Ben Morgan’s Pacific Update – Security discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum – Foreign Ministers Meeting

The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting is approaching fast. Last week member state’s Foreign Ministers met in Suva. The Pacific Islands Forum is a key element of the Pacific’s security architecture.  Its membership includes 18 nations from Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia including Australia and New Zealand. The forum also provides opportunities for diplomatic discussions with approx. 24 ‘dialogue partners,’ a group of nations that include the US, UK, France, Japan, Taiwan and China. 

Notably, the forum has a history of successful collaboration around security issues, including 2002’s successful intervention in Solomon Islands. The Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands stopped an ethnic conflict in the nation, and supported the re-establishment of civilian government.  The forum has also supported Tonga and New Caledonia to manage security issues.  

However, a key feature of recent forums has been diplomatic competition. For example, in 2025, the host Solomon Islands, banned all dialogue partners from the Leaders’ Summit because concerns were raised about Chinese diplomatic pressure to ban Taiwan from attending the conference.  Rather than single out China or Taiwan, the members decided to ban all dialogue partners. 

As we build up to this year’s leaders meeting, on 30 August, the forum is again debating issues related to Sino-American or Sino-Australian competition. Like responding to China’s ballistic missile test in the region last month. 

A joint statement opposing testing in the Pacific was debated but was not supported by the forum. The members use a consensus decision-making model and therefore the opposition of only two countries – Narau and Kiribati – was enough to prevent a statement being agreed. Radio NZ reported that “Disagreement from some China-aligned Pacific Islands countries has prevented regional countries within the Pacific Islands Forum issuing a joint statement against missile testing in the Pacific.”  

Another issue tabled at this week’s Foreign Ministers meeting is a proposal from Solomon Islands for a new regional collective security treaty.  New Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale, first proposed the idea soon after his election in May 2026. Wale discussed the idea with Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese in June 2026.

If agreed, the proposed treaty could significantly change how Pacific nations respond to security threats. The forum’s current collegial approach is guided by principles stated in regional declarations like Biketawa, Boe, and the Ocean of Peace. This approach has historically worked well because decisions are carefully considered, collective and action requires consensus.

An agreement or treaty, on the other hand, may compel participants to undertake specific actions in some situations.  Dr Anna Powles, from Massey University summed up the differences for Radio NZ as follows “The proposed treaty would convert political commitments into obligations under international law, which poses a series of questions from what obligations it creates, whether decisions remain consensual, and whether it regulates existing bilateral security partnerships.”

At present there is not much information available about the proposal but some impacts of a multinational security agreement could include; changing the focus of security discussions, members having less freedom of action and regional decision-making being less consensus based. For example, a new treaty may require members to notify other members about new security threats or about proposed new security arrangements with other countries. 

External powers that wish to retain or grow their influence in the region are all likely to try and shape the discussion.  As Powles points out – “There will be concern in parts of the region that the proposed treaty could become another geopolitical instrument through which certain states seek to limit their competitors.” 

Anyone with an interest in Pacific geo-politics should be carefully studying the forthcoming Leaders Meeting because it is likely to be an interesting meeting.  Recently, Australia has signed new security agreements with Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji effectively blocking China’s diplomacy in these nations. Immediately after his election in May 2026, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale stated he wanted to ‘reset’ the nation’s relationship with Australia. Immediately, Australia provided AUS $ 35 million in emergency aid and the two nations confirmed that they are negotiating a bi-lateral security agreement.  Recently, Wale also discussed repairing his nation’s relationship with the US. 

My assessment is that Australia’s diplomatic successes will be concerning for China, a nation that has worked hard to build greater influence in the region. Several other nations including India and Taiwan are also keen to maintain, or extend their influence in the Pacific and will be following the situation closely. This means that we should expect plenty of politicking at the Leaders Meeting. 

Exercise RIMPAC 2026

The world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), finished on 31 July.  The exercise is a bi-annual, US-led event that provides opportunities for the US, its allies and partners to practice their war-fighting skills. RIMPAC 2026 ran from 24 June – 31 July. 

Studying military exercises provides insight into participant nation’s security policy and this year’s exercise was large and complex involving approx. 30,000 service personnel from 30 nations, 30 warships, five submarines, and 197 aircraft.  

The participating land, sea and air components practiced a range of skills that indicate the type of littoral conflict being planned for, the key elements of which can be summarised as follows: 

• Inter-operability. RIMPAC 2026 saw a range of activities designed to practice inter-operability or militaries working together. The exercise included training exchanges and joint-operations but another notable factor was the delegation of command roles to non-US exercise participants. For example, a Japanese officer was appointed Vice Commander, RIMPAC 2026 Combined Task Force, a South Korean officer commanded RIMPAC 2026 Combined Force Maritime Component, a Chilean officer commanded the Maritime Logistics Support Element, and an Indian officer served as Deputy Commander of Theatre Anti-Submarine Warfare Combined Task Force 174. The appointment to command roles of partner nations is a method for building better understanding and inter-operability. 
• Amphibious operations.  The US Navy and Marine Corps led a large-scale amphibious operation involving ships, aircraft, and soldiers from several nations. A key was to integrate partner nations throughout planning and execution of the operations. The exercise also practiced a key skill of amphibious warfare, Naval Gunfire Support, fifteen ships participating in live-firing practice.
• Joint long-range strike. The exercise demonstrated the importance of US and allied forces being inter-operable so they can coordinate long-range missile attacks across military assets from several partner nations. For example, Japan Ground Self-Defence Forces 8th Surface to Ship Missile Regiment and the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 623rd Field Artillery carried out a live firing practice and sank a target warship using their respective Type 12 anti-ship missile and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Notably, the Spanish frigate ESPS Alvaro De Bazan fired an AGM-84 Harpoon and US Army, US Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy helicopters also practiced working together and firing missiles against target hulks.

Studying Exercise RIMPAC 2026 we can see that there is a trend towards bigger and more operationally focussed training. Specifically, the focus on inter-operability and the capabilities required for littoral conflict provide the building blocks of a collective military response to aggression in the region. Further, the exercise involved a wide range of countries from outside the Pacific including; Germany, Greece, India, Spain, Poland and the UK indicating the high level of international interest in the region.  Exercises like RIMPAC 2026 are not just training activities but are also capability demonstrations designed to deter assertive diplomacy from escalating into physical conflict. 

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. 

US – Solomon Islands security deal creates political tension

A new US – Solomon Islands security deal, called a ‘ship rider’ agreement that allows US Coast Guard vessels into Solomon Islands waters, to conduct joint law enforcement and surveillance operations alongside local police has ignited political tension in the small nation. Essentially, the agreement allows Solomon Islands law enforcement agencies to ride on US Coast Guard ships during transits of the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).  Solomon Islands benefiting from having access to US Coast Guard ships to help police its EEZ.  The US already has a approx. a dozen similar agreements with small nations across the Pacific. 

However, the opposition party in the Solomon Islands parliament argues that the agreement will prejudice Solomon Islands sovereignty.  The leader of the opposition Manasseh Sogavare, argues that the agreement allows the US to over-ride Solomon Islands interests. Sogavare’s position is indicative of local political tension about relationships with external powers like the US, Australia or China. 

Radio NZ quoted esteemed legal scholar and Solomon Islands National University vice-chancellor, Dr Transform Agorae, who cautioned that “One concern I have observed in the current debate is that legal arguments sometimes become proxies for political preferences. Instead of discussing whether an agreement complies with international law, discussions sometimes shift towards whether one supports the government that negotiated it, or whether one supports the foreign country involved.”

In my opinion, Agorae’s statement captures a difficult situation very well. Melanesia is on the front-line of intense geo-political competition and every decision must be carefully weighed and considered.  And, like Agorae I believe international and local law should provide the basis for consideration rather than diplomatic or political pressure. 

Papua New Guinea requests election support from Timor Leste

In an interesting acknowledgement of the new nation’s development Papua New Guinea has asked Timor Leste to provide security assistance during its upcoming elections. Radio NZ reported that “PNG’s Prime Minister James Marape said the request is part of a broader plan to build a 1000-strong multinational election security and observation team. This would feature soldiers from Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Australia, and New Zealand.” Timor Leste has been asked to provide 200 personnel. 

Participation in a security and observation operation protecting the integrity of Papua New Guinea’s elections is a big step for Timor Leste’s defence force and is an acknowledgement of the new nation joining the Melanesian family of nations. It reflects on the resilience of the Timorese people and the hard work of UN soldiers and civilians that contributed to stabilising the country, and building its state infrastructure over the 25 years since it became independent. 

Bougainville independence – An update

Bougainville is a large island located between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. During the 1980s and 90s a bloody civil war was fought for Bougainvillean independence that killed approx.20-30,000 people.  

The war finished in 1997, after a peace deal was brokered by New Zealand. Later, a peace accord was signed in 2001 that outlined the steps towards Bougainville becoming independent.

In 2019, a referendum confirmed that 98% of the population want independence. Since then the matter has been debated in Papua New Guinea’s parliament. The referendum is non-binding so a final decision on Bougainville’s status must be made by Papua New Guinea’s parliament, and there has been considerable debate about options and the majority required for a final decision. 

Papua New Guinea’s parliament decided in June the ratification vote will require a three-quarters majority of Members of Parliament rather than the normal two-thirds threshold usually required for a constitutional change. 

Last week, Radio NZ reported that “After months of uncertainty, both governments have resolved that the Bougainville referendum results will finally be tabled for parliamentary deliberation in three week’s time.” 

My assessment is that Papua New Guinea’s parliament will stall, or say ‘No’ offering greater local autonomy rather than giving the island its independence.  The reasons why can be summarised as follows: 

• Bougainville is rich in natural resources and potentially provides valuable revenue for Papua New Guinea. In 2025, Radio NZ reporter Scott Waide wrote “Economically, Bougainville once underpinned the national budget through the Panguna mine. At its peak, Panguna generated nearly half of Papua New Guinea’s total export earnings and around 17 percent of national government revenue, effectively underwriting the young state’s finances in the years surrounding independence.”
• Additionally, Papua New Guinea has other resource rich provinces that may wish to break away; New Ireland or East New Britain.  Bougainville’s independence could trigger further independence discussions in these provinces. 

However, Bougainvillians may have other plans and last month the Autonomous Bougainville Government announced it plans to declare independence in 2030. Bougainville is also continuing its preparations for self-government until at least 1 September 2027. 

Papua New Guinea’s desire to keep Bougainville combined with the strong independence movement make the situation unstable and potentially dangerous.  Bougainville is definitely an area in Melanesia that Pacific observers should keep watching.

 

Ben Morgan is TDBs Military Blogger. a defence and security analyst specialising in modern warfare, military adaptation, and operational-level conflict analysis. He posts at Substack. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan