Strategically, several Ukrainian campaigns are culminating and cracks are starting to show in the Kremlin. Militarily Ukraine’s air campaign is increasing in intensity and scope. Diplomatically Ukraine has achieved a higher level of influence over the Whitehouse. Evidenced by recent US sanctions on oil companies and by President Trump’s diplomatic ‘cold shoulder’ towards Putin. Strategic success that further isolates Russia and reduces its ability to raise revenue.
Maintaining cashflow is vital for the Kremlin because Russia relies on cash benefits to recruit soldiers. If soldiers cannot be recruited with incentives, then the Kremlin would be forced to conscript soldiers to maintain the costly war. A situation that could spark civil disorder and rebellion. Ukraine’s direct attacks compromise the flow of oil, Russia’s most lucrative export, and Trump’s sanctions add another layer of pressure. The recent disappearance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is indicative of the strain Putin’s regime is under.
Meanwhile, Pokrovsk remains the centre of the land campaign. Russia is reported to have committed approx. 150,000 soldiers to the battle and its forces are closing in, but Ukraine still controls part of the town. The battle is intense, and the result remains uncertain as winter weather closes in.
Ukraine expands its air campaign
Russia continues to launch large and damaging airstrikes against Ukraine, and specifically targets the country’s energy network. However, as winter approaches Ukraine’s air campaign is evolving from focussing on oil export infrastructure, to include Russia’s power grid. This is not a tit-for-tat campaign of retribution but part of Ukraine’s strategic plan.
Oil infra-structure is relatively easy to compromise, even a small explosive charge carried by a drone can start a large fire. Aside from their value to the Russian economy, Ukraine targeted these facilities first because they are easy to locate and can be damaged by drone attacks. An important consideration when Ukraine had limited access to long-range missiles or bomber aircraft. Therefore, Ukraine spent years degrading Russia’s air defences, opening pathways for air attack when better weapons became available.
Recently, the situation changed when Ukraine’s new Flamingo missile entered service. It is inexpensive, can be mass produced and carries a large warhead. Flamingo joins other air launched cruise missiles supplied by European nations, Taurus, SCALP and Storm Shadow. All weapons that can damage more substantial infrastructure, like Russia’s power grid.
On 13 November, Diane Francis a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council spoke to Times Radio and described how Ukraine uncovered weaknesses in Russia’s power grid.[i] Essentially, the Russian grid is interconnected and lacks resilience. For instance, shutting down the power grid in parts of Moscow created rail issues across Russia. Francis also observes that while Ukraine has the technical ability to repair its power grid, Russia struggles to maintain their network.
Now that Ukraine has access to large, long-range missiles its air war is evolving. More and harder strikes on oil export infrastructure, more than 50 since August are now being combined with attacks on the Russian power grid, approx. 15 strikes since the start of October. For a more detailed analysis, I suggest watching William Spaniels analysis ‘The Astonishing Success of Ukraine’s Air Campaign’ on You Tube. Link here –
The impact of the Ukrainian air campaign is transferring from being mostly economic to directly impacting Russian citizens. Already, petrol prices in Russia are steadily increasing and are likely to rise higher. The Moscow Times reporting on 27 October that “Gasoline prices in Russia have risen by 11.6% since the start of the year, driven largely by Ukrainian drone attacks that have damaged oil refineries and forced shutdowns at several major facilities since August.”[ii]
Now Russian citizens face a cold winter as well as high petrol prices, a situation that is certain to be causing concern in the Kremlin. The question is does Russia have the capability to respond effectively, by repairing its infrastructure quickly or making it more resilient? The answer is likely to be ‘No’ because decades of poor governance and corruption have weakened every part of Russian society, including the technicians and engineers who build and maintain infrastructure. The longer the war continues the worse the situation will get.
The battle for Pokrovsk
In the land campaign, Pokrovsk continues to remain the point of focus and both sides are eager to achieve decision before winter. Russia’s operation has two pincers; the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) advancing from the north towards Myrnohrad, and the 2nd CAA advancing from the south. This week the defenders from Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps still maintain a foothold in Pokrovsk, but Russian forces are closing in on their objective.
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The defenders were delivered a tough blow by nature on 10 November, when thick fog descended over the battlefield. The fog limits the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drones providing an opportunity for Russian forces to cross the defensive ‘kill web.’ A web of constant surveillance and immediate attack in which ‘sensors’ like drones, soldiers, electronic listening posts and radars use digital communication networks to instantly provide target locations to ‘shooters’ like artillery, attack drones, missiles and direct fire weapons.
The Russians took advantage of the opportunity to cross the defensive ‘kill web’ and get ‘boots on the objective.’ Ukraine’s ‘kill web’ prevents the Russians from bringing armour close to the battlefield so the attacking force was moved in cars, and on motorcycles. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported “troops were seen entering the city in Ukraine’s east on motorcycles and in ramshackle cars, in what was dubbed a “Mad Max-style” convoy.” A low tech but effective manoeuvre that allowed Russia to increase its presence in the urban area. The BBC estimates that the operation resulted in Russia being able to infiltrate between 300-500 extra soldiers into Pokrovsk[iii], meaning the Russians probably have between 500-800 soldiers in the town at this point.
Ukrainian defenders used air strikes to disrupt the movement of Russian soldiers into Pokrovsk. This bought Ukraine more time and limited the number of soldiers Russia could infiltrate. The bad weather also provides opportunities for Ukraine to attack. Ukraine’s 425th Assault Regiment was able to mount a series of small attacks using armoured vehicles because Russia’s drones are also grounded.
Ukraine’s defenders are now involved in a tough, close quarters, urban battle. A fight that involves trying to stave off Russian attacks and infiltrations, while also trying to find and neutralise enemy soldiers in the town. It is a complex and difficult battlefield environment that is influenced by the weather. Russia using the fog’s cover to move more troops into the city.
American ‘think tank,’ the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported on 15 November that “The Russian military command appears to be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk over efforts to close the wider Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area.”[iv] An indication that Russian forces are committed to a direct attack on Pokrovsk from the south rather than trying to envelop the towns.
This decision is notable because although a direct attack may be quicker, the cost in human terms is likely to be higher than envelopment. Russia’s reasoning is worth considering. For instance, ISW assessed that although there are tactical reasons for this prioritisation, Russia’s current emphasis on a direct attack could be driven by the desire to achieve a quick win for propaganda purposes, stating, “Russian forces may be prioritizing the seizure of Pokrovsk for a number of reasons. Russian leadership may seek to exploit the informational effects that the town’s seizure will likely generate, or may hope that the seizure of Pokrovsk will facilitate a subsequent effort to close the pocket.”
I agree that Russia’s operational planning will be influenced by ‘exploitation of informational effects,’ or in simpler language; winning a victory that will reinforce Russian propaganda. But another observation is that the advance from the north is probably slower because the ground in that direction is better suited to the use of drones. This means Ukraine’s drone based ‘kill web’ is more effective against Russian forces attacking from this direction. Likewise, the ground to the west of Pokrovsk is relatively open and more suitable for a ‘kill web’ that could stop the two Russian pincers meeting.
Several factors contribute to the way the battle for Pokrovsk is developing, notably:
- Weather. The weather in Ukraine is deteriorating and fog remains persistent around Pokrovsk. Russia is likely to continue trying to use the situation to move troops forward and create sufficient critical mass within the urban area that Ukraine is forced to withdraw. Likewise, units like Ukraine’s 425th Assault Regiment will continue to try and stop this movement. We are likely to see fierce local fighting and perhaps even armoured vehicles being used in combat, and to ferry soldiers forwards.
- Ground. My assessment is that the ground is a significant factor in Russia’s decision to prioritise the southern axis of assault. In this direction there is more broken ground and concealment for infiltration. Likewise, ground contributes to Russia’s inability to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad because the ground to the west of the towns is more open, so Ukraine’s drone based ‘kill web’ is more effective there.
- The Dobropilla Salient. Currently, Ukraine is destroying Russian forces in the Dobropilla Salient. This fighting destabilises 51stCombined Army’s right flank, slowing down its advance.
Therefore, do not expect to see sudden changes in the situation. Russia will probably continue with its current scheme of manoeuvre, two pincers closing slowly on the defenders, prioritising the southern advance. The question is whether Ukraine can hold on until winter weather settles in and reduces both sides ability to fight?
Conclusion
In conclusion, the battle for Pokrovsk is not a forgone conclusion. Russia may be closing in on the town but it is not moving quickly, so may not beat winter’s onset. When the weather gets cold Russia may not be able to continue its attacks, and the soldiers infiltrated into the urban area will suffer terribly.
Further, Russia needs to capture Myrnohrad to secure Pokrovsk, an operation that is currently moving very slowly. This situation is unlikely to change because the Russian force advancing from the north toward Myrnohrad is fighting on two fronts. Essentially, Russian victory at Pokrovsk in not guaranteed.
And while the Kremlin focusses on Pokrovsk, Russia may already be feeling the impact of new US sanctions and Ukraine’s air campaign, two effective strategic interventions.
[ii] https://www.themoscowtimes.
[iii] https://www.bbc.com/news/
[iv] https://understandingwar.org/
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
