Tension continues to build in Ukraine. Russia’s build-up of force in Donetsk during August and September is the prelude to a major battle. Russia large force aims to capture the towns of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka. Urban fortresses sitting on high-ground, well-defended and controlling local road and rail junctions. If Russia can capture them, they will become a doorway into eastern Ukraine’s ‘Fortress Belt.’
Although Russian forces have been massing in this area since August, their progress remains minimal. Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka are still held by Ukraine and Russia is not making significant progress capturing them. An increase in Russian hybrid operations indicates that Putin understands the situation and is applying more pressure on the NATO alliance.
President Trump recently made a strong statement about supporting Ukraine. In a Truth Social post after meeting President Zelenskyy at the UN, Trump said Ukraine could return to “the original borders from where this war started“ with the support of Europe and NATO. A statement interpreted optimistically by many commentators, and it will be interesting to see if he acts.
Understanding Russia’s hybrid war
In the last post we discussed Russian hybrid operations, using the work of Australian strategist, David Kilcullen to help interpret the situation. Kilcullen categorises Russian hybrid tactics as ‘liminal warfare,’ arguing that between a democratic enemy knowing it is under attack, and it being able to respond with military force there is a grey or ‘liminal’ zone of conflict.
Kilcullen’s liminal zone has two sub-sections. An area or period of ‘covert operations’ during which attacks or intelligence activities are detected but cannot be ‘attributed,’ and one of ‘ambiguous action’ during which attacks are ‘detected’ but ‘attribution’ is difficult.
For example, Russia interference in the 2016 US presidential elections was ‘detected’ and ‘attributed’ but US action has been limited by ‘ambiguity.” In 2018, the US Senate’s bi-partizan Security and Intelligence Committee reviewed intelligence reporting, stated that “The Committee found that specific intelligence as well as open source assessments support the assessment that President Putin approved and directed aspects of this influence campaign.”
However, regardless of the Senate’s finding few Americans are willing to act because although the activity could be interpreted as a planned and concerted Russian hybrid operation against the US, there is sufficient ‘ambiguity’ that the response was limited. Lacking political support, it is difficult for US governments to take meaningful action to disincentivise future Russian election interference.
Kilcullen argues that Russian strategists have identified that their adversaries are democratic so are constrained when responding to hostile activity by the requirement for public accountability. A consideration that is especially pressing within an alliance of democratic nations like NATO, because collegial action requires support from the electorate of each member state.
Russia’s hybrid war is part of a wider strategy
The situation is simple, Russia’s ground campaign in Ukraine is failing so their hybrid war against Ukraine’s supporters needs to escalate. Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye or GRU has been expanding its operations since the 2022 invasion failed. In March 2025, the Centre for Strategic and International studies reported that” “The number of Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, after quadrupling between 2022 and 2023. Russia’s military intelligence service, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (or GRU), was likely responsible for many of these attacks, either directly by their own officers or indirectly through recruited agents.” Cyber-attacks, dis-information and sabotage attacks are becoming more common but are still hard to directly ‘attribute’ to directly to Russia.
Strategically, Russia is deeply concerned about NATO and the US supporting Ukraine. Putin knows that if the US ‘turns on the tap,’ and emphatically supports Ukraine his defeat is guaranteed. Likewise, if European nations work together, they have the industrial muscle to support Ukraine and defeat Russia. However, supporting Ukraine requires collective action, and Russia’s strategy is to prevent this occurring by creating situations that divide the alliance.
The intrusions into NATO airspace force all members of the alliance to consider if they are willing to take the risk of escalating the conflict with Russia. A conflict that the Kremlin is careful to frame as potentially nuclear, using threatening but vague rhetoric. For example, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov’s response to the UN’s 28 September debate about Russia’s intrusions, in which he stated that any aggression against Russia will be met with “a decisive response.” Strong, but vague language designed to create uncertainty.
Historically, NATO is slow to respond to Russian aggression, fearful of reprisals and worried by nuclear sabre-rattling. In 2014, Putin tested the mettle of NATO, and the strength of the Budapest Memorandum by invading Crimea and Donbas. The invasion was cloaked in uncertainty; Russian soldiers did not wear identification and the Kremlin described them as ‘volunteers’ supporting kindred communities in Ukraine. This ambiguity confused NATO countries encouraging them accept the invasion as a fait accompli, and look the other way.
Further, Russia has sown the seeds of discord using disinformation and carefully staged information operations to undermine democratic institutions in other countries. Russia’s information warfare presents the narrative that Russia is powerful and will fight to achieve its goals, and that supporting Ukraine risks confrontation. A confrontation Russia’s leadership is willing to escalate further than the democratically elected leaders of Europe. Russia’s programme has had some success because some US political leaders are now defined by their dislike of Europe, by the concern that NATO ‘freeloads,’ and by fear of Russia.
Intruding into NATO airspace is an escalation
Russia’s intrusions into NATO countries airspace are an escalation within the framework of Russia’s hybrid campaign. Sabotage, dis-information and cyber-attacks are more covert forms of attack that do not excite media inquiry and public debate. The wider public does not always perceive the effects of them. By their nature dis-information campaigns are hard to identify, small acts of sabotage pass unnoticed and people accept cyber-attack as part of modern life.
This ‘covert’ phase of the campaign is not designed to target the wider public, instead it targets NATO’s leaders and the key messages are; Russia has the will, and the means to attack covertly. Therefore, any decision to support Ukraine puts your nation at risk. Whether, it is an attack on democratic institutions, or costly shut downs of civil infrastructure there will be a price for supporting Ukraine.
Drones and fighter aircraft entering NATO airspace are the next phase, and in my opinion represent Russia moving from ‘covert operations’ to ‘ambiguous action’ in Kilcullen’s model. For example, Russia’s drones cross Polish territory creating alarm. Russia says the incursion is a mistake and the crashed drones are unarmed. Russia’s actions are easily ‘detected’ and ‘attributed’ but their intent is ‘ambiguous,’ forcing European leaders to assess whether the incursion is a mistake or something deliberate.
Last week the campaign intensified with Russian drones reported over Poland, Romania and possibly in Norway and Denmark. Russian Mig-31 fighters strayed over Estonia for 12 minutes, before being intercepted by Italian fighters and escorted out of NATO airspace.
Estonia was targeted because it does not have an air force. Instead, it relies on NATO to protect its airspace. This is why Italian F-35 fighters intercepted the Russian planes. The Russian’s are testing whether Italy, or every other NATO nation contributing to protecting Estonia’s airspace are willing to risk becoming engaged in a war with Russia to support Ukraine.
Essentially, Russia’s objective is to ‘turn up’ the pressure on the alliance, hoping less committed nations will break away, or to create organisational paralysis as alliance members debate
Is Russia’s plan working?
However, Russia’s programme of intrusions may not be achieving the desired result, NATO leaders appear to be united and willing to take a strong stance. For instance, speaking recently to CNN Romania’s foreign minister, Oana Toiu summed up the situation, stating that after speaking to Estonia’s foreign minister she believes “Russia is trying to undermine NATO’s coherence, but I think they’re achieving the exact opposite.”
And there is evidence that Toiu’s assessment is correct. NATO released a statement on 23 September stating “Russia should be in no doubt: NATO and allies will employ, in accordance with international law, all necessary military and non-military tools to defend ourselves.”
Speaking at the UN Security Council UK Foreign Secretary, Yvette Cooper stated that “Our alliance is defensive, but be under no illusion … if we need to confront planes that are operating in NATO airspace without permission, then we will do so.” Mike Waltz, the US representative told the Security Council that the US and its allies “will defend every inch of NATO territory.” Notably, Poland and Sweden have both issued blunt statements that Russian aircraft entering their airspace will be shot down.
The land campaign
The land campaign remains static; Russia is unable to capture key terrain or break into Ukraine’s defensive line in Donetsk. Russia’s operations near Sumy appear to have culminated, and Russian troops are being withdrawn from this area and moved to Donetsk.
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In recent weeks, Russia has concentrated resources in this area, including:
- Elite infantry units including at least three airborne (VDV) brigades and all of Russia’s five marine infantry brigades
- The 90th Tank Division, Russia’s largest and best equipped armoured formation.
- The Rubicon drone unit.
However, even with an impressive array of elite units, lots of tanks and approx. 250,000 soldiers in the area Russia is not making progress in Donetsk. In fact, Ukraine is systematically counter-attacking and reducing the salient Russia created north of Pokrovsk last month.
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The fighting in Donetsk is noteworthy because it demonstrates the combat power of Ukraine’s ‘drone wall.’ The lack of Russian forward movement indicates that Ukraine has been able to create a sophisticated local ‘kill web,’ or an area of ground that is under constant surveillance and within which any enemy movement is subject to immediate drone or artillery attack. A ‘kill web’ that is blocking Russian attacks.
Approximately, 100km north of the fighting in Donetsk is the town of Kupyansk. An important city built on the Oskil River. This river runs roughly north-south and blocks Russian advances west into Kharkiv Oblast. If Russia can capture Kupyansk it will control important bridges and transport infrastructure for crossing the river that could be used to attack into Kharkiv. This is and important battle to monitors.
In the last month, the battle to control Kupyansk has ebbed and flowed, and last week Russian troops used a gas pipeline to sneak close to the city and launch an attack. This daring operation received a lot of media coverage, and Ukraine’s ability to maintain control of the city had been questioned. But to-date the operation has not resulted in Ukraine losing control of the city.
Conclusion
In conclusion, at this point, the land campaign remains static. Russia has amassed a huge force in Donetsk but cannot ‘break into’ Ukraine’s defences. Putin’s regime has no desire to stop fighting, so is expanding the war ‘laterally’ by posing hybrid threats that it hopes will break NATO cohesion. Russia aims to use a hybrid campaign to reduce the support Ukraine receives from its NATO partners.
This is a dangerous phase of the war because NATO countries must act decisively to prevent escalation but remain proportionate. Sudden escalation by one nation may not be supported by all alliance members, testing unity and achieving Russia’s aim. It is a time for strong deterrence but action must be considered and collective. At this stage, the European leaders appear to understand the situation and maintaining the alliance’s cohesion.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
Ben – No Russia progress this week on the ground..?
https://deepstatemap.live/en#7/47.8500308/33.6511230
That’s a lot of progress
Hahahahahahah, cope more NATO shill