BEN MORGAN: Ukrainian air campaign escalates, more trouble for Russia

Currently, the Ukraine War is at a very interesting point. President Zelensky suddenly replaced the both nation’s defence minister and its military commander-in-chief. Ukraine’s air campaign expanded from prioritising Russian oil and gas infrastructure to include attacking Russia’s version of Amazon.  Meanwhile, Ukrainian intelligence sources report that Russia is considering mass mobilisation. It has been a busy couple of weeks in Ukraine! 

 

Leadership changes are an insight into Ukrainian civil-military relationships 

On 15 July, President Zelensky dismissed Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov. Days later the president dismissed the Chief of the Ukraine’s Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. In less than a week, Ukraine changed its most senior civil and military leaders.  A notable turn of events, that demonstrates that potential governance and management tensions are inherent in any conflict.

Fedorov and Syrskyi are very different characters, and conflict was probably inevitable. Fedorov is a tech-savvy reformer credited with being the intellectual horsepower behind Ukraine’s recent advances in drone warfare. Syrskyi is a different beast, trained in the same style of war as his Russian opponents and his nickname ‘The Butcher’ immediately characterised him negatively in many people’s minds. 

A recent article with retired Estonian Commander in Chief, General Martin Herem in the Baltic Sentinel quotes Syrskyi’s view of the civil military relationship as follows: “I fight the war and tell you what I need, and you — the Ministry of Defense — deliver it. If you do not, I will find another solution. But you do not come and tell me how I should use these things.” Sentiments that would be common to most generals around the world, and that are at the crux of the civil-military relationship.

In most states, military commanders are subordinate to civil power and rely on the wider civilian state to provide them with the resources they need to fight. But military commanders also need a degree of freedom to operate effectively and these boundaries are generally hard to define so there is often tension between elected or politically appointed officials and their generals.  An important element of the Art of War at these levels of command is managing civil-military relationships.

Hard to reconcile differences that are summarised with regard to Ukraine in a The Conversation article by Doctors Sarah Whitmore and Bettina Renz who observe that “…. Fedorov came to symbolise a more modern and hi-tech approach to warfare in contrast to Syrskyi’s Soviet style of military leadership.” 

Regardless of conflict between these leaders, Syrskyi’s strategy is working. Ukraine has stopped Russia’s advance, inflicted massive casualties and is damaging the Russian economy. Fedorov contributed to the strategy’s success over the last six months by streamlining integration between the military and Ukraine’s defence industry.  Fedorov’s work meant that new drone and digital communications technology was delivered quickly, and at scale.  A joint effort that created Ukraine’s ‘drone wall,’ stopped Russian advances, and provided new long-range strike drones and missiles that Ukraine uses to attack both on the battlefield and deep behind the front-lines.  

In Ukraine’s case, Fedorov was dismissed first and then after large civilian protests Syrskyi was dismissed. Obviously, it is unwise to dismiss both of the most important civil and military leaders at the same time and the sequence of events may provide insight into Ukraine’s government and leadership.

My first observation is that this situation indicates Zelensky relies on the military establishment more than individual defence ministers.  Initially, he dismissed Fedorov and my speculation is that this action aimed to retain his relationship with Syrskyi, and the wider military establishment. However, Zelensky underestimated the political backlash and when the unpopularity of the decision became apparent, he was forced to dismiss Syrskyi. 

Zelensky probably appointed Fedorov to achieve a rapid increase in Ukraine’s drone capability. During his tenure as defence minister, he managed to bridge the gap between industry and the military, introduced new tech, and most notably developed methods to scale implementation of new capabilities. Ukraine’s factories now produce millions of drones; outpacing and out performing Russian production.  

Perhaps, like many innovators Fedorov was difficult to work with and robustly challenged Syrskyi and the military establishment. A group that Zelensky values highly and at a pragmatic level needs to retain a good relationship with. So after a significant capability leap was delivered, Fedorov’s position was reviewed and Zelensky decided to dismiss him to ease the concerns of his military. 

Based on this assessment I do not believe the dismissals were well-planned or are indicative of a re-structure prior to a change of plan like a Ukrainian offensive. Instead, my assessment is that the changes are a stumble, the Fedorov-Syrskyi relationship simply became toxic and Zelensky took action. An action that had unexpected consequences. 

 

Ukraine’s new military leadership – What changes are likely?

Yevhenii Khmara was appointed Acting-Defence Minister and is an interesting choice because he has a history of special operations commands.  He led the operation to re-capture Snake Island and Operation Spiders Web, a series of surprise drone attacks on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet in 2025.  He is a seasoned professional military officer whose appointment is probably an attempt to stablise the civil-military relationship.

The new commander of Ukraine’s military is Mykhailo Drapatyi, who at 43 is the youngest Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  Drapatyi is a popular commander with a combat history dating back to the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea.  Since then Drapatyi’s reputation has continued to grow, and he became a leader tasked with stabilising threatened sectors of the frontline including at Vovchansk in 2024 and later in Luhansk. He then led the important ‘Khortytsia’ later ‘Dnipro’ Operational-Strategic Grouping of Forces. 

Throughout his career, Drapatyi is described in positive terms by his subordinates and he is famous for submitting his resignation after a 2025 Russian missile attack killed 12 soldiers under his command on a parade ground. Drapatyi’s acceptance of personal accountability and responsibility for the attack’s success is a trait that people admire.  

Based on the available public information it is unlikely that the Khmara will be as innovative as Fedorov but he is likely to get on better with Drapatyi. The two soldiers probably know each other and share a military bond. I believe that these appointments signal a commitment to consolidation and that although Syrskyi may be gone his strategy is working. So, in the foreseeable future I see little change in Ukraine’s war plan that can be summarised as follows:

• Use drones and long-range missiles to put political pressure on Putin by damaging Russia’s economic infra-structure and isolating Crimea.
• Defend the frontline and use defensive battles to attrit Russia and inflict sufficient attrition that Russia’s cannot afford to continue the war.

In my opinion, this means that we should not expect a sudden Ukrainian transition to offensive operations because – If the plan is working – Why would Ukraine risk a ground offensive?    

 

‘Wildberries’ – extending Ukraine’s strategic air campaign

Ukraine’s air campaign targeting the Russian economy expanded this week to include attacks on Russia’s version of Amazon – ‘Wildberries.’  Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed several enormous distribution centres, sounding alarms in the Russian economy. The Ukrainian attacks have already destroyed approx. 10% of Wildberries warehouse capacity.

The chain is Russia’s largest online retailer and The Independent reports that “Together, Wildberries and competitor Ozon, account for economic activity worth around 8.5% of Russia’s GDP. They support around 4 million jobs, or more than 5% of Russia’s workforce.”   

Ukraine’s official position is that Wildberries logistics infrastructure is being used to support Russian operations making the warehouses a military target.  However, it is more likely that the attacks are designed to damage the Russian economy and exacerbate Russia’s air defence problems.  The chain’s large warehouses are easy targets that cannot be hidden and are spread across Russia so are probably impossible to effectively defend. Any Russian attempt to do so will further stretch their already thin air defences allowing for Ukrainian attacks on other targets, like oil facilities or defence factories. 

The economic impact is difficult to predict and game theorist and analyst William Spaniel provides a good analysis on his You Tube channel titled ‘How the Wildberries Meltdown Could Dismantle the Entire Russian Economy.’ Although the destruction of Wildberries logistics infra-structure will impact on the local supply chain, especially small and medium-sized businesses, it is also likely that the real economic target is the Russian banking system. 

Wildberries is a large business that relies on Russian banks for loans and will struggle to repay debt if Ukraine’s attacks continue.  The size of Wildberries means that if it cannot honour its debts there could be significant impacts on the wider Russian financial sector. For example, Reuters recently quoted Denys Shtilierman, Fire Point’s co-founder and chief designer who on 27 July 2026 described “Wildberries as the largest borrower in Russia and said its demise would lead to the collapse ​of a large number of banks, including VTB.” 

Reuters also reports that “The Russian government is exploring ways to support Wildberries, the country’s biggest online retailer, and related businesses after Ukrainian drone attacks, with state-controlled bank ​VTB expected to play a central role.” Unfortunately for Russia, the government’s ability to underwrite banks is rapidly reducing as Ukraine’s attacks interdict the flow of oil and gas exports.  

This expansion of the air campaign indicates that Ukraine remains focussed on its key strategic goal – Breaking Russia’s economy in order to create political pressure on Putin. It is also a good lesson for other countries about the vulnerability of centralised logistics, and the model’s implications for national resilience.

 

Mobilisation – Will Putin risk it? 

In recent weeks, Ukraine has been warning that Russia is preparing for a full mobilisation.  This would involve Russia calling up its reserve of trained conscripts adding approx. another 500,000 soldiers into Russia’s army.  By Russian law, conscripts can only be used to defend Russian territory so the new soldiers would be used to secure border areas and free up ‘contract’ soldiers for offensive operations in Ukraine.  

The prospect of a full mobilisation is concerning for Ukraine because Russia’s most important advantage is the size of its army.  The prospect of Russia being able to enhance the weight of its grinding offensives weighs heavily on Ukrainian planner’s minds.  And in September, Russia has its elections a key decision point noted last month by the Atlantic Council that stated “Official confirmation of a mass mobilization is unlikely to come before Russia’s September 2026 parliamentary elections. While the outcome of these elections is a foregone conclusion, Putin has a record for using rigged votes to set the stage for unpopular public announcements.”

But is Putin likely to mobilise? 

The question is impossible to answer at this stage but my assessment is that the political risk is too high. I believe that if mobilisation was a realistic option Putin would have pursued it already.  However, there is a chance that he will use the September election cycle to build a mandate for mobilisation.  However, a mobilisation is unlikely to change the war’s current trajectory. In an Atlantic Council article, Mykola Bielieskov states “In reality, any Russians mobilized to join Putin’s invasion in the coming months face the prospect of becoming cannon fodder for Ukrainian drones. A mass mobilization will cause more death and devastation, but it is unlikely to decide the outcome of the war.”

Russia’s key tactical issue has remained constant for two years – it has not evolved a tactical system to breach Ukraine’s drone-based defences.  Instead, it sacrifices soldiers trying to penetrate the Ukrainian front line, suffering massive attrition.  This model is unsustainable, and as Ukraine’s drones get more sophisticated Russia’s losses will increase.  The application of more soldiers to an obsolete tactical system will lengthen the war but is unlikely to defeat Ukraine. 

Additionally, the Russian economy is already facing labour shortages.  A full mobilisation will remove 500,000 working age men from the economy exacerbating this issue and increasing the war’s economic impact.  Less workers means higher wages. Higher wages mean higher inflation and that effects Russian consumers.  Mobilisation has extreme economic and political risks for Putin. Who probably understands this situation and is so is more likely to continue to focus on outlasting Ukraine’s supporters by sustainably maintaining front line activity with contract soldiers rather than risk a mobilisation. 

 

Conclusion

Strategically Ukraine holds the initiative and on the frontline Russia is fixed and unable to advance. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s successful long-range air campaign has expanded to include Wildberries, a large e-commerce company that supports many small and medium-sized Russian businesses and accounts for a sufficient percentage of Russia’s GDP. Wildberries relies on loans from Russian banks that may need government support if Ukraine’s attacks cause a default.

Currently, Ukraine’s strategy has generated a series of successes and the recent leadership changes are unlikely to affect the campaign. The impact of the air campaign is that Russia’s ability to economically support the war is deteriorating.  A situation that may force Putin to take a huge political risk and order a full-scale mobilisation after the elections in September.