lose momentum. However, closer analysis indicates that Ukraine’s frontline is well-supported and their units are being regularly rotated into; and more importantly out of combat to rest.  Further, over the last two weeks Ukraine’s weather has been rainy slowing operations down.  

Looking deeper, on the Orikhiv Axis the offensive is pushing into urban areas, Novopropivka on the west flank and Verbove on the east flank.  Any military activity in urban areas is difficult and slow. The complexity of the terrain providing hiding places, cover from fire and routes for concealed movement that assist the defenders and force the attacker to take time slowly and deliberately clearing the area. Further, operations in urban areas are very manpower intensive requiring lots of infantry soldiers to enter buildings and clear them of their defenders.  It has been confirmed that Ukrainian armour (tanks, armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles) have crossed the Surovikin Line near Verbove; and there are reports of Ukrainian attacks towards Kopani. However, the size, nature and success of these attacks has not been confirmed yet.  Overall, Ukraine’s operations on the Orikhiv axis continue with constant pressure on Verbove and Novoproppivka. See the map below. 

Likewise, on the north-east axis around Bakhmut the terrain is also difficult and complex.  The Russian defenders have withdrawn to an easily defended line anchored on the main rail line south of Bakhmut, slowing down the Ukrainian advance.  Although, Ukraine controls high ground south of the city and is inflicting casualties on the defenders it is not making large gains on the ground. As in the south there has been little movement in the last two weeks but Ukraine still holds the initiative setting the tempo of operations. And; Ukraine plans to continue fighting into the winter, the Institute for the Study of War reporting on 6 September that “Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash noted that Ukrainian forces are preparing for offensive operations throughout the autumn-winter period.” The Institute has long assessed the fighting will continue through the rasputitsa and the winter and this statement confirms Ukraine’s position.

Russia is also preparing for the fighting continued and last week the Institute for the Study of War also reported that units of 42nd Motor Rifle Division defending near Novopropivka and Verbove had successfully rotated out of the frontline and were successfully replaced. Many observers were surprised the Russians can conduct complicated tactical manoeuvres of this nature. It should not be surprising because throughout the campaign Russian units have demonstrated the ability to successfully break contact and withdraw. The real problem for Russia is whether its tactical logistics operations can support the re-constitution of withdrawn units.  Additionally, in the north-east Russia has launched more unsuccessful attacks towards Kupiansk. 

At tactical and operational level (i.e. within the land campaign) Ukraine may not be advancing right now, but it still has the initiative and appears to be far from culminating.  Instead, we are seeing consolidation and relentless pressure on Russia. Pressure that Russia is going to find harder to contain after Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu recently announced there will not be another new mobilisation.  This should be interpreted to mean – “There will be no new mobilisation until after the presidential elections in March 2024.”  Obviously, Putin’s regime does not have the political capital to mobilise more troops over the five to six months.  Meaning that Russia is betting on being able to hold on, while on the hand Ukraine knows that if it can destroy Russia’s forces in theatre it can win.  And; both sides are showing no signs of slowing down regardless of the weather.  Ukraine using its developing artillery supremacy to slowly attrit the Russian defenders. Russia digging deeper and holding on, hoping that Ukraine’s supporters will fail.  

And; that is Ukraine’s strategic problem.  Billions of dollars of aid poured into Ukraine and unfortunately this aid is seen by some as an investment. The return on which is measured in ground captured.  Already, we have seen a funding debate in the United States that includes the issue of aid to Ukraine.  The Republican dominated Congress stopping authorisation of the annual budget, specifically questioning expenditure on Ukraine. The New York Times reported on 6 October that “In the past few days, Republicans managed to strip billions in military and humanitarian assistance requested by Mr. Biden out of a stopgap spending bill to keep the government from shutting down.”   The European Union rallied in support of Ukraine this week, committing to long-term support at a meeting in Spain. However, America is by far Ukraine’s biggest donor and without the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ behind them Ukraine’s ability to maintain the fight reduces considerably.  

This is a good example of the interface between tactical battles and strategic operations.  In recent weeks, Ukraine has driven Russia’s navy out of the Black Sea, destroyed some of Russia’s best military units, broken down Russia’s Crimean air defence network and breached the Surovikin Line but without occupying large areas of land its successes are hard to demonstrate to politicians in countries supporting their war. Funding the Ukraine War is a tough position to support and will get tougher.  Rest assured that Putin’s intelligence services are already seeding conspiracy theories across social media undermining support for the war.  

A good example of this type of activity was provided by cyber security expert and military blogger Ryan McBeth who recently promoted work by Dr Caroline Bueno that traced Russia’s use of social media during the Hawaiian wildfires in August this year to encourage Americans to question their nation’s support for Ukraine. Dr Bueno’s article outlines how she tracked social media posts with the key words “Hawaii, not Ukraine” to their source; a Russian ‘bot.’  The campaign was successful with a string of commentators including Tucker Carlson using the phrase and actively questioning United States support for Ukraine. This is link to Dr Bueno’s article: https://weaponizedspaces.substack.com/p/russia-amplifies-right-wing-influence .  

Although it is unlikely that Ukraine will completely lose support because too much has already been spent and the risk of ‘giving up’ and letting Putin believe that he has won a ‘battle of wills’ is too great. Instead, it will involve slow pressure on Ukraine to seek a negotiated solution. Perhaps giving up on Luhansk, Dontesk and Crimea in exchange for peace; or worse accepting the current situation as the basis for a peace deal. It is a dangerous time for Ukraine. It cannot afford to lose support because without an uninterrupted stream of ammunition, the nation will need to risk more lives to achieve results in battle.  

In summary, Ukraine is fighting hard continuing to attrit the Russians and retains the initiative.  It sets the tempo in the land campaign and still has resources available. So, even if fighting slows down during the rasputitsa pressure will be maintained on Russian forces. Most importantly, Russia’s manpower is limited because there is not the political will to conduct a second unplanned mobilisation; at least until March next year.  Putin is gambling that his soldiers can hold until then but any failure on the Orikiv axis will see a sudden Ukrainian advance and a big change in the campaign.  

 However, the upcoming rasputitsa will become a key milestone for some people assessing the success of aid to Ukraine and without demonstrable progress on the ground arguments against funding the war can be made.  Arguments that will be exacerbated and propelled by Russia’s highly effective social media warriors.  We are witnessing a crucial point in the campaign, if Russia can convince the world that its aid is not working, then Ukraine will be pressured to end the war and make peace on negotiated terms probably losing territory.  So, it is important in nations supporting Ukraine there is informed discussion about the war and that decisions about continued support are based on careful consideration of all factors, rather than just on how far Ukraine advanced last week.  

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger