Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update: A simple explanation of this week’s military and political developments in the Pacific

New Chinese naval base in Cambodia 

On 12 July, the ‘Breaking Defence’ website published an article titled ‘China’s newest military base abroad is up and running, and there are more on the horizon’ surmising that China’s naval presence at Ream in Cambodia indicates “China’s newest overseas military facility appears to be up and running, confirming years of suspicions about China’s presence in the Southeast Asian country.”  The base at Ream is described as mid-sized and capable of supporting training and helping to protect Chinese access to the South China Sea. 

Ream is China’s second overseas naval base, the first is an Indian Ocean base that opened in Djibouti in 2017.  Ream’s position demonstrates China’s interest in the South China Sea either to protect vital maritime trade routes or to enforce its claim to areas like Rifleman’s Bank and James Shoal, at the southern end of the ‘9 Dash’ line. 

China’s new naval base in Cambodia is not an immediate threat to regional security and the base’s development has a long history. China’s relationship becoming apparent in 2019 when Cambodia refused American aid for developing the base.  The development of a base at Ream is unlikely to be a direct challenge to the US or it partners and allies.   Currently, the US operates approximately 20 overseas naval bases (depending on how facilities are classified), nine of which are in the Indo-Pacific region so retains a significantly greater ability to project naval power.

In fact, a June 2024 article written by RAND corporation analysts titled ‘Not Ready for a Fight – Chinese Insecurities for Overseas Bases in Wartime’ provides insight into China’s military planning. The report indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strategy for developing overseas bases is still evolving. That although bases and facilities able to be turned into bases are certainly being investigated, China’s military planners are cautious about developing a network of bases for expeditionary operations. The article stating that ‘’The PLA is unlikely to resolve these self-assessed limitations and pose a meaningful threat to U.S. interests from its overseas forces in the immediate term.’’ 

After reviewing a body of Chinese theory about acquiring bases for expeditionary purposes, RAND reports there is still debate within the PLA about overall strategy concluding that “While the PLA’s interest in developing overseas bases remains an issue to monitor in the near term, it is unlikely to manifest into a significant wartime threat to U.S. operations through at least 2030.” Additionally, that China’s key area of military focus is the re-unification of Taiwan, an area likely to be prioritised ahead of building bases further afield. 

Building a useful network of bases requires military planning and logistics capabilities to protect and maintain them.  China still needs to build these skills and capabilities. Further, the RAND report indicates that within China’s military there are serious questions about the sustainability of overseas military bases during conflict. The RAND study assessing that “… without the ability to protect its bases from U.S. counteroffensives, a PLA overseas basing network would offer little utility for significant offensive operations at enormous cost during a war.” 

The RAND study does identify long-term Chinese anxiety about maintaining ‘Sea Lines of Communication,’ (SLOC), China is a trading nation and relies on oil shipped from the Middle East through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.  The study reports that “China’s PLA textbooks have long expressed anxiety over the PRC’s relative dearth of capabilities with which to control key SLOCs and deep concern about a potential U.S. blockade.”  The Djibouti base is clearly located to provide support to forces in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea and developing a naval base at Ream is consistent with managing the threat to SLOC from the Middle East.

Ream’s location also allows it to support activity in the South China Sea. Naval bases are used to resupply, re-arm or refuel ships and submarines, extending the time they can spend ‘on station’ away from their home ports. Chinese vessels working from Ream can operate for longer in the southern half of the South China Sea.  Therefore, if tensions in the area persist expect to see more activity in this port.  

Looking ahead, Ream is noteworthy because it may provide insight into China’s long-term intent for overseas bases.  The RAND report states that “the absence of evidence of PLA planning to use its bases to support offensive operations in wartime does not definitely provide evidence of an absence of PRC intent” and then provides a set of ‘indicators and warnings’ of China’s long-term intent either, to remain focussed on Taiwan or to develop the ability to project power globally.  The indicators include long-term deployment of highly capable warships and amphibious forces in foreign locations.  Good advice for those observing Ream and the Pacific region for a potential escalation of tension.      

Here are links to relevant articles: 

China’s newest military base abroad is up and running, and there are more on the horizon – Breaking Defense (ampproject.org)

Not Ready for a Fight: Chinese Military Insecurities for Overseas Bases in Wartime (rand.org)

More information about Pacific trends from the NATO summit 

Last week NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary in Washington.  The meeting included leaders from four Pacific nations; Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, known as the ‘Indo-Pacific Four’ or ‘IP 4.’  At the end of the summit the members issued a joint statement within which there is information about how NATO’s relationship with the Pacific may evolve. 

NATO’s increasing interest in the Indo- Pacific region was highlighted in its 2022 Strategic Concept. It specifically refers to the Indo-Pacific region as an area of interest and names China as a potential threat. Sentiments echoed in Paragraph 4 of the alliance’s recent joint statement that identifies the challenge posed by China, and by that nation’s deepening relationship with Russia. The statement says “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies continue to challenge our interests, security and values. The deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the PRC and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, are a cause for profound concern.” 

In terms of a Pacific perspective, NATO has identified a Sino-Russian threat to the international rules-based order.  A threat most likely to be addressed in the Indo-Pacific Region. An example of Chinese behaviour that fuels NATO concerns are its aggressive actions enforcing its claim in the South China Sea. A claim that is not internationally recognised, but that China aggressively enforces. Enforcement that is not legally mandated by international law but could that threaten an important maritime trade route.  European nations that rely on international trade are therefore concerned about this activity. Additionally, China’s tacit support for Russia’s war in Ukraine contributes to NATO’s perception that China has little regard for international law.

The joint statement is critical of Chinese activity, in Paragraph 26, the statement describes China as a ‘decisive enabler’ of Russia’s war with Ukraine. The next paragraph highlights China’s alleged cyber and dis-information operations in NATO nations stating “The PRC continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security.  We have seen sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation, stemming from the PRC.” Reading the joint statement and the 2022 Strategic Concept, it is safe to say that NATO’s assessment of the threat posed by China is not reducing.  

A noteworthy point is that ‘kinetic’ military competition between these parties is most likely to occur in the Indo-Pacific region. NATO supporting partners like South Korea, Japan or possibly other US allies. It is therefore important that Pacific nations are aware of NATO’s developing strategic position and NATO’s response to the perceived threat is to reinforce collective security arrangements to deter aggression and support the international rules-based order, while leaving a doorway open for dialogue with China.  Paragraph 14 starting with “We (NATO) remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests.” 

In 2016, IP 4 were invited to work with the alliance to manage North Korean aggression by extending NATO security relationships into the Indo-Pacific regions.  The joint statement indicates that this policy is increasingly important.  Paragraph 30 stating that “We (NATO) will meet with the leadership of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, and the European Union to discuss common security challenges and areas of cooperation.  The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.  We welcome the continued contributions of our Asia-Pacific partners to Euro-Atlantic security” and Paragraph 44 that “We (NATO) will increase outreach to countries in our broader neighbourhood and across the globe and remain open to engagement with any country or organisation, when doing so could bolster our mutual security.” 

Words that echo a range of recent deployments of NATO assets into the Pacific including Exercise Pacific Skies 2024, that involves NATO fighter aircraft, tankers and transport aircraft.  The latest in a range of activities and exercises that include last year’s deployment of German aircraft and paratroopers to Exercise Talisman Sabre, in Australia and NATO warships involvement in ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols in the Pacific.  Essentially, NATO’s deterrence against perceived Chinese aggression includes the Pacific. The alliance supporting collective security measures that protect the free movement of vessels in places like the East China Sea, Sea of Japan, South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. 

In the Pacific, we should expect to see more NATO activity. Probably not permanent positioning of forces but more and larger exercises to test and practice the movement of European combat power into the region. Probably using US and Australian bases and logistic infra-structure.  Hence, North Australia’s growing military infra-structure that can serve as a landing pad for reinforcements from the US and Europe.  Additionally, we should expect to see more integration of operational doctrine, digital communications, technology standards and training between NATO and IP4 countries. 

Melanesian update 

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

Chinese President hosts Solomon Islands Prime Minister

The Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Jeremiah Manele met Chinese President Xi Jinping last week. President Xi discussed China’s friendly relationship with Solomon Islands and plans for more cooperation around issues like healthcare, rural development, infrastructure and climate change.  

Since, Solomon Islands established diplomatic relationships with China instead of Taiwan trade between the nations has increased, by about 9.6% per annum.  Solomon Islands clearly benefits economically from the relationship and China benefits from the smaller nation’s diplomatic support.  

Japan donates computers to Solomon Islands anti-corruption office

In previous Pacific briefs we have discussed Japan’s support for programmes in the Pacific to strengthen governance. Last week, Japan donated a million dollars-worth of computer equipment to the Solomon Islands Independent Commission Against Corruption. This donation is part of a UN sponsored programme designed to strengthen governance in small Pacific nations. 

Senior US officials visit Papua New Guinea

Last week, senior US military officers and civilian officials visited Papua New Guinea. The aim of the visit was to encourage the delivery of a range of projects within the two nations Defence Cooperation Agreement.  The projects cover a wide range of civil and military functions including; deploying US civil affairs and medical training teams, supporting Papua New Guinea to address fuel and electricity supply concerns. 

The team included Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command along with senior White House, State Department and US AID officials.  A powerful group, and the visit is clearly designed to demonstrate America’s commitment to its relationship with Papua New Guinea. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack