BEN MORGAN: The battle for Pokrovsk, a front row view of tactical evolution

The war in Ukraine will be won on land, probably in Donetsk. Breaking into the Ukrainian ‘Fortress Belt’ is now the schwerpunkt, or decision point in the land campaign. Both protagonists understand the importance, and are concentrating their forces for this key battle. At the moment Russia’s focus is on Pokrovsk and since our last post there are tactical innovations from both sides that provide an opportunity to study the new battlefield, specifically the way drones and digital networks influence tactics.

The big picture

Since stopping Ukraine’s 2022 and 2023 offensives, Russia is committed to operations in Donetsk, that started with bloody battles to capture Avdiivka and Bakhmut. Capturing these towns secured bases to support Russia’s advance west. However, a key obstacle is Ukraine’s ‘Fortress Belt,’ a defensive network of urban areas that includes the cities and towns of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka. Large urban areas with solidly constructed Cold War-era buildings, bomb shelters and reinforced factories that sit on high ground so are easy to defend.

Putin must capture these urban areas if he is to claim victory in the Donbas and the land campaign currently revolves around Russia trying to ‘break into’ the ‘Fortress Belt’ by capturing Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk. Two towns sitting at the southern extremity of the belt that if captured provide a base for an advance from the south. Attacking from this direction allows Russian forces to advance along the roughly north-south ridgelines that the towns and cities occupy. An easier vector for attack than trying to advance uphill from the east.

Russia’s first push was from Bakhmut against Chasiv Yar aiming to capture this town and break into the ‘Fortress Belt’ via Kostyantynivka. When Chasiv Yar did not fall, Russia looped south and attacked Pokrovsk.

The battle for Donetsk includes operational-level manoeuvre and in August last year, Ukraine invaded Russian Kursk trying to draw Russian forces away from Donetsk. More recently, Russia and attacked across the border near Sumy to draw Ukrainian forces away from Donetsk. Both sides unsuccessfully using these attacks in to ‘turn their opponent’s flank’ or force them to divert resources north towards the new attacks rather than use them in the battle for Donetsk.

The battle for Pokrovsk – Russia’s ‘1-2’ combination

Fighting in Donetsk has a long history, but the current phase starts with Russia’s Dobropillia attack, a Russian surprise offensive launched on 11 August near Pokrovsk. In boxer’s terms this attack could be interpreted as the first blow in a ‘1-2’ combination and initially, the operation was successful. Russia breaking the Ukrainian line and penetrating approx. 15 km into their territory. This penetration meant Russian forces threatened to envelop Pokrovsk from the north.

However, Ukrainian forces reacted quickly, containing the offensive then ‘cutting off’ and destroying Russian forces in the salient. The light green and blue shading on the map below shows how the Ukrainian counter attack has progressed. The blue shading showing the ground most recently captured by Ukrainian forces.

The defeat of the Dobropillia attack initiated Russia’s second blow, a punch from the south-east into Pokrovsk. This battle is currently underway and small groups of Russian soldiers are reported to be operating inside the town. Russia is using infiltration tactics, sending small groups of soldiers into the urban area where there is more concealment from Ukrainian drones.

Historically, this is a successful strategy because the small groups of infiltrators are hard to locate and destroy. Drones appear to be less effective in complex terrain so Ukraine is forced to use more infantry soldiers to track down and neutralise the infiltrators. Essentially, Russian infiltration into urban areas forces Ukraine to fight an infantry led battle of attrition that it cannot maintain.

The battle for Pokrovsk – We are witnessing tactical innovations created by drone warfare

In the last post we discussed how Ukrainian tactics are evolving, including how Ukraine’s use of ‘drone walls.’ A ‘drone wall’ is a sophisticated web of ‘sensors’ linked to ‘shooters’ that can respond almost instantly to targeting information. ‘Sensors’ include drones, ground surveillance radar, human observers and satellites that constantly watch the battlefield identifying potential targets. ‘Shooters’ can be artillery, mortars, missiles and drones respond and attack targets identified by the ‘sensor.’ The system held to together by a digital network creating an integrated ‘kill web.’ Anything moving in this area can be quickly and decisively engaged. Recent fighting in Donetsk indicates that Ukraine’s ‘drone walls’ or ‘kill webs’ are highly effective at stopping Russian advances.

Russia’s recent incursions provide insight into how drone based ‘kill webs’ work, their impact on tactics, and a possibly a way to beat them. Most clearly the battle shows how ground effects the establishment of ‘kill webs.’ For example, Pokrovsk’s eastern approach is defined by being a wide bowl of open farmland that is an excellent defensive ‘killing area,’ even for traditional combined arms tactics. Therefore, Russia has studiously avoided this ground choosing to circle to the north or south and attempt envelopments rather than a frontal assault.

The Dopropillia offensive found a weak spot in the Ukrainian line and Russian forces advanced quickly across relatively open ground. However, after its initial success Ukraine was quickly able to contain and hold the offensive. Ground in this area is quite open so is suitable for creating drone based ‘kill webs.’ Ukraine was able to contain this offensive and then retake the territory. Ukraine’s attrition of Russian forces entering the salient and their ability to push the Russian’s out of it demonstrates how much of a combat multiplier drones are when used in open country.

Russia’s advance towards Pokrovsk from the south-west, on the other hand, has been more successful because Russian soldiers are advancing through complex terrain; small towns and woods that provide plenty of concealment. Urban areas, woods and other complex terrain limit visibility, and with less observation the surveillance a ‘kill web’ requires becomes less effective so small groups of infantry soldiers can infiltrate through the area.

Currently, around Pokrovsk we are witnessing two armies working out new tactics to manage the impact of drone based ‘kill webs.’ Russia does not care about individual losses and probably lacks technological sophistication compared to Ukraine, so is using manpower to defeat the ‘kill web.’ Its tactics are reminiscent of those employed by the North Vietnamese against the US during the Vietnam War. Tactics that involved infiltration to avoid US firepower, the North Vietnamese aimed to close the distance between combatants making the safe use of heavy artillery and airpower difficult for US forces.

Russian leader’s understand that Ukraine’s ‘kill web’ is less effective in close, complex terrain like urban areas. So are willing to take time and accept casualties infiltrating small groups of soldiers close to Ukrainian positions, knowing that even a small group of 2-3 Russian soldiers will require a section (or squad) of approx. 8-9 soldiers to neutralise. And that during this process the Ukrainian side is likely to suffer casualties. Russia is happy to accept these losses because they know Ukraine has less manpower.

On the Ukrainian side, the reverse applies because its forces are aiming to mechanise the battlefield, using drones to replace humans as much as possible. However, recent events demonstrate that these tactics are ground dependent and work better in open ground. Now Russia may have broken into Ukraine’s ‘kill web’ around Pokrovsk infiltrating soldiers into the urban area, Ukraine has a tactical choice.

Ukraine may choose to continue to hold Pokrovsk fighting in the town. But the town is surrounded by open country and it may be better tactically to let Russia capture Pokrovsk only to find that its forces are trapped within the urban area by new Ukrainian ‘kill webs’ thrown across the open country to the town’s west and north.

This leaves a range of potential options for Ukraine that could include:

• Withdrawal so Russian forces are contained in Pokrovsk, unable to advance out of the urban area because Ukraine’s drones are most effective in the open country surrounding the town. If Ukraine has the resources, fixing the Russians in Pokrovsk could be the preliminary stage of an offensive operation.
• Defending Pokrovsk and fighting a long attritional battle. Russia will continue to bomb Pokrovsk, infiltrate small groups and slowly wear down Ukrainian defences possibly forcing a withdrawal.

   

The risk is that if Ukraine withdraws, Russian forces use Pokrovsk to push north towards Kostyantynivka. Or Pokrovsk could become a base for an advance east towards Pavlohrad, approx. 100km directly west of the town.

My assessment is that the most likely ‘next step’ is the first scenario. Tactically, Ukraine is evolving rapidly and their drone based ‘kill webs’ (that save lives) are proving more effective across open ground. Potentially, they could forgo defending the urban areas and use the open ground that surrounds Pokrovsk to contain the Russians in the town. Ukraine using drone based ‘kill webs’ to prevent them exploiting its capture by an advance either west or north. Drone based ‘kill webs’ making good use of the open farm land surrounding Pokrovsk to mitigate the risk of Russian exploitation.

Additionally, if Ukraine does have sufficient resources fixing a significant portion of Russia’s force in Pokrovsk could create conditions for future Ukrainian offensive manoeuvre. Russian reinforcements moving into Pokrovsk potentially providing concentrations for soldiers, artillery and missiles that can be attacked.

Conclusion

The current fighting in Donetsk provides useful insight into how drones, enabled by digital information networks are changing tactical assumptions. For example, Russia’s move away from combined arms tactics towards using small unit infiltrations against Pokrovsk’s defenders. An acknowledgement that crossing ground in large numbers is difficult when faced with a modern defensive ‘kill web.’ Currently, Russia’s infiltration tactics appear to be working and are forcing Ukraine to make a tough decision about whether to fight for Pokrovsk or withdraw.

Ukraine has demonstrated that it can stop Russian movement across relatively open country. Tactically, Ukrainian leaders will probably be considering whether it is better to try and hold Pokrovsk, or to withdraw and continue the battle on ground that is more suitable for their new drone based tactics. This means that in the next few weeks we will learn more about the relationships between tactics, ground and new technology.