Early September was a busy time in China, on 1 September the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) met in Tainjin, an event followed on 3 September by China’s enormous Victory Day Parade. Around the world people world watched both events with interest, as China took the opportunity to project its strategic narrative on a global stage.
September’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit
The SCO is a Sino-Russia led forum that brings together Eurasian nations for economic and security discussions. The SCO is increasingly important as the Sino-Russian alliance tries to create an alternative rules-based order for international trade, economic development and security to reduce US and European influence in global affairs. When politicians, or commentators discuss movement towards a multi-polar world the SCO is part of this trend.
This year’s conference is notable because geo-political instability, and erratic US foreign policy creates opportunities to increase the SCO’s influence. This year, China and Russia were keen to present an alternative to the current US-rules based order and Al Jazeera summarised the situation as follows “China and Russia presented their vision of a new international order at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, where Beijing offered new financial incentives to countries aligned with the Beijing-led economic and security group.”
The meeting was an opportunity for Chinese President Xi Jinping to present a new manifesto for a different rules-based order for trade and economic development. Specifically. Xi outlined plans for new development bank and finance options for member states. This activity is notable because it is the first public statement of Chinese ambitions to develop alternative financial institutions.
Xi spoke about multilateralism and partnership, a message that contrasts strongly with the ‘America First’ language and actions of the Trump White House. For example, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi attended the summit. The result is that both China and India pledged to resolve their differences at the summit. India is motivated to engage more with China after President Trump imposed punitive 50% tariffs on Indian goods because it buys Russian oil and gas.
Current US foreign policy is providing a window of opportunity to rapidly evolve the SCO. We should expect to see the organisation develop further providing more for members, and increasing in size. It is likely that some authoritarian leaning countries in the ‘Global South’ will see the potential advantages of joining, especially if development funding, financial systems and security become more available to members.
It will take time for China and its partners to build institutions able to compete directly with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, but this year’s conference is a public signal that the process is starting. Strategists in the US, Europe and partner nations should note this development.
The Victory Day Parade – Chinese military power on display
Military power, financial institutions and economic power are interconnected, and the Victory Day Parade was an opportunity to demonstrate that China has the military power to underpin an alternative rules-based order. This year’s parade was an important piece of political theatre designed to carry key messages to international observers, and my observations are:
- The strategic missile force remains central to China’s projection of military power. The display included plenty of hypersonic anti-ship missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles that show China’s long-range strike capability. Additionally, China’s next generation of long-range missiles are increasingly sophisticated and effective. The new missiles on display included the DF -61 and DF -5C both world class ballistic missiles with global range. Meanwhile, the new JL-3 and DF-31BJ missiles on display are reported to use advanced delivery systems that make their warheads harder to intercept. For example, the Centre for International and Strategic Studies estimates the JL-3 carries three Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV) carrying either; a nuclear warhead that manoeuvres to its target avoiding defensive measures, or a decoy.
- Space control is now an important aspect of Chinese doctrine. The parade included the first public appearance of the HQ-29 missile defence system, described as a “satellite hunter.” The HQ-29 is reported to be capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and low-orbit satellites. Space control is vital for successful employment of long-range missiles, satellites are used to find targets and to guide missiles and militaries around the world are developing anti-satellite systems. Future conflicts in the Pacific will be characterised by area-denial using long-range missiles, and the parade demonstrated some of China’s capabilities to interfere with its adversary’s satellite network.
- Multi-domain operations. Like the US, China is preparing for a new type of conflict fought across the land, sea, air, space, information, and cyber domains. The parade was the first public outing of the new Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force. The parade demonstrates China is developing capabilities to build and support a digital ‘web’ to transfer information around the battlespace. For example, intelligence about enemy movement, targeting information and finally propaganda designed to shape enemy actions or to contribute to ‘telling China’s story’ internationally during a conflict.
- Drones. Automation and uncrewed vehicles were on display including the large the AJX002 autonomous submarine. A new stealthy drone ‘loyal wingman’ designed to work with China’s 5th Generation fighter aircraft, the FH-97 was on display along with a wide- range of smaller air, sea and land drones. Like its rivals, China is clearly investing heavily in autonomous and robotic military technology.
Presenting a unified front
The Victory Day Parade also provided China with an opportunity to demonstrate unity with its partners. “Allies close to the podium—Putin and Kim Jong Un—stood alongside Xi, emphasising Moscow and Pyongyang’s centrality to Beijing’s security calculus. Their joint appearance was a stark collective defiance against Western criticism and sanctions” stated Dr Guangyi Pan in a recent article for the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
The event also provided an opportunity to consolidate China’s relationships with a range of other nations, and leaders from 26 countries attended including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Belarus and Pakistan. Notably absent were leaders from democratic nations, although a range of former politicians from these nations were invited and some attended including Japan’s Yukio Hatoyama, Australia’s Bob Carr and Dan Andrews, and Taiwan’s Hung Hsiu-chu. People that provide a semi-official network that helps bridge the diplomatic gap between China and democratic nations.
Final thoughts
The overall objective of these events is to send a set of messages to the wider international community. The most important of which is that there is an economic and security alternative to the current US-led rules-based order. A message reinforced by demonstrating that China is economically and militarily capable, resolute, and has the backing of powerful allies.
However, this activity is not a sudden escalation or a particularly provocative statement. Instead, recent activities are a confirmation of existing Sino-American tensions, currently exacerbated by uncertainty around US foreign policy.
AUKUS update – US review continues as Australia builds new infrastructure
US officials are currently reviewing the AUKUS deal. The Trump White House is worried that the programme does not safeguard its ‘America First’ policy because it provides difficult to produce submarines to other nations, rather than keeping them in the US Navy. The UK and Australia are both concerned about the review because the are relying on the partnership to upgrade their nuclear-powered submarine fleets.
After the US review was announced, the UK and Australia signed the Geelong Treaty in July 2025. An agreement to help integrate Australia and the UK’s defence and nuclear industries. Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles described the deal as creating “… a seamless defence industrial base between the United Kingdom and Australia.” The Geelong Treaty is also an example of the UK and Australia working together to pressure the US by demonstrating absolute commitment to AUKUS.
Another political factor to consider is that US officials are reported to be trying to extract a commitment from Australia that if there is conflict, Australia’s AUKUS submarines will automatically be under US command. Commitments that the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reports are worrying Australia’s government, writing that “The Albanese government has been uneasy about the way some Trump administration officials have tied AUKUS to defence funding, and has pushed back forcefully against US demands that it pre-commit Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to any American war efforts in this region.” The Australian government is justifiably concerned of the risk that after making an enormous investment in AUKUS, its submarine fleet may not be completely under its control.
Influential US think tank the Centre for Strategic International and Studies (CSIS) added to the debate when it released a report in late- August that urges the Trump White House not to abandon AUKUS. The report is authored by Abraham Denmark and Charles Edel. Denmark was a senior AUKUS advisor to the previous US Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, and Charles Edel is the Australian chair for CSIS.
The report suggests a way to mediate US and Australian concerns, stating that “To navigate U.S. requests for a more concrete commitment from Australia, and Canberra’s sensitivities to issues of sovereignty, the United States and Australia should initiate a robust contingency planning process that incorporates Australian SSNs.” Essentially, that by planning together Australia can provide a level of assurance that it will support the US without forgoing its sovereignty.
The CSIS report highlights the benefits to the US of the deal, and the importance of the US taking a strategic approach to measuring those benefits, stating “… debates over the wisdom or potential of the U.S. sale of Virginia-class SSNs to Australia have been overly focused on U.S. submarine production rates. This is not a strategic approach—production is only a part of the equation. The key strategic question is whether AUKUS would increase or decrease the number of boats available for operations during a crisis or contingency. Even if the United States is unable to improve its own SSN production capabilities, the answer is still unequivocally positive: AUKUS will put more U.S. boats in the water by addressing its maintenance backlog and will provide the United States with an additional critical location from which to operate its SSNs.”
Here is a link to the full report – https://www.csis.org/analysis/
Meanwhile, in Perth an AUS $ 8 billion project is progressing to build facilities for up-to five Virginnia Class submarines, and around 1,200 US and UK personnel. This work is being completed to support the Submarine Rotational Force (SRF), roughly four US Virginia Class and one UK Astute Class submarine operating in the Indo-Pacific region and rotating through Perth for maintenance from 2027. The SRF aims to give the Australian defence industry and navy an opportunity to develop the skills and knowledge to maintain nuclear-powered submarines. It is the first phase of AUKUS prior to Australia buying its own fleet.
The outcome of America’s AUKUS review has not been published, and it remains to be seen if the US will remain in the programme. An American withdrawal would be a foreign policy issue, undermining US credibility, and creating significant issues for its partners.
Pacific Islands Forum 8-12 September
Although marked by diplomatic tension beforehand, this year’s Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting took place quietly between 8-12 September. The Pacific Islands Leaders Forum consists of small nations within Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. It has 23 ‘members’ and ‘associate-members,’ and Australia and New Zealand are the largest member nations. The forum also has another 22 ‘partners’ including the US, China and Taiwan.
The Pacific Islands Forum plays an important role in South-West Pacific security, providing an opportunity for these small nations to work collectively to support regional security. The forum has led peace-keeping missions and coordinated humanitarian aid during disasters.
However, in recent years it has been subject to Sino-American rivalry, both parties trying to gain influence. And 2025 was no exception, China allegedly pressuring host nation Solomon Islands to exclude Taiwan. Pressure that Solomon Islands responded to by not inviting any ‘partners’ to this year’s leaders meeting.
The leaders discussed the ‘Ocean of Peace’ declaration proposed by Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitveni Rambukau. The declaration reinforces the members commitment to maintaining peace in the Pacific.
Pragmatically, the members also discussed managing relationships with external partners, a response to the increase in diplomatic competition. An official statement has not been released but media reports indicate the forum’s partners will be more carefully managed and divided into ‘tiers’ based on their level of investment.
- Tier 1 partners being those that contribute to cooperation and investment across all aspects of the forum’s planning.
- Tier 2 partners being nations that contribute to individual projects.
Over time more information will emerge, but this year’s forum appeared carefully managed and produced some useful steps towards dealing with external political influence in Pacific affairs.
Melanesian update
A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.
Papua New Guinea celebrates 50 years of independence
Papua New Guinea hosts a large celebration of its 50th year of independence between 15-17 September. The event is large and significant for the small nation, and will be attended by a range of leaders from all nations seeking influence in the region.
Transnational crime and ASEAN’s relationship with Timor Leste
Recently, at the 19th Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in Melaka, Malaysia, Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn met with Francisco da Costa Guterres, Timor-Leste’s Minister of the Interior.
A bi-lateral meeting to discuss Timor Leste’s ability to support the work of the AMMTC. This meeting highlighted two important points. First, the impact of transnational crime in Melanesia, an area like much of the South-West Pacific that struggles to combat the flow of drugs.
The second point is that ASEAN’s interaction with Timor Leste are another indication of the organisation’s developing relationship with the small nation. A relationship that is rapidly strengthening ASEAN’s presence in Melanesia.
Vanuatu and Australian agreement stalled
Australian diplomacy ran into a roadblock in Vanuatu last week. The two nations recently announced a foreign aid deal for Australia to invest AUS $ 500 billion into the smaller nation. The ‘Nakamal Agreement’ is an aid package designed to position Australia as Vanuatu’s security ‘partner of choice’ blocking Chinese influence in the smaller nation.
Last week, the Prime Minister of Australia, Anthony Albanese flew to Vanuatu to sign the agreement. However, the meeting did not go as planned, Vanuatu refusing to sign the treaty and requesting further negotiations. The specific concern being that the Nakamal Agreement may restrict Vanuatu’s ability to engage with other counties especially about foreign aid and infrastructure development. Vanuatu has a strong relationship with China, borrowing money, and receiving aid including police training support.
Clearly, the situation is difficult and there are allegations of Chinese influence, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reporting that “One diplomatic source told the ABC that China had been pressing some of Mr Napat’s ministers not to sign the agreement, although they said it wasn’t clear whether Beijing’s diplomats in the country had mounted a concerted campaign against the pact.”
A similar situation occurred in the 2022, when a security agreement between Australia and Vanuatu not formally ratified. Vanuatu’s parliament concerned about consultation and whether the agreement was consistent with the nation’s policy of non-alignment. The current diplomatic battle is worth watching and studying, to see if the Albanese government can salvage the agreement.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
