BEN MORGAN: Trump fires the first shots in possible negotiations, is the end-game starting?

Strategically, it feels like the end game is starting President Trump opening negotiation, via social media on Sunday 8 December. In the post, he called for an immediate ceasefire, saying it is Russia’s time to act. This statement was closely followed by similar comments on NBC’s Meet The Press on Monday 9 December.  Trump’s position regarding potential negotiations is currently the most important strategic factor influencing the conflict.  

It appears that Trump is turning the ‘heat up’ by setting conditions for negotiation. In September, he met with Ukraine’s leader President Zelensky in New York, and again on 7 December in Paris. Two meetings that ‘bookend’ comments made by Zelensky on 30 November.  During an interview on Sky News, the Ukrainian president’s comments indicated a subtle change in Ukraine’s position. A softening of territorial demands,  Zelensky emphasising the importance of people rather than terrain, saying that “This war (is) for independence of the people, not of the land.”

Words that could indicate Ukraine is open to a peace settlement that is not predicated on complete Russian withdrawal from occupied territory.  Zelensky appears to be positioning himself as ‘reasonable’ and committed to finding a path to peace.  Zelensky seems pragmatic, aiming to work with Trump.  And, as we approach Trump’s inauguration Ukraine’s forces are still holding their positions in Kursk and Pokrovsk. Likewise, Ukraine appears to be achieving their aim of attriting Russia’s forces.  The UK Ministry of Defence reporting this week that Russian casualties now total more than 700,000 killed or seriously injured. 

The success of Ukraine’s attrition strategy on Russia’s military was demonstrated last week in Syria.  Russian forces choosing to withdraw rather than fight to support Bashar Al-Assad’s forces. Years of Russian foreign policy in Syria changed overnight when instead of miliary support, Putin offered Assad sanctuary.  And, the question we should ask is – Why?  

Occam’s Razor is a logical principle that can be summarised as follows; when faced with two hypotheses, the simplest is most likely to be true.  In this case, political, historical, and military considerations indicate that Russia wants influence in Syria. Prior to the war in Ukraine, influence was secured by military support for Assad’s regime. Immediately, after the fall of Aleppo, Russian aircraft were at work bombing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces. Reuters reporting on 30 November that “Russia’s Defence Ministry said its air force had carried out strikes on Syrian rebels in support of the country’s army, Russian news agencies reported.” Initially at least, Russia supported Assad’s regime but over the course of the week Russian military support disappeared.

What changed? The simplest hypothesis is that Putin realised that Russia does not have the combat power to fight another conflict. This reality required a rapid change in policy that included evacuating Assad, and Russian troops withdrawing without fighting. Another aim of the withdrawal is likely to be reducing tensions with HTS, allowing for the possibility of negotiating to keep Russia’s important Syrian bases.  Bloomberg reporting on 13 December that “Talks are taking place for Russian forces to remain at the naval port in Tartus and the air base at Khmeimim, according to people with knowledge of the matter in Moscow, Europe and the Middle East, asking not to be identified because the issue is sensitive” News that indicates, Putin is cutting his losses and trying to negotiate with HTS. 

Syria indictates that Russia no longer has the combat power to support overseas deployments. The embarrassing withdrawal should remind NATO and US negotiators that Russia’s military capacity is stretched. Hence, Zelensky is smart to project reasonableness and the willingness to work with the Trump administration.  The conflict is probably entering its endgame and  Zelensky has an opportunity to ‘win the peace’ by working with rather than against the new administration.  Zelensky’s battle is not about territory or lines on the map it is about creating a secure, safe, and separate Ukraine.  

Security, not territory is Ukraine’s key strategic-level aim in negotiations

 At this stage, it is important to remember Russia’s key objective in this war, which can be sumarised as ‘regime change.’  When Putin talks about ‘de-Nazification’ or ‘de-militarisation’ of Ukraine he means creating a new Ukraine that is able to be dominated by Russia. A vassal state cast in the model of Belarus.  In the earliest days of the war he sought to achieve this objective by capturing Kyiv but as the war progressed his means to achieve this end evolved. Tempered by defeat his emphasis switched from Kyiv to controlling a ‘land bridge’ from Transnistria to Donbas.  Territory that if secured would land lock and surround Ukraine allowing Russia to dominate it. After being defeated at Kherson, he was forced to revise that plan.  Now his plan appears to revolve around trying to scare Ukraine’s supporters with the threat of a long, expensive war. A threat designed to encourage the US and NATO not to allow Ukraine to join NATO, or provide effective security guarantees in peace negotiations. 

A tragic aspect of Putin’s plan is that it is essentially an ‘information operation.’ He is willing to lose a thousand casualties per day to ensure Russia generates the fear of a long ‘forever war,’ if its objectives are not met. Putin believes that Ukraine’s supporters, especially the US are tiring of the war, so Russia is demonstrating both the will and the capacity to keep fighting.  Even if Russian forces are only capturing farmland the ‘line on the map’ is moving, reinforcing the idea that Russia is both willing and able to fight a long war

For Putin, any negotiation will revolve around preventing Ukraine getting meaningful security guarantees, from either NATO or the US.  If a negotiated peace includes Ukraine joining NATO, future Russian intervention is impossible, and Putin has lost. Therefore Russia’s current operational-level focus is driven by capturing ground to trade, and to demonstrate that Russia can keep fighting.  Putin would probably like to conquer Ukraine but realises that it is far beyond his current capabilities, Russia is not winning and instead it is throwing bodies at Ukraine’s lines to demonstrate it keep fighting, regardless of US policy. A noteworthy point for the Trump administration to consider. 

The situation at operational-level

On 12 December the US announced a US$ 500 million military aid package.  Another large aid package of equipment and ammunition drawn directly from US war stocks, meaning it will arrive quickly.  So far this month the US has provided, more than a billion dollars of material to Ukraine. It is noteworthy, that Russian casualty rates increased in the second half of this year after the flow of US aid was confirmed. Ukraine is probably confident in its logistics chain and firing more artillery, inflicting attrition according to General Syrskyi’s stated plan.   

Intense fighting continues across the frontline, from Kursk to Velyka Novosilika but generally without  operationally significant advances by either side.  Near Kursk, Russia has made some progress towards reducing the Ukrainian salient, capturing some territory on the it’s south east flank.  In the north-east near Kupyansk, Russia continues to maintain pressure and has achieved a small lodgement on the west side of the Oskil River. Further south, fierce positional fighting continues around Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.  

However, the most operationally significant developments are in the east, near Pokrovsk.  Russia continues to advance along the Solona River’s valley toward Shevchenko. Russia appears to concentrating its efforts south of Pokrovsk, getting ready for an assault on the town.  The Russian plan appears to be, to  avoid the large areas of open ground to the east of Pokrovsk and instead advance roughly north-east using complex boggy terrain, via the towns of Pischane and Zvirove. See the map below. 

My assessment is still that Pokrovsk is unlikely to fall in the immediate future. Although the Russians have recently advanced significant distances, this is often related to terrain. The Ukrainians falling back relatively large distances in open country to focus their effort on defendable terrain like towns, villages or wooded country.  To-date we have not seen a Ukrainian collapse, and this seems unlikely based on current reports, and because Russia’s commanders continue to dissipate effort against many different targets. 

The history of this campaign tells us that when a side chooses to defend a town or village, the other side needs to prepare for a tough fight. This has not changed, for instance Toretsk and Chasiv Yar are both still be contested months after being assaulted.  The Ukrainians are holding towns like Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and Kurakhove, using their strongly built Soviet-era apartment blocks to create deathtraps for Russian forces.  Eventually, Russian firepower can reduce the defences but each battle like this inflicts more attrition on Russia, weakening its forces and preventing them developing the momentum they need to transition into operationally significant manoeuvre. 

Essentially, the Ukrainians are fighting a delaying attritional battle and the key questions are:

• Can Ukraine sustain the losses they are inevitably taking? Or will Russia force a section of the front to collapse?
• If Ukraine can sustain the battle, do they have the reserves to transition to an offensive? Could Ukraine launch a surprise offensive to influence negotiations?
• How long can Russia maintain its ‘full court press?’ 

Questions that should be answered early next year when the Trump administration’s policy starts to coalesce, and both protagonists hare a clearer appreciation of the strategic situation. 

Summary 

Currently, the war is likely to enter a period of negotiation, an end game. Both sides are exhausted, but keen to demonstrate they can keep fighting in order to influence peace negotiations. Ukraine to confirm it is not a lost cause, Russia aiming to scare Ukraine’s supporters with the threat of long war.  

Strategically, Russia is weaker and has survived to-date because it inherited enormous stocks of equipment from the Soviet Union and by being willing to accept enormous casualties.  However, its war chest is nearly empty, it faces labour shortages and a looming economic crisis so its ability to sustain the war long-term is questionable. Recent events, including requesting help from North Korea and the withdrawal in Syria demonstrate that Russian military power is waning.  

Further, European leaders attitudes are hardening towards Russia and even Putin’s supporters China and India are concerned about his nuclear rhetoric.  Essentially, it feels like Putin has over-extended himself militarily and diplomatically.  Russia’s ‘red lines’ are consistently broken, and his military is demonstrably ineffective. Further, I think that Putin may have over-estimated his relationship with Trump, who I would speculate realises he has little to gain from allowing Russia to win. And, the new president holds the ‘trump’ card because he controls US support to Ukraine. Therefore, my predication is that we are entering the end game with the possibility of a peace deal being negotiated next year.  Therefore, expect to see plenty of activity in the next few weeks as both sides throw everything they can at securing the best possible deal. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack