Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: Chinese naval activity in the Tasman Sea

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The recent arrival of a small Chinese naval task force near Australia is an important event in the Pacific region. Although small, the task force consisting of a large destroyer, a frigate and resupply ship sent a powerful message – China has the will, and the capability to project military force into the Southern Pacific.

This message was accentuated by the task force conducting a series of short-notice live-firing exercises that forced airlines flying between Australia and New Zealand to change their flight paths. The patrol should not surprise anybody monitoring security competition in the Pacific because for years tension has been increasing, and it is likely that we will see more of this type of activity.

In my January ‘annual review’ (dated 21 January 2025) I discussed in detail the mechanics of Sino-American military competition in the Pacific. Essentially, China is becoming increasingly assertive, keen to prevent its potential for isolation by a US-led blockade of its trade routes if conflict occurs because American allies surround China; Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines and Thailand.

China’s strategy to oppose this situation is to claim large areas of the oceans through which its trade moves. The South China Sea is a good example, China claims the sea as its territorial waters, occupying islands and using its ships to drive other nations out of the area. International courts do not accept Chinese claims, but in military terms ‘possession is nine tenths of the law,’ and China has the military power to ignore international law.

The annual review also predicted that competition would move further south, however it is a surprise how quickly this has occurred. And, escalation to military demonstrations is an important indicator of China’s commitment to expanding its area of influence. In my opinion, the task force’s key roles were to:

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  • Send a message to Australia and New Zealand about their commitment to collective security in the Pacific.
  • Test America’s position.

Regarding the first objective, Australia and New Zealand are both active in collective security arrangements deterring China’s aggressive activities in the Northern Pacific. Australia has been vocal about its security concerns, and is a key partner in AUKUS. If China, can scare either of these nations out of participation in collective security it wins a strategic victory. China is too big for any country to oppose alone, so the only way small nations can safeguard their interests, like ‘freedom of navigation’ in the South China Sea is by working together in collective security arrangements. And, as US foreign policy becomes more uncertain, collective security becomes more important for nations like Australia and New Zealand.

A situation that is likely to make New Zealanders support greater security collaboration with other nations, for example joining Pillar Two of AUKUS, or developing security relationships with non-historic partners like NATO, Japan or South Korea.

Uncertainty about US foreign policy, and testing American commitment to an ally like Australia is probably the second objective. It is unlikely we will see this reaction in the media, instead the US response is likely to be ‘behind the scenes’ diplomatically, or in new defence arrangements with Australia. Perhaps speeding up the delivery of AUKUS nuclear-power submarines, or rotating more US warships through Australia. It is a situation that we need to watch carefully.

A another less certain, but possible role of the patrol is demonstrating to small Pacific nation’s like Cook Islands, Kiribati or Solomon Islands that China does have the capability to provide security guarantees. China is negotiating new relationships with many small Pacific nations, some of whom may be keen to accept a security relationship with China instead of their historic partners. It is possible that this patrol is also meant to signal to these nation’s that China can project military power into the South Pacific, reinforcing its position as a potential security partner.

The patrol’s last reported location was roughly south of the Great Australian Bight, heading east. Based on open-source information about the ships it seems that they are operating at the extent of their range so are unlikely to head further south. Further, if the task group is heading east, it is unlikely to return via Polynesia or visit the Cook Islands. A small nation that has recently signed a series of cooperation agreements with China.

Cook Islands Update

The relationship between New Zealand and Cook Islands remains tense. Cook Islands Prime Minister, Mark Brown slowly releasing details of the agreements his government has made with China. The key agreements from a security perspective relate to allowing Chinese ships to berth in Cook Islands, and that China commits to developing the nation’s port infra-structure.

A situation that New Zealand, its ally Australia and other security partners will be concerned about because once port infrastructure is built it can be used for either military or civilian ships. The impact being a potential Chinese base in the heart of Polynesia.

Pacific security expert, and lead associate at the Pacific Regional Security, Jose Sousa-Santos was quoted by New Zealand 1 News stating that “This could enable China to have a resupply capacity for its navy in the Pacific facilitating its presence and acts of intimidation in the region, as seen by the recent live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea.” It is likely that similar concerns are being discussed by diplomatic and military leaders in New Zealand, Australia and around the Pacific.

New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Winston Peters has expressed his concern and stated that the relationship with the Cook Islands needs to be ‘reset.’ He will soon meet with Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi and with Mr Brown. Mr Peters stating with regards to Cook Islands that “We will also need to find a way, as we did in 1973 and 2001, to formally re-state the mutual responsibilities and obligations that we have for one another and the overall parameters and constraints of the free association model.” The situation is concerning, China’s activity in the South China Sea demonstrates a history of aggressive diplomacy, that would be detrimental to security and stability in the South Pacific.

Melanesian update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Australian F-35 fighters visit Papua New Guinea

Two Australian F-35 fighters visited Jackson International Airport in Port Moresby. The planes were enroute to RAAF Tindall, in Australia’s Northern Territory and stopped to refuel in Papua New Guinea. This is an interesting visit because it is a physical demonstration of Australia’s commitment to work more closely with Papua New Guinea, and on a practical level it is an opportunity to familiarise F-35 pilots with operating in Papua New Guinea.

Australian Papua New Guinea announce they are negotiating a new defence treaty

Papua New Guinea looks set to develop a closer security relationship with Australia. The two countries announcing last week that they are starting talks about a new defence treaty. Since Solomon Islands agreed a security deal with Solomon Islands, Australia has been working hard to rebuild its Melanesian relationships. Including signing a defence agreement with Papua New Guinea in December 2023.

The new treaty will expand on this agreement is likely to include a range of standard features designed to improve inter-operability, or how the two nations can work together. Australian Defence Minister, Richard Marles stating that “Practically, a treaty would make it easier for Australia and PNG to support each other’s security, and contribute to the collective security of the region.” However, it also appears that the treaty will open a pathway for Australia to recruit Papua New Guineans into the Australian Defence Force. An interesting way for Australia to rapidly increase the size of its military. “Australia has certainly indicated they have been struggling to find manpower to work not just the frontline defence force sector, but are struggling to find those who can work in defence industries” said Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reports that both countries a keen to settle the details quickly, and start working together.

Timor Leste aims to join ASEAN

Timor Leste announced its aim to join the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) last week. Admission could help the nation to address the range of economic and social issues it currently faces, and the application could be led by Malaysia. ASEAN is generally accepted as strong supporter and enabler of its members, so Timor Leste joining the organisation could increase stability in the small nation.

 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack

11 COMMENTS

  1. Considering the recent deal the US has struck with Ukraine mining to recoup their prior aid package funding. Expect Trump not to give aid to the Pacific without some transactional quid-pro-quo ally for hire deal. Don’t expect any freebies. To quote a recent BBC article on this US foreign policy observation in Ukraine.

    “The White House meanwhile is setting a precedent. US aid in the Trump era comes with strings attached. Aid for aid’s sake – whether given for humanitarian or strategic reasons – is a thing of the past.That represents a fundamental reordering of American foreign policy for more than 75 years, from the days of the Marshall Plan to post-Cold War idealism and George W Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” push to promote global democracy.Ukraine is just the start. Expect Trump and his foreign policy team to apply their “America First” principles around the world over the course of the next four years.Zelensky raised the prospect of access to some of the country’s mineral wealth last year, when he presented a “victory plan” to Western partners.”

  2. what gets me… is that the americans have given the ‘republic of china’ Many warships over the last fifty years.FACT.

  3. Interesting, but how many ships in total could the Chinese support this far away from their homeland? I suspect very few.

    • Great point, New Zealand only has like four cargo ships on our maritime registry. It’s basically just yachts and the yachts pretending to be ‘military vessels’ of the RNZN. I’m sure China is basically the same just a bit bigger, maybe they have fifty or so cargo ships that could be requisitioned for sealift, no more than that.

  4. As if China needs to invade NZ…they are 1/2 way to buying it already….The U.S owns all the banks here batm….so they have a vested..interest.

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