GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – Tension builds in Ukraine as Christmas comes

Christmas is less than a week away but in Ukraine seasonal cheer will be thin on the ground as soldiers and civilians hunker down trying to keep warm and stay alive. Although in recent weeks, the frontline in Ukraine has stabilised this does not mean that there is not tension building in the region. And; my gut feeling is that Avril Haynes, United States head of intelligence may soon be proven wrong by an explosion of activity.   Both sides are under enormous pressure to break the current deadlock, go on the offensive and try to regain some momentum.  

After mobilising approximately 300,000 soldiers, the Russians fed about half to the Ukrainian guns in order to stop the Luhansk offensive and also to allow for a controlled withdrawal across the Dnipro.  The remaining 150,000 soldiers are nearing the end of their training cycle and where these soldiers will be deployed is still uncertain. North of Kyiv, in Belarus a Russian combined arms army (about 9,000 soldiers) has reportedly been building up forces in the south since the start of October. Belarus provided a large number of tanks, artillery and vehicles to replace Russian losses; and the build-up was interpreted as an opportunity to match mobilising troops with this equipment while threatening Kyiv and forcing Ukraine to keep troops on the Belarus border. 

By late November, commentators were interpreting the build-up of Russian forces in Belarus in a more threatening way. American ‘think tank’ the Jamestown Foundation stating late in November that “This is also a marker that a strike group will most likely be formed from the Russian units in Belarus in the near future, about which the Ukrainian General Staff has regularly warned. Overall, this grouping’s tasks will be to jeopardize the supply of aid to Ukraine and seize the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant”.  Essentially, the Russian forces re-constituting in Belarus provide a grouping of forces that could be used to support Russian strategy.  An offensive in northern Ukraine or the area around Kyiv would be integrated with Russia’s wider strategy of targeting Ukraine’s civil infrastructure.  Further, an offensive in this area could help disrupt the flow of NATO aid to Ukraine because its impact on power infra-structure makes it harder to manage railways and an offensive could directly threaten supply routes from Poland.

Last week, tension in this area increased further Reuters reporting that “A flurry of Belarusian military action, including a counter-terrorism exercise last week, has kept Ukraine guessing about Minsk’s intentions and raised concerns in Kyiv that it might join the war on Russia’s side”. At the same time Ukraine is issuing statements about an imminent Russian offensive from Belarus. 

This week, on 19 December 2022 Putin is scheduled to meet Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk. The meeting is to discuss greater cooperation between the countries including a series of snap drills and exercises being conducted this week and planned next week.  Last week’s activity also included a very large and significant Russian missile attack that targeted Kyiv.   Ukraine has been very public about its concerns in the north, and it seems that Russia is using this force to ‘fix’ Ukrainian forces on the Belarus border. Holding them in place in case they are required to stop an offensive from Belarus rather than being able to use them in other areas to support offensive operations.

 However, it should be noted that the Ukrainians are also successfully fixing a large Russian force in Donetsk.  Ukrainian pressure on the area around Kremina and Russia’s obsession with Bhakmut combining to keep a large number of Russian soldiers occupied.  The Ukrainians are also successfully convincing the Russian’s to ‘dig in’ facing west along the Dnipro River.  An interesting situation because most analysts think there is little chance of Ukraine crossing the river and attacking on this axis.  Essentially, the Russians cannot constitute an offensively focused reserve in the south and east because they are either defensively postured along the Dnipro River and the Svatove-Kremina line or their resources are being fed into the Bhakmut meatgrinder.  Most importantly, the Ukrainian information machine is silent about these area.  Independent media is shut out and very little information flow is coming from Ukrainian sources. Instead, their information operations are directed at highlighting the threat from Belarus.

So what is happening? Who has the initiative and is driving the tempo of the operation? 

My answer is that we have seen this pattern before and that at this time the tempo is being driven by the weather.  Ukraine is still suffering the effect of autumnal rain and both sides are waiting for the ground to freeze.  And; I think that as soon as the ground freezes we will see some significant movement.

The first question relates to the Russian presence in Belarus. The force that we know is mustering there is significant providing Russia an ability to concentrate force at a key point and achieve a ‘break in’.   However, the force we know about is not large enough to make a significant operational impact.  Possibly, it could seize an objective within about 100km of the border so the Rivne Nuclear Power Station is a potential target. About 50% of Ukraine’s power is nuclear generated and disruption or capture of this power plant would reduce Ukraine’s nuclear power generation capacity by more than 10%.  A significant blow on top of the production lost when the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was captured and this action would contribute to Russia’s wider plan to interrupt Ukraine’s civil infrastructure. Capturing this area would also interdict the E373 highway that links Lublin in Poland with Kyiv.  The key issue is that a force of this size will be defeated.  It is not large enough to hold an 85km salient and will be pushed back by the Ukrainians.  Turning the operation into a raid rather than an offensive. 

Another option advanced by the Ukrainians in their information campaign is that the Russians will advance on Kyiv.  An even more unlikely option because Kyiv’s defences will be very strong and Russia does not appear to have the numbers; even with the full 150,000 newly mobilised soldiers deployed Russia would struggle to capture Kyiv. Numbers alone are not a good measure of offensive capability, the newly mobilised units are even more poorly trained, equipped and led than the Russians soldiers in the initial invasion and this time they will be meeting a fully prepared Ukrainian defence.

Even in the unlikely event that Belarus forces joined an advance, their army is small and suffers the same problems the Russians have including low fighting strength states, poor leadership, old equipment and dated tactics.  Although, considerable work is reported to be underway to integrate Belarus and Russian forces it takes months or years to generate effective integrated units; and requires willingness from both parties. Unfortunately for the Russians, there is lots of evidence that Belarussians don’t support the war in Ukraine either at the political level or at an individual level within the armed forces. 

United States intelligence sources are not confirming Ukraine’s concerns, instead John Kirby recently stated that US intelligence officials “aren’t seeing any indication that there’s an imminent move on Kyiv”.  Throughout the war United States policy has been to be transparent about identified threats and if there was a significant build up on Ukraine’s northern border it is likely that it would be noted. So at this stage, the Institute for the Study of War’s assessment seems correct “A Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible”. 

Ukraine is keen to highlight the potential threat to the north for two reasons:

• The threat encourages NATO nations media to keep talking about the war and therefore to maintain the interest of European voters; and
• If the world is talking about Belarus, then it is not looking at Ukraine’s next move.

As I said we have seen this pattern before, Ukrainian information operations designed to divert attention away from where the blow will actually land.  A couple of weeks ago in the article What next?  Can Ukraine recapture the initiative? I laid out what I thought would be Ukraine’s plan and that can be summarised as follows:

• Ukraine has two broad options; pushing east into Luhansk in the north or south into the area between Mariupol and the Dnipro River (the Crimean land bridge). 
• However, the south coast is the campaign’s ‘vital ground’, the ground that if you hold it – you win.  Russia needs this area to access Crimea, a region of vast historical, psychological, political and military significance.  If Ukraine can cut the ‘land bridge’ Crimea is effectively isolated. 
• The south coast is also hard for Russia to support logistically. Until the Kerch rail bridge is running again Russia does not have a rail supply line into the ‘land bridge’.  Instead, they must truck supplies forwards; and have a limited number of trucks. 
• An assault south needs to cover about 80 km to get to the coast.  Less, if Melitopol is the target.  

Based on these factors it seems likely that the Ukrainians will push south. Breaking the Svatove-Kremina Line, advancing east and capturing Luhansk is probably an easier option but strategically won’t win the war.  Breaking the Crimean land bridge on the other hand brings victory much closer reducing the risk of Ukraine losing NATO’s support.  Mariupol is where Russian rail from Donetsk terminates and without this area under control supplying Russia’s forces in the south becomes much harder.  In winter logistics requirements are higher as forces need more clothes, fuel for heating and the ability to evacuate frost bitten soldiers.  Breaking the ‘land bridge’ isolates Russian forces on the south coast and Crimea and winter is the best time to move because if ground is captured in winter, then in spring rain provides an operational pause to re-organise and regenerate after the offensive.  

In simple terms a successful winter offensive in the south, with the objective of breaking the Crimean land bridge could see the Ukrainians able to isolate Crimea with an option to advance north into Donetsk possibly encircling Russian forces currently deployed forwards trying to push west near Bhakmut.  And; Mariupol seems like a good target.  The city’s role in Russian logistics, the fact that it is already battered and largely evacuated combined with its value as a potential place to pivot north into occupied Donetsk all contribute to this assessment.  

So it makes sense that the Ukrainians are talking big about a coming battle in the north while at the same time fixing Russia’s army near the Dnipro River and Bhakmut as they prepare for their next move far away from their current discussions.  The only questions are when and where?  And; it is likely that when the ground freezes we will find out. 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.