Ben Morgan: Operation Vivaldi reveals the uncomfortable truth – Russian victory is not inevitable

“All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out.” – I.F. (Izzy) Stone.

In recent months the disconnect between Russian propaganda and the battlefield’s reality has increased. Ukraine’s military demonstrating that facts and truth are the best counter to propaganda; as its latest offensive, Operation Vivaldi, captures more territory.

Ukraine has released geo-located evidence confirming an advance on the campaign’s north-eastern flank, near Lyman. The operation appears to have pre-empted plans for Russia’s next offensive; an operation that aimed to envelop the Donetsk Fortress Belt rather than trying ‘break into’ it.

Russia’s commitment to capturing Donbas is predicated on being able to capture the Fortress Belt cities of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Kostyantynivka. An objective that operations since late-2023 demonstrate Russia does not have the combat power to achieve. Meanwhile, Russia continues to report imagined advances and victories.

This activity raises intriguing questions about Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s situational awareness because he either does not know how badly his armies are struggling, or does not care about casualties so long as he maintains an illusion of Russia’s potential to continue the war.

So, to borrow Izzy Stone’s insight – Are Putin and his advisors smoking the same hashish that they are selling to the world?

Why the Fortress Belt is central to Russian strategy

I’ve always believed that this war will be won on the ground and that the determining feature of its decision will be when one side fails on the battlefield. For example, the air campaigns of both sides are focussed on creating the conditions for victory in the ground war. Ukraine uses its to limit Russia’s ability to fund the war or re-stock material, depleting Russia’s ability to generate combat power in the ground campaign. Russia’s campaign ‘on the other hand’ targets the ‘will’ of the Ukrainian people. It is designed to damage their homes and to hurt civilians in order to break the country’s morale and undermine its willingness to continue fighting the war on the ground.

Likewise, the war of words, fought in the legacy media and on social media platforms is designed to contribute to victory ‘on the ground.’ Ukraine’s goal is to rally international support. Its campaign highlights the illegitimacy and brutality of Russian occupation; and that Russia is not invincible. Ukraine needs its international supporters to understand that an investment in its defence will not be wasted. In contrast, Russia’s campaign aims to legitimise its cause and convince people that its victory is inevitable because of its size, and sheer will to accept casualties.

But the key metric of success for both sides is ground, and the most important ground is the Fortress Belt. This group of cities is important because it is located at the western edge of Donetsk Oblast, on a ridge that runs roughly north-south. The ridge is a physical break between the Donets Upland and the flatter plains that characterise Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. North of the ‘belt’ movement is constrained by rivers and large reservoirs. Sitting on this high ground the solidly constructed Soviet apartment blocks and factories of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantynivka dominate their surrounding countryside.

The Fortress Belt blocks access to the flatter, more open ground of Dnipropetrovsk that is a potential manoeuvre corridor for Russian forces. The ground between the Fortress Belt and the Ukrainian cities clustered around the elbow of the Dnipro River lacks easily defensible terrain so could be advanced across more easily.

Therefore, the Fortress Belt is key terrain because whichever side controls it can use it to secure their territory; or as a base for future offensive operations. Likewise, the side that does not control it at ceasefire will never be safe because it provides a base from which to launch attacks.

Most commentators believe that Putin wants to control all of Ukraine but at the current rate of advance Russia is unlikely to achieve this goal.^[i] Since he is unable to conquer all of Ukraine, Putin needed to define an achievable area upon which he can base a claim of victory. In 2022, he confirmed new; more limited objectives when he annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts. And, securing these oblasts requires the Fortress Belt so Putin is very unlikely to accept any ceasefire or peace deal without it.

How Russia’s operational-level campaign was countered by Ukraine

It is noteworthy that Putin’s need to secure the Fortress Belt transfers directly into Russia’s operational-level plans. For example, after capturing Pokrovsk in 2024, Russian forces concentrated on advancing roughly north toward Kostyantynivka, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk. This axis of attack could allow them to advance north along the ridgeline these cities occupy slowing capturing them like ‘beads on a string.’

This plan moved very slowly because Russian forces cannot secure Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka, so have failed to ‘break into’ the Fortress Belt from the south. This situation encouraged Russia to consider an envelopment. Russian forces on the southern flank advancing from the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya sector northward to the area west of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk. While, on the northern flank Russian forces planned to capture Lyman, cross the Siverskyi Donets River and advance into the area west of Sloviansk. Eventually, the two pincers would meet surrounding the Fortress Belt.

Russia failed to achieve this plan because Ukraine’s forces defending the south flank are conducting small offensives in Zaporizhia and interdicting Russian supply lines sustaining Crimea. This activity ensures that Russia needs to divert forces away from the frontline therefore cannot concentrate sufficient combat power to break Ukraine’s defences in the south.

Operation Vivaldi plays a similar role on the north flank. It involved Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps cutting off a Russian salient near the town of Lyman. Heavy Russian casualties are reported and open-source intelligence analysts estimate Russia has lost approx. 200-240 square km of territory.^[ii] But the most important impact of the operation is that it counters Russia’s plans for envelopment from the north. Lyman is an important logistics hub, so if it is captured by Russia, it could be used to support an advancing force manoeuvring south from Lyman behind the Fortress Belt.

Ukraine’s operations stalled this plan and the Institute for the Study of War reported on 12 September that “Russian milbloggers claimed on September 9 through 11 that Ukrainian forces had effectively cut the Russian salient north of Lyman and pushed Russian forces to the Zherebets River.”^[iii]Operation Vivaldi stops Russia using Lyman as firm base for future operations and will probably establish a new defensive line along the Zherebets River. This relieves considerable pressure on Ukraine’s defensive lines and defeats Russia’s current operational-level plan.

Ukraine demonstrates new tactical methods

In May’s post ‘A Tactical Revolution in Ukraine’ ^[iv] I discussed how Ukraine is integrating emerging drone technology into its combined arms tactics, now as information emerges about Operation Vivaldi, we can see how these trends are developing and some notable features of the operation are:

Ukraine’s use of drones to deliver massed effects like surveillance and strike

A feature of both Ukrainian and Russian drone use is the concentration of drones in specialised brigades. In this operation, the Kyiv Post speculates that 20th Unmanned Systems Force Brigade “K-2” and 429th Unmanned Systems Force Brigade “Achilles” were assigned to the attacking manoeuvre formation 3^rd Army Corps. The Kyiv Post describes the operation as follows” The first step has been to mass drones in the vicinity of a targeted Russian defensive position or Russian-held village, using observation aircraft to maintain permanent surveillance and bomber and first-person-view (FPV) drones to hit targets.”^[v]

Essentially, Ukraine has moved from thinking of drones as ‘small helicopters’ to managing them to provide ‘massed effects.’ An ‘effect’ is an impact imposed upon the enemy. For example, FPV drones provide a range of ‘effects’ that includes; surveillance, target acquisition or delivering indirect fire ‘effects’ like ‘neutralising,’ ‘suppressing’ or ‘destroying’ enemy positions. By massing drones in brigades their ‘effects’ are amplified.

The article ‘Why Artillery Should Manage Battlefield Drones’ observes that “Russia and Ukraine have both consolidated large number of drones and drone operators into large units like Ukraine’s Magyars Birds or Russia’s Rubicon. An organisational change that allows FPV drones and the best operators to be concentrated at the point of main effort. Alongside logistics and other supporting assets like maintainers, surveillance drones, electronic warfare units, cyber experts and intelligence analysts. “^[vi]

This tactical system was applied during Operation Vivaldi, K-2 and Achilles drones being provided with specific objectives; like targeting Russia’s Rubicon drone brigade^[vii], attacking bridges, supply lines and reinforcements moving to the frontline. Ukraine’s operation started with establishment of drone superiority which was achieved using concentration of drones, electronic warfare and air defence. So, when Ukraine’s forces advanced it was supported by large swarms of drones providing surveillance and attack effects.

Winning the intelligence and digital communications battle

Operation Vivaldi, Ukraine’s recent Zaporizhia offensive and the 2024 Kursk Offensive demonstrate another component of Ukraine new tactical system – its emphasis on winning the intelligence and digital communications battle.

Ukraine used drones, air defence and electronic warfare to ‘blind’ Russia’s intelligence gathering drones. In this case, a priority task for Ukraine’s drone brigades was neutralising Russia’s Rubicon drone brigade. 3rd Army Corps reports indicate the highly experienced and well-equipped Rubicon unit was neutralised by Ukraine’s drone campaign that destroyed their logistics, attacked launch sites, and killed drone operators.

Notably, Operation Vivaldi is another example of Ukraine achieving local dominance of the electro-magnetic spectrum. This involved concerted attacks on Russia’s local radio and digital communications networks using high powered transmitters to jam transmissions, listening into Russia communications, and cyber-attacks. Ukraine temporarily shut down the digital communications network that supports Russia’s local ‘kill web’ enabling its forces to advance.

‘Marsupial’ ground drones dropped by air drones

Operation Vivaldi also includes the first use of ground drones deployed by large, load carrying aerial drones. A tactic RBC Ukraine calls ‘marsupial drones’ because of the similarity between this technique and animals like kangaroos that carry their babies in a pouch. 3^rd Army Corps reports that it used heavy bomber drones to deploy ‘Gryphon’ ground drones more than 10 kilometres behind Russian lines.^[viii] Cameras mounted on the Gryphons recorded activities and were used to target attacks on Russian forces.

Deep strikes by uncrewed aerial systems are now common but the emplacement of ground based ‘sensors,’ attack drones, digital communications relay stations, and electronic jammers is likely to become an integral feature of combined arms tactics.

Summary

In the article, ‘An Overture to Victory: Operation Vivaldi and Ukraine’s Path to Battlefield Decision’ author Robert G Rose states that “Operation Vivaldi was built on a months-long crescendo of preparation. It demonstrated how Ukraine might achieve an operational-level breakthrough on the contemporary battlefield.”^[ix] A statement that captures the risk Russia faces if it does match Ukraine’s tactical evolution because when viewed together; this year’s offensives in Zaporizhia and Operation Vivaldi indicate an evolving combined arms approach to tactics. If Ukraine continues on this trajectory, then its forces may be able to break Russia’s lines and manoeuvre at operational-level.

Conclusion

The narrative of inevitable victory is a ‘drug’ sold by Russian leaders who deliver a steady flow of mis-information about Russia’s victories.^[x] A key question is whether Russia’s leaders understand the danger of their current situation, or if they are ‘smoking the same hashish they are selling.’ Looking at the conflict as an outsider in seems clear that Ukraine is slowly but steadily modifying its tactics and is starting to demonstrate that it can retake territory.

In 2026, we have witnessed a steady progression from small offensive operations in Zaporizhia to a more tactically significant operation near Lyman. Ukraine has also joined forces with European countries to develop a military industrial complex that is producing millions of drones and range of other equipment while Russia’s economy slowly falls apart. Notable indications that the war is slowly but inexorably swinging towards Ukraine.

It remains to be seen whether Russia’s leaders can see the danger, or if they will continue trying tell the world Russian victory is inevitable while Ukraine continues to prove them wrong on the battlefield.

 

Ben Morgan is TDBs Military Blogger. a defence and security analyst specialising in modern warfare, military adaptation, and operational-level conflict analysis. He posts at Substack. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here – buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan