Ben Morgan: Challenging the myth of inevitable Russian victory


A defining feature of the war in Ukraine is the myth that Russian victory is inevitable. Now, two and a half years since the war started the myth persists. Unfortunately, it leads to dangerous political assumptions about supporting Ukraine. Often media and political discussions start from the assumption of eventual Russian victory, leading to questions about supporting Ukraine being framed in negative terms.

Essentially, that Ukraine is lucky to have survived and that since Russian victory is inevitable, investing further support is only prolonging the suffering.   Further, that it is pragmatic for Ukraine and its supporters to ‘cut their losses,’ accept the inevitable and broker a peace deal based on the current line of control.  Assumptions, that should be challenged because they are not supported by evidence.

The myth of Russian invincibility

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia presented itself as the union’s heir.  Russia inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal and much of its military equipment. Most importantly, Russia felt that it inherited the Soviet Union’s super power status. Russia, presented its military as the heir to the Soviet military machine.  A powerful force that defeated Nazism in World War Two, then stood toe-to-toe with the US and NATO through 45 years of Cold War.

During the Cold War, generations of Western servicepeople trained and planned to fight the Soviets; and the huge military machine they faced was powerful.  Soviet armies intervened effectively in Hungary and Czechoslovakia projecting power within Europe. The invasion of Afghanistan was sudden and well-executed, even if the war was eventually unsuccessful.  The Soviets were a dangerous threat. Many contemporary military leaders were junior officers in 1991, trained to fight the Soviets and that threat continues to echo in the minds of service planners, politicians and commentator. Unfortunately, this historic threat is often convoluted with modern Russia a completely different threat.

For instance, the Ukraine War started with Western military commentators painting a picture of inevitable Russian victory.  The media told us that Russia has the second most powerful army in the world, an army of super soldiers and advanced equipment. Ukraine’s fall seemed inevitable. Even the Pentagon believed the hype, offering to evacuate President Zelenskyy from Kyiv.

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Commentators told us that today’s Russian army descends from the force that endured, and won the largest and most bloody battles of World War Two: Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kharkov and Kursk. Russian combat equipment was better, they said. Simple and roughly made but robust, effective and tested in combat. Kalashnikov rifles were indestructible. Russian tanks were faster, smaller and well-armed. Russia has huge stockpiles of artillery and can apply their fire to devastating effect.  Simple, robust Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters were more reliable and easier to maintain than US planes.  And, because they were cheaper Russia could fill the skies with them. Further, Russia has enormous natural resources and an inexhaustible supply of soldiers, we are told.

But invading Ukraine exposed the truth

Early in the war, it became apparent that Russia’s military does not meet expectations. In the first days of the war, this column discussed the impact that modern Western anti-tank missiles like Javelin and NLAW would have on Russian forces. That instead of a foregone conclusion Russia’s invasion force was too small and its armoured vehicles too vulnerable to modern weapons. Additionally, even with surprise on its side the Russian air force had failed to achieve air superiority.

Then as days turned into weeks, we saw the slow collapse of Russia’s logistics networks, years of corruption taking its toll on battlefield effectiveness. Throughout the war Russia has been unable to demonstrate effective operational manoeuvre.

A claim that will be challenged, but that I stand by.

The last operationally significant manoeuvre initiated by Russia was the invasion, in February 2022. Despite occupying large areas in Kherson and Kharkiv they were out manoeuvred and forced to withdraw from these areas in late-2022. The capture of Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2023, did not decisively change the campaign or open opportunities for Russia to advance, neither hard won victory was operationally significant.

Russia has demonstrated the ability to hold ground, stopping Ukraine’s offensive in 2023, but wars are not won by holding ground. Russia started the war with the advantages of size, more modern equipment and surprise but has failed to defeat Ukraine.

The current situation on land

Victory, in Ukraine is defined by success in the land campaign; and on land the frontlines remain static. A situation that has not changed for months, Russia’s offensive near Kharkiv has culminated and there are reports that Ukraine is counter-attacking near Vovchansk. East of Kharkiv on the Kremina-Svatove Line, positional fighting took place this week Russia advancing marginally near Kupyansk. Ukraine matching this advance near Kremina.

Further south, Ukraine still holds Chasiv Yar. An important town that sits on high ground, that if captured could be used as a firm base for a Russian advance towards the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Fighting continues between Toretsk and Marinka without significant changes in the frontline.

Overall, the land campaign has stagnated and the next question is – Which side is more likely to generate extra combat power in the future?  Because, the side that can generate more combat power is the one that is going to be the side that breaks the current deadlock.

Ukraine’s air campaign, generating additional combat power

It is probably a misnomer, because Ukraine’s air campaign is mostly being fought on the ground.  Ukrainian long-range missiles and drones slowly but surely degrading Russia’s local air-defence network. Russian air defence missile launchers, the radars that guide their missiles and the Airborne Early Warning and Command aircraft that manage the airspace over Ukraine are all being targeted.   The overall aim of this campaign is clearly to create conditions for using new F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters as they arrive in Ukraine, ready for action.

Ukraine will probably continue to target Russian air-defence missiles in Crimea, destroying them and drawing more from across the wider campaign into the peninsular, where they too can be destroyed. Crimea’s importance to Russia being used to create a vulnerability.  The overall aim is to degrade Russian air-defences over Ukraine so that new fighter aircraft can be used to support operationally significant manoeuvre on land.

The number of F-16s pledged to Ukraine is relatively small, 64 frontline aircraft backed by a pool for training. A force this size cannot dominate the whole frontline, but could create air superiority over a small sector supporting a ground attack or to defeat a Russian offensive. The F-16s will start entering service over Ukraine soon and will be followed later in the year by French Mirage 2000 fighters.

Ukrainian force generation on land

Longer-term, Ukraine is generating combat power on land.  New factories are being opened in Europe and in the US to produce artillery shells, European nations are training Ukrainian service people and billions of dollars of military aid is being transferred to Ukraine. Aid that is confirmed in long-term bi-lateral agreements or uses frozen Russian assets, mechanisms that help guarantee sustainability.  Additionally, Ukraine recently tightened conscription laws to ensure a flow of service personnel into the military.

Russia on the other hand has fully mobilised its defence industry that is already at peak capacity. It has not called for full national mobilisation though.  Probably because this would be politically unacceptable and Putin believes he can find soldiers elsewhere.  Another gamble because Ukraine’s frontline is holding and they are inflicting losses on Russia at a rate of roughly five to one.  A rate that Russia cannot sustain indefinitely without mobilising further.

Even with an extra battalion (4-800 soldiers) from North Korea, Russia’s generation of land combat power is either static or declining, while Ukraine’s is increasing. This process will take time, I do not expect Ukrainian offensive action until 2025.

After the 2023 offensive, Ukraine will be more cautious and will work slowly to build the force elements it lacked.  Specifically, tactical airpower that can support ground operations, stockpiles artillery ammunition, engineering assets to breech defensive lines and frontline air-defence.


Russian victory is not inevitable and it never was, the invasion was a gamble. Russia invaded with too few soldiers and is now burning through the vast stockpile of equipment it inherited from the Soviet Union. Assumptions about Russia need to change, it is not the Superpower that the Soviet Union once was; its population is about half the size of the US and its economy is only marginally larger than Australia’s.  Russian industry can produce plenty of artillery shells and refurbish tanks from war stocks but it is not able to match US or European production.

The Russian military has proven inept. Throughout the war it has been plagued by poor leadership and bad decisions, including the recent Kharkiv offensive. An operation that achieved nothing more than diverting forces from a useful operation, capturing Chasiv Yar.  Its soldiers are poorly trained and led, although there have been some useful tactical improvements they are probably too little too late.

Regardless of what some commentators will tell you about Russia’s enormous military power or Putin’s genius, results are what matters.  During the first half of this year, while US support waivered Russia had its best opportunity to strike hard and make an operationally significant manoeuvre. Instead of concentrating their forces they dissipated their effort along the frontline and opened a new axis of attack in Kharkiv Oblast.  This is not masterful campaign planning. Instead, it demonstrates that senior commanders are not working together and lack discipline.

Currently, we are entering a period of nuclear brinkmanship as Putin realises the situation Russia is in, that victory is not inevitable. His response is to threaten and to play off the West’s fear of the Soviet Union.  It is important that NATO and the US acknowledge this risk but are not overwhelmed by it. If Putin was going to use tactical nuclear weapons he would have, by surprise early in the war with a huge psychological impact.  Now if Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon, as it detonates, NATO war planes and cruise missiles will be in the air on the way to their targets. NATO is prepared now and their military capability far outstrips Russia’s so the potential consequences of using these weapons are too high to justify the risk.

At this stage, we need to look past Russia’s carefully crafted image of invincibility, to see the reality of the Russian war machine. Broken by corruption, poorly led and surviving by feeding the youth of Russia’s poorest republics to Ukraine’s guns. Today’s Russian military is not the Soviet military, it is a shadow of that force and as more light is shone on it, the more the shadow diminishes.

Commentators need to actively challenge the assumption that Russian victory is inevitable because the evidence does not support the assumption. Instead, with time and international support Ukraine can drive Russia out of its territory.


Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack


  1. Challenging the myth of imperialism’s inevitable victory

    Nobody thought the British Empire could be defeated in India.

    .Nobody thought the American imperialists could be defeated in Vietnam

    For all their murderous firepower, faced with popular insurgency that just won’t quit, even if the imperialist or colonialist power in question resorts to genocide they will eventually lose.

    • Especially when a country is fighting to defend itself. Ultimately it’s more important to the people fighting for their homes then it is to those attacking. Something Russia with it’s history should be well aware of as they have been on the receiving end more then once.

      It is exactly the same reason why despite everything thrown at it Gaza will not “lose”. You said you knew people there. I know people in Ukraine. Anyone that thinks they’re about to roll over is deluded.

      • PC, you might wish to consider that Ukraine as constituted by the Soviet was not a “nation state”. From 2014 there has been an east west civil war along ethnic lines, Russians to the east of the Dneiper versus “Ukrainians”. For that reason it is difficult to see Russians in Novorussian areas supporting “Ukrainian” nationalism. For the same reason it is doubtful that Russia wants Ukraine West of the Dneiper, the cost is too high, the return zero. They will probably be happy for it to be a drain on Europe.

        • Nick I am very aware of the history of that part of the world and I don’t care what the Soviet considered Ukraine to be. There is a large part of this world that used to be “considered” something else. There is a whole generation there now that that has grown up under their own flag.

          And there are people in those “Russian” areas that have now walked away from their homes and farms because they refused to become Russian citizens and couldn’t deal with the intimidation any more. I know some of them. So yes I will agree that that part of the world is a confused mix of people identifying with different countries, but the idea that they all identified as “Russian” was simply not the case. It is probably true now that they are more Russian then Ukrainian because of the number of people that just left, although Russia is also currently claiming areas that it doesn’t control.

          Nick I read what you write here. I will say that although I think Putin is in the wrong and has done immeasurable damage I will also acknowledge faults with Ukraine. A lot of faults.

          However I have never seen you criticise a single action that Putin has taken. It seems any criticism of him or what has happened in Russia is always “lies” of the MSM. Do you honestly think he has been without fault in this whole sorry affair?

          • Nothing is black and white, people have walked from both sides which rather demonstrates my point of civil war along ethnic lines. Growing up being told you are Ukrainian doesn’t make you such, if your culture and language is otherwise it would probably piss you off. I’m thinking of Northern Ireland here, tell a Catholic he’s the King’s subject. There’s history there, just as there is in Ukraine Soviet history that must be accounted.

            As to no criticism of Putin, lazy
            argument. I’m a Westerner, I fully
            understand what we have done to
            piss off the Russians. I have spent a lifetime critical of neoNazis, neocons, American exceptional ism, and Western arrogance. Until we get our house in order don’t ask me to criticise the Russians and the other 90 percent of the world who hold the West in contempt.

        • Said like a true imperialist lickspittle;

          “…Ukraine as constituted by the Soviet was not a “nation state”. Nick J

          • Get it right Pat, the correct term is “running dog lick spittle capitalist roader”. Call yourself a Marxist?

            How little you know or comprehend.

      • Hahah, you mean like the heroes of Donetsk and Luhansk who managed to hold off Zelensky and Poroshenko’s blood soaked butchers for nearly a decade with very little help? Yeah, the forces of humanity sure do fight well in defence.

  2. Ben – The myth is Ukraine will defeat Russia…Ukraine is still running out of people, NATO is not putting soldiers in the field…

    • I have no idea what the outcome will be Nathan, but no other nation put boots on the ground in Afghanistan. How did that work out for the Russians? Of course the west well and truly paid for it by funding a bunch of a’hole extremists but Russia did not prevail.

    • “….the Ukrainians are saying they are going to lose” stand_alone_slmplex

      How about a link for that assertion, or did you just pluck this alleged ‘fact’ out of your arse?

      • “But Zelensky did not mince words in a video meeting this month with a Ukrainian aid group: “It is necessary to specifically tell Congress that if Congress does not help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war,” he said.”

        Pat O’Dumb

        Looks like he’s got till November to win this…

    • Ben slowly admitting that the Zelensky regime will lose…while spinning it to present it as not inevitable, just an unfortunate result of not giving his MIC backers enough money.

  3. Ben hasn’t really answered how Ukraine is going to roll back the existing front line. From the experience of the last 18 months, it does not appear that either side can break the front line in any material way. The Ukraine offensive of 2023 failed. The Russian offensives of 2023/24 have also failed.
    Both sides have put a huge amount of resource into improving their defensive lines. Breaking them would seem to require more combat power than either side is capable of amassing.
    Hence why I restate what I have said numerous times before. Time for serious negotiations to end the war. Ukraine accepts that Russia keeps what it has got. Russia accepts that Ukraine is now in the western orbit. Meaning becoming a member of the EU. And at a minimum Ukraine has a NATO guarantee, even if Ukraine is not formally part of NATO.

    • Wayne, it is obvious that the battlefield reflects the available tools, and in that respect new technologies preclude against manoeuvre warfare. Every time you hear “big arrow” proponents (as we all probably were two years ago) the question comes to mind: have you actually been watching?

      I’d suggest that the Russians went into this under prepared but have since learnt their lessons, adopting suitable strategy and placing themselves in an unbeatable position. Note I didn’t say winning position. If you read Nick Lloyd’s Western Front this is almost a replay of how attrition and numbers were made to count, no big arrow manoeuvre required.

      • I look at a wide variety of material on the war, every few days, so I consider myself reasonably well informed.
        Yes, Russia has got more competent, but so has Ukraine. In my view Russia had its best opportunity in the first half of 2024, when Ukraine was running short of munitions, especially 155mm rounds. But that has changed. When did you last read of Ukraine being dramatically short of 155 mm rounds. Not for quite a few weeks. Plus the Ukrainians are soon getting modern combat aircraft.
        Nevertheless I don’t think Ukraine will break the Russian lines. But they will definitely put Russian forces on the defensive. Russia will soon realise that future offensives will be just too difficult.
        So the incentive to negotiate will increase.

    • Makes sense to end the war based on current lines of control / Ukraine clear to become a member of NATO / Putin can go back to building obscene holiday houses and murdering political rivals.

      • Ukraine will never become a member of Nato. That is the whole point. Russia told the western warmongers; they went ahead and couped the elected government and made it the second biggest army in Nato right on Russia’s border holding millions of ethnic and cultural Russians hostage anyway.

    • Wont solve Russia’s problem, just compound them. For it will need to spend mega amounts of capital to rebuild those regions. Their total destruction makes them uninhabitable without major infrastructure rebuilding. Russia would be smarter to withdraw and place the rebuilding costs onto Ukraine to tie them up financially for a decade or more. The whole idea of a land bridge across the top of the Crimea is gone. One has to wonder once (not if but when) the Kerch Bridge is destroyed, what value the Crimea holds to Russia, especially seeing the water supply for agricultural use there is in the hands of the Ukrainians. With Russia destroying the dam to control the water for Crimea, the need for the land bridge to control the Dnpro River delta is mute. The fact that Putin wants to add Kherson to Russia, whilst he has no control on the ground, speaks volumes for his “peace” proposal.

    • No conquest is the red line of our peace in the West, and in some ways around the world, since 1945. So the best that can be done for Russia is to keep the conquered land ‘unofficially’. And, also so, continued sanctions. To end those would require an independent process to a referendum in 10, 20 years

  4. I think “Ukraine accepts that Russia keeps what it has got” would happen despite any rhetoric from Zelenskyy, however:

    “Russia accepts that Ukraine is now in the western orbit. Meaning becoming a member of the EU. And at a minimum Ukraine has a NATO guarantee, even if Ukraine is not formally part of NATO.”

    That’ll be the part that I think Russia will find hard to accept, although I agree with you that it seems the logical way to end this. It’s the “NATO” part that Putin would never be able to sell domestically. So somehow Ukraine needs to make sure that it maintains a defensive strength without it being “NATO” backed.

  5. Thanks for the commentary Ben. Always interesting to read.

    In the end I don’t think victory will be defined by simple land occupation. I think there are better parallels in the first world war when an uncaring and incompetent Imperial Russia casually threw a generation of men at the Germans, and they died in enormous numbers. The result was the February Revolution.

    We hear today that a fresh Russian recruit brought to the front line has a life expectancy of just two days because the generals just keep sending them toward the Ukraine lines as ‘meat waves’. Tell me how long they can keep that up before there’s a blowback at home.

    So, Ukraine needs to maintain its defensive lines, protect itself with the aid of F16s that will chase Russian fights back and more air defence systems. Then keep on killing Russians in their thousands as they are presented by Russia’s corrupt officers. Russia will eventually crack.

  6. Meanwhile –

    The Ukrainian Air Force Parked Six Su-27 Fighters In The Open 100 Miles From The Front Line. A Russian Missile Destroyed Two Of Them.
    In nine months, the Russians have hit at least five active Ukrainian warplanes at vulnerable air bases.

    Jul 1, 2024,05:28pm EDT
    Updated Jul 1, 2024, 05:50pm EDT
    A Ukrainian Su-27 in 2019.
    A Ukrainian Su-27 in 2019.WALLYCACSABRE PHOTO
    On or just before Monday, a Russian surveillance drone winged from Russian lines to the Ukrainian air force’s Mirgorod air base, 100 miles from Ukraine’s northern border with Russia.

    The drone spotted at least six Ukrainian Sukhoi Su-27 supersonic fighters parked in the open at the base in broad daylight. A Russian Iskander missile barreled in, destroying two of the precious Sukhois and damaging the other four.

    It may have been one of the costliest single days for the battered Ukrainian air arm since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. “There are some losses,” air force official Yuriy Ignat acknowledged.

    Ukrainian bloggers rushed to blame the air force officers who ordered the Su-27 crews to park their jets out in the open at a base dangerously close to the front line. “A million years of war, sheep do not learn anything,” one blogger moaned.

    The raid on Mirgorod is just the latest in a series of Russian strikes on vulnerable Ukrainian air bases. In recent months, Russian Lancet drones have struck at least four Ukrainian jets at Dolgintsevo air base near Kryvyi Rih, just 45 miles from the front line in southern Ukraine.

    The first two strikes, last fall, took the Ukrainian air force by surprise—and blew up a pair of Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters. The third strike in November seemingly struck an unflyable decoy Sukhoi Su-25 attack jet. But then a fourth drone raid hit a flyable Su-25.

    The two Su-27s that Iskander wrecked at Mirgorod bring to at least five the number of Ukrainian warplanes the Russians have blown up on the ground in the last nine months or so. These are losses the Ukrainians can’t afford.

    The Ukrainian air force went to war in February 2022 with around 125 Su-27s, Su-25s, MiG-29s and other jets. In 28 months of hard fighting, the Ukrainians have lost around 90 jets that the analysts at Oryx have confirmed.

    To make good their losses, the Ukrainians have acquired from their allies, or restored from long-term storage, scores of replacement MiGs and Sukhois. These airframes are keeping the air force in action until ex-European fighters—85 Lockheed Martin F-16s and perhaps a dozen Dassault Mirage 2000s—arrive in Ukraine.

    The problem, of course, is that the F-16s and Mirages will also be vulnerable to Russian drone and missile strikes as long as they’re parked in the open in broad daylight.

    There are obvious steps Ukrainian commanders could take to protect their planes. For starters—pull operational jets away from the bases closest to Russia.

    Ukrainian forces have access to around 20 large air bases, dozens of smaller airfields and even highway airstrips scattered across the country. Every single Ukrainian jet type ranges hundreds of miles on internal fuel. There’s no reason for an Su-27 that ranges 700 miles to spend any time at an airfield a hundred miles from the front line.

    But moving warplanes farther from the front probably isn’t enough—not as long as the Russians possess ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike across Ukraine. In addition to vacating the most vulnerable bases, Ukrainian commanders could keep their planes and crews moving.

    Ukrainian fighter brigades normally stress unpredictability—all in order to complicate Russian targeting. Their pilots “almost never take off from an airfield and land at the same airfield,” said Gen. James Hecker, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa.

    The uptick in Russian strikes on parked planes should compel the Ukrainians to be even more unpredictable. At the same time, they could build reinforced shelters to shield parked jets while they aren’t on the move—and also deploy more decoys. “The air force is doing everything it can to counter the enemy, mislead the enemy, including through mock-ups and other means,” Ignat insisted.

    Whatever the Ukrainians choose to do to protect their planes, they need to move quickly in the face of unrelenting Russian attacks. “Systemic negligence may get us all six feet under in this war,” Ukrainian journalist and author Illia Ponomarenko warned.

    What’s especially galling, for supporters of a sovereign Ukraine, is that Russian jets are equally vulnerable at their own bases near Ukraine. But in some cases, U.S. policy prohibits the Ukrainians from striking those jets with American-made weapons.

  7. Russia has lost any geopolitical aims it had. No buffer zone, no warm water ports, no freedom in the Black Sea, no freedom in the Baltic Sea, NATO troops already in the Ukraine (French Foreign Legion), NATO armed to the teeth with fresh troops ready for action, likely to loose the Kalingrad enclave to Poland, Ukrainian regime firmly ensconced, etc.

    Be interesting what Ben and all the other commentators think about Russia ceding the Tumen River to China. Inch by inch the eastern Siberia is falling under China influence. Only 350km to Vladivostok. Without which Russia has no warm water ports with access not under NATO control.

    Putin in North Korea to tell them their only direct land based link (rail) to Russia is now under Chinese control?


    • this is hilarious. Why would Russian human beings be worried about Chinese human beings? Chinese aren’t demons wearing skinsuits, like ammurricans are.

  8. Unless NATO starts sending in troops, Ukraine will inevitably lose this war. The US loves forever wars of course (gotta feed the US Military Industrial Complex), so they will keep supporting Zelensky for as long as he keeps asking for it. The core issue is that Ukraine is running out of cannon fodder, and Zelensky is losing support from the Ukrainian people to provide it – they would rather he at least at the table for peace negotiations. Zelensky is effectively a dictator at this point, so I suspect it will be hard to have him removed, so the latest US forever war continues.

  9. “The frontl ines remain static ” ! Is this bloke for real ? Russia have been liberating a square km at a time consistently for months . Every week they take back 2 or 3 villages for the break away republics .
    As for Chavis Yar the Russians are employing there famous meat grinder tactics where they lure company after company into the killzone and annihilate them with artillery superiority and increasingly now with the FAB 3000 guided super bombs .
    The Ukies are press ganging teenagers and old men off the street and sending them straight into combat , whereas the Russian recruits are trained for nearly 12 months before going to the front .The chaps glasses are so rose tinted they are sprouting thorns .

    • Fred,

      At Chavis Yar, it is literally the other way round to what you say. It is Russia that is on the attack trying to take Chavis War, hence why Russia employs the “meat wave” attacks. Ukraine is on the defence, which means dug in. That dramatically reduces the effectiveness of artillery, which does most of its damage against troops in the open.

      Simple logic must tell you why you are wrong. When in defence there is no reason the deploy troops in the open, that is something that only those on the offence need to do.

      • lol you’re presuming that the Zelensky regime cares about the lives of Orthodox Christian Ukrainians. Absurd

      • The Russsians semi enclose the Ukies in a cauldron . Deliberately leaving an avenue for resupply to keep them there and destroy them with artillery until the enemy is annihilated like in Chavis Yar . In fact this morning it was announced that Eastern Chavis Yar right up to the canal has been taken . Rinse and repeat . “Meat waves ” are a fantasy , especially in this phase of the Special Military Operation . Tactics have evolved and the Russians are using APCs , sometimes accompanied by one or two tanks to drop off platoon sized units at the line of contact. Using this widespread method they are incrementally making constant forward momentum .

  10. Who or what is invincible or inevitable does no longer matter.
    The damage is done. The dying goes on.
    So or so, for many years to come.
    Europe has been split.
    Heavy militarization is going on both sides of the battle line.
    Check the shares of the MIC industries.
    The hegemony looks towards the Pacific.

    Who says ‘mission impossible’?

  11. How is Russia conquering parts of Ukraine different from Hitler conquering Sudetenland? Yeah, it’s no different. Why we outlawed conquest after WW ll. Hence, mostly peace in Europe and the West since. It’s a good rule, especially for small countries. Works equally for everyone.


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