GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Zelenskyy says expect to see more progress soon, do we believe him?

This week’s key activities were off the battlefield, in Russia the political landscape is evolving and internationally the agreement to maintain the flow of Ukrainian grain to the world market expired. Russia saying it will not renew the deal and obliquely threatening ships transiting the Black Sea. On the battlefield, the situation has changed little, Ukraine continues to make slow but consistent progress against strong Russian defences.  Ukraine still has a large reserve of around 60,000 soldiers that has not been deployed so is certainly still in the battle and we are waiting to see if cluster munitions (DPICM) will provide the necessary firepower to attrit Russian forces to the point that using the reserve is guaranteed to be successful; or whether it will require improvement of Ukraine’s air power to complete the task.  Can Ukraine use DPICMs to ‘tip’ the battle towards a successful large offensive this campaign season?  Is a question that will take time to answer.

But we can see that there has been a subtle change in Ukrainian tactics; a transition focussing on the ‘deep battle’ or destroying the enemy’s will and ability to fight by targeting their logistics.  An example of this change are the attacks on the Kerch Bridge and other targets in Crimea.  Ukraine damaged the bridge on 18 July, and attacked a nearby ammunition depot on 22 July; closing the bridge again. President Zelenskyy stated on Friday that ” the Crimean bridge, this is not just a logistical road — this is the road used to feed the war, with ammunition, and this has been done on a daily basis” summing up the bridge’s military importance and justifying attacks against it.

And; from a military perspective the Kerch Bridge is a vitally important piece of the Russian logistics chain. Its rail lines providing the main supply route from Russia’s main logistics base at Rostov-on-Don to their forces in Crimea, eastern Kherson and southern Zaporizihia.  Russia’s logistics were never very strong and it relies heavily on the rail network.  Two heavy rail networks support this area of operations; one that runs east – west from Mariupol and Dontesk to the city of Zaporizhia, then from there south to Melitopol and Crimea.  And; another that runs from Rostov-on-Don west over the Kerch Bridge, through Crimea and then north to Melitopol.  While Zaporizhia city remains in Ukrainian control Russia’s logistics support to Crimea, eastern Kherson and southern Zaporizihia are entirely reliant on the Kerch Bridge. 

Further, Russia’s military truck fleet was severely depleted early in the war meaning that the only remaining alternative is trying to supply their forces using ships.  An increasingly risky proposition as Ukrainian drones and missiles become more effective at targeting ships.  The Kerch Bridge especially its rail line is militarily very, very important to Russia’s campaign.  However, there is another angle to this operation that is worth discussing, ‘Information War.’  

Crimea is where the Russian middle-class and elite holiday, its warm weather and beaches are a welcome change from Moscow and St Petersburg’s harsh climate.  Last week’s first attack on the bridge saw large traffic jams and long lines of holiday-maker’s cars parked along the E97 motorway.  An experience that those people will take home and tell their friends about. Putin may control the mass media in Russia and big hunks of social media, but he can’t stop the Russian lawyers, doctors, civil servants and small business people whose holiday was ruined from complaining and talking.  Compromising the Kerch Bridge doesn’t just affect the military campaign it hits this group of influential people, who will talk and discuss the war creating more political drama to be managed in Moscow. 

Already, Putin has plenty of political drama to manage.  He is still managing the fallout of Prigozhin’s coup, initially purging the military and now turning his attention to Russia’s strange world of ultra-nationalist military bloggers, arresting Igor Girkin a popular military blogger and ardent Russian ultra-nationalist.  In most parts of world, a military blogger like Girkin would have little influence, their work catering to a relatively small sector of the population.  Military nerds and possibly political operatives seeking alternative viewpoints, but in Russia this group has achieved a high level of political influence.  Girkin’s arrest should not be seen in isolation because several other ultra-nationalist political figures have also been arrested. The Institute for the Study of War has speculated for some time that Girkin and his supporters are linked to a key player in Russia’s security service (FSB) who feeds information to them and uses their political influence. The institute assessing on 21 July stating that “The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.” The institute indicating that there may be ‘bigger wheels in motion’ as Putin and his allies consolidate their power after Prigozhin’s coup.    

 Russian politics are opaque at the best of times and last week was no exception, however we can be certain that there is instability within the elite.  This is inevitable and its impact on the war is hard to define and at this point it does not appear to have changed the situation in Ukraine.  However, time will tell and Putin’s biggest political play this week is threatening to cancel the Ukrainian grain deal and to board civilian ships that traverse the Black Sea.  This activity is the latest example of Putin’s aggressive and destructive approach to foreign policy and it appears that his aims are to:

• Limit Ukraine’s ability to get income from exports. 
• Create a global food crisis that forces Ukraine’s allies to reconsider their punitive sanctions allowing Russia to get the money it needs to finance the war and more access to key imports.
• Possibly, to reduce grain supply generally increasing demand and therefore prices for Russian grain. 

Putin is backing his policy by attacking Mykolaiv and Odessa’s port and storage facilities trying to destroy Ukraine’s physical capacity to export grain. Odessa has suffered numerous missile attacks over the last week destroying facilities and stockpiled grain.  This activity is important because Putin is using scarce resources to attack Odessa, missiles that could be used against Ukraine’s military.  Actions that tell us that either; Putin is confident that his forces will hold the line in Ukraine or that he really needs to stop the flow of Ukrainian grain to the world.  The latter situation may demonstrate that sanctions are working and that Russia’s financial and economic situation is deteriorating rapidly.  And; it is interesting that for all of his rhetoric Putin is choosing his words carefully seeking to negotiate rather than completely throwing the deal away which may indicate that the sanctions are hurting his war-fighting ability. 

How can the world respond?  Giving in and removing sanctions will only empower Putin and demonstrate that he can use bullying tactics to get what he wants. Conversely, holding fast on the sanctions will see many people suffer all around the world.  It is a tough situation, speaking on Times Radio defence commentator Chris Parry outlined some possible options including:

• Using a route through the territorial waters of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria for grain ships that would potentially provide a measure of security for about 500km out of the 700km journey.  
• Using a tactic that was used successfully during the 1980s when Iran blockaded the Straits of Hormuz stopping oil shipments from the Persian Gulf.  Tankers were re-flagged under United States jurisdiction meaning that they were protected by that nation and Iran did not want conflict with the United States. 

Both options are high-risk, if Russia boards grain ships in a NATO member’s territorial waters it is a big deal.  Likewise, the idea of sailing ships under the United States flag seems like a guaranteed way to escalate the situation, which is not to say that it won’t work.  Readers familiar with the Cuban Missile Crisis will know that during this event the United States Navy blockaded Cuba, stopping and boarding Soviet ships in international waters.  A high-risk intervention that demonstrated United States resolve and forced the Soviets to back down on their plan to put nuclear weapons in Cuba.   High-risk strategies don’t always pay off but we can safely bet that between NATO and the United Nations there is a lot of backroom discussion happening to try and develop a workable solution to this problem that does not let Putin achieve his goals.  

Meanwhile, with regards to the land campaign on Friday President Zelensky publicly stated that the offensive will soon start to move more quickly.  This may be rhetoric; or we may be starting to see the culmination of Ukraine’s shaping battle.  Last week Ukraine made little progress on any of its three main areas of operation:

• Advancing from near Orikhiv towards Tokmak.
• Reducing the Velyka Novosilka salient.
• Encircling Bakhmut.

However, last week’s progress does not tell the full story because we know that battle to draw out and destroy Russian artillery and reserves would take time. Fourteen weeks ago, in this column (see ‘The Truth about Ukraine’s Offensive’) we said “The offensive is likely to start slowly” and “Ukraine does not have an air and artillery firepower advantage; so it can’t overwhelm the Russian’s defences with sheer firepower.  Instead, we are likely to see precision guided depth fire. HIMARS knocking out supply hubs and concentrations of reserves. Ukraine also lacks numbers so it can’t afford to risk resources in poorly planned attacks.  Expect widespread and persistent reconnaissance that’s tempo builds over time probably culminating in an axis of attack that is unexpected.  Finally, the south is now well-fortified so progress is likely to be careful and slow as Ukraine uses combined arms war fighting techniques to breech Russia’s defensive lines.” 

And; this prediction is currently proving accurate, Ukraine slowly and carefully probing in small combat teams, drawing out Russia’s reserves and destroying them.  Focussed on attrition and making the frontline ‘brittle’ because if it can be broken Ukraine has approximately 60,000 soldiers with modern NATO equipment ready and waiting to push through the frontline and exploit the situation.  In last week’s summary we noted that Ukraine is developing areas on the frontline in which they appear to have weakened Russian defences, points at which the application of DPICM firepower may create a hole for this force to push through. Ukraine’s change of tactics, with an increased focus on depth targets like logistics hubs and ammunition dumps may be a precursor to a larger commitment of Ukrainian forces at one or more of these points supported by the additional firepower DPICMs provide; or it could mean Ukraine has appreciated that its offensive has stalled so is switching to depth targets rather than committing its reserve. 

In summary, I have been ‘bullish’ throughout about Ukraine’s chances of success this summer. Even though Russia has greater numbers; and has had time to develop a powerful defensive line. I am confident in the Manoeuvrist Doctrine that is employed by Ukraine and in the higher morale and commitment of their forces.  Further, recent advances in surveillance and precision-strike technology that Ukraine is taking advantage of may be re-writing military thinking about airpower.  Perhaps, this war is challenging air power’s pre-eminence in tactics.  The increasing availability of long-range, accurate and powerful precision-strike weapons providing an alternative to air delivered bombs.  

However, the recent United States decision to supply DPICMs to Ukraine challenged my assessment.  It is an admission that Ukraine needs more frontline firepower.  Fortunately, the United States has literally millions of DPICM artillery shells in storage, a stockpile built to defend Europe from the Soviet war machine that is being shipped to Ukraine. DPICMs started being used against the Russians late last week, but the question is whether this additional firepower will be enough to change the course of the campaign by creating the hole in Russia’s defences Ukraine needs. It is impossible to say for sure, instead all we can do is watch and wait.   The ‘tipping point’ is coming soon. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer and TDBs military blogger