Ben Morgan: Pokrovsk and Kursk, where will Russian resources go?

Ukraine’s plan in Kursk is to draw forces away from Russia’s main effort, capturing Pokrovsk.  Ukraine’s attack into Kursk is a success, they achieved surprise and have captured about 1,200 square kilometres.  Further, Russia does not seem able to respond effectively.  But, is the attack achieving its objective? 

At this stage, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s plan is hard to determine.  The advance into Kursk looks significant on a map, and a recent New York Times article report, US officials estimate that Russia will need 15-20 brigades (or approximately 50,000 soldiers) to drive Ukraine out of Kursk. But the real test of the offensive’s success is that it excites a large enough Russian response to shape the situation near Pokrovsk. A point that is still being debated on the battlefields of Ukraine. 

The ‘Big Picture:’ How the campaign is developing

Strategically, both sides are still committed to air campaigns using drones and missiles to damage their opponent’s economic infra-structure.  Ukraine launching damaging drone strikes on Russian oil depots this week and a large attack on Moscow.  Meanwhile, Russia continues its air campaign against Ukraine’s power grid. But this war will be won and land, and that is where we must focus our analysis.  In Russia, Putin faces mounting political pressure and embarrassment that may force him to step back from his current plan and reinforce Kursk.  Likewise, Ukraine’s situation is precarious because it has committed lots of resource to diverting Russian forces from Donetsk to Kursk. Resources that Ukraine cannot afford to waste.

The land campaign continues to teeter at a point of balance, Russia remaining committed to its main effort, capturing Pokrovsk.  Ukraine working hard to relieve Russian pressure on Pokrovsk by attacking 360km to the north-east at Kursk. But it is hard to appreciate the effect that Ukraine wants to impose on Russia, are they: Trying to prevent the capture of Pokrovsk? Or, has Ukraine accepted that this is inevitable, so aims instead to limit exploitation of the town’s capture by reducing Russian reserves? And, with only Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) available, it is impossible to be certain, although the large commitment of forces to the Kursk attack may indicate that Ukraine needs immediate results.  For instance, preventing the capture of Pokrovsk.   

However, we can confidently state that Russia’s main effort is capturing Pokrovsk, and from that it is reasonable to extrapolate a longer-term goal of capturing the whole of Donetsk Oblast. Pokrovsk controls a major road junction that would allow Russia to extend its offensive north or south.  

Evidence for this assessment includes Russia’s recent re-organisation of its Central Group of Forces, the element operating in Donetsk.  This change was followed by Russian forces in the area demonstrating much greater tactical flexibility in July and August, switching directions of attack quickly as they actively sought Ukraine’s weak points.  Russia’s dogged commitment to the battle in Donetsk, regardless of Ukraine’s actions in Kursk, reinforces this assessment of main effort.  Russia is trading ground in Kursk for time in Donetsk, focussing entirely on the main effort. 

Since Ukraine’s offensive aims to divert resources away from the main effort, this is the measure by which its success must be judged.  

The situation in Kursk 

Ukraine continues to slowly expand the pocket of land it holds.  Further, it has destroyed three large bridges crossing the Syem River cutting off a group of Russian soldiers.  Destroying the bridges and trapping a group of soldiers creates a threat that Russia must address. The soldiers trapped in the area (shown by cross hatching on the map) are mostly conscripts and national guardsmen.  The conscripts are young men straight out of high school completing national service, a group that is specifically excluded from service in Ukraine.  Russian policy is that only reservists and volunteers, called ‘contract soldiers’ will serve in Ukraine. 

By threatening to kill or capture large numbers of conscripts, Ukraine heightens the political impact of the operation.  The tacit approval the Russian people extend Putin could be withdrawn if lots of young conscripts are killed or captured.  

Russia is slowly bringing new forces into the area and is a working hard to build defences. However, the situation is hampered by accurate Ukrainian depth fire.  Aircraft working together with ground launched missiles like HIMARS and ATCAMs to strike concentrations of troops moving forwards.  Ukraine appears to be winning the targeting battle, drones and special forces groups operating deep behind the front line to find and report targets.  

It is noteworthy that Ukraine has deployed some of its best Western equipment for this operation including Challenger 2 tanks. This British main battle tank is used in small numbers, roughly squadron strength (company in the US) by the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. The tank’s deployment is confirmed by Russian video of one being destroyed.  The tactical employment of these tanks is interesting, Ukraine using them behind lighter forces to provide long-range accurate fire. A first-generation, Challenger 1 holds the record for the longest-range confirmed tank kill, hitting an Iraqi T-62 at 4,700 during the 1990 Gulf War. Challenger 2 uses the same gun with vastly improved fire control, so is a very capable platform for long-range sniping attacks.

Another feature of Ukraine’s tactical success is the Kropyva computerised tactical information and fire control system. When we discuss ‘network centric’ war, it is systems like Kropyva that enable this type of war-fighting.  The system was developed a long-time ago around 2014-16 and is now maturing in service. Essentially, Kropyva is an app running on the Android operating system and in each vehicle, there is a rugged computer terminal using the system. Kropyva maps where friendly and enemy forces are, and allows units to transfer information about their situation to each other digitally. This means that tactical information can be shared immediately and accurately between vehicles, or between units. 

However, Kropyva also integrates drones and ballistic calculations into the network.  For instance, drone footage can be shared instantly with a Challenger 2 tank, a mortar detachment or an artillery battery that receives not just information about the target, but also fire data to immediately engage the target.   Kropyva means that Ukraine’s units have excellent situational awareness and the ability to utilise any weapons system that is in range to engage Russian targets.  

Meanwhile, Russia faces a very different problem, trying to manage a confused local command structure. Andrey Belousov, head a five-person team working together to manage the situation is managing a multi-agency joint task force. Command lines between the security service (FSB), national guard (Rosgvardia) and army are reportedly convoluted and difficult to manage. A situation that is slowing down Russia’s response.

But is the attack working? What is the effect in Pokrovsk? 

Russia is currently engaging Ukraine’s defensive line, that is demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove.  Although areas are under pressure near Krasnyi Yar and Novohrodivka, an imminent collapse is not apparent.  This assessment is strengthened by Russia’s recent movement south, appearing to be looking for a flank to turn near Selydove.  This rapid evolution of the tactical plan indicates that in this area Russia command structure is working effectively. 

The race south is inevitable because the Ukrainian flank north of Novohrodivka is secured by lakes and canals.  However, as Russian forces swing south they run into a similar geographic block about 14 km south of Selydove when they hit he Vocha River. Further, the ground south of Selydove is more undulating and Russian forces will be advancing ‘across the grain’ of the land rather than with it.  

At this point, Russia has been engaging the Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove defensive line for about a week.  Ukraine is reportedly evacuating the area around Pokrovsk and may be getting ready to withdraw.  But at this stage, there are probably days or weeks left in fighting along the current line as Russia tries to turn the southern flank, so I am not expecting a sudden Ukrainian withdrawal. 

It is too early to say whether Russia’s slow progress is related to the fighting in Kursk.  The Kursk operation was never going to draw units committed this attack away: instead, the effect would be on reserves and whether Russia’s second echelon would have the weight to push through.  Coming days and weeks will tell us more, as the attack on Pokrovsk either advances or fails.  

Summary

In Russia, oligarch Oleg Tinkov is publicly criticising Putin’s ‘crazy’ war.  Criticism that follows similar criticism last month from another oligarch, Oleg Deripaska. Although these men lack the power to unseat Putin, the fact that they are publicly criticising him is significant because it indicates that they do not fear retribution. Tinkov and Deripaska obviously sense growing discontent and are willing to take risks, indicating holes in Putin’s hold on power. However, despite the commentary about the psychological effect of Ukraine’s operation, it is unlikely that Putin will be toppled in a coup or removed. Putin is a hard man, and militarily the situation in Kursk is recoverable. He can wait, finish the battle in Pokrovsk then deal with Kursk.

The situation reminded me about an anecdote that I recollect is from the author Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, a Soviet general who defected to the West and wrote military books using the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov. Rezum lectured at NATO staff colleges, discussing the differences between Soviet and Western tactics. And, I will paraphrase the anecdote as I remember it, Rezum posed the following tactical problem to NATO officers: If you have three units under your command; one is advancing according to plan, one is static and one is in danger of being overrun. Which unit should you allocate more resource too?   

The Soviet answer was that resources should go to the unit advancing according to the plan, always maintain resource at the point of decision.  Resources sent to support the unit being overrun were likely to be wasted, and since the static unit was surviving on its own it did not need further resources. A view that was often challenged by NATO officers, but that may provide an insight into Putin’s thinking. He is product of the same Soviet system, and raised on the myths of Russian sacrifice in the Great Patriotic War. A person for whom sacrificing land or soldiers in exchange for victory is an easy calculation.  

However, although he is unlikely to be removed from power there will be voices in his inner circle calling for more to be done in Kursk.  Some will be ‘hawks’ embarrassed by the situation; others will be politicians worried about the public’s reaction to the loss of conscript soldiers.  This is the unknown factor that Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk aims to influence. Can it make these voices loud enough that Putin makes a poor militarily decision and switches resources away from the main effort? Only time will tell. 

Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack