GUEST BLOG: Ben Morgan – What happens next? Understanding Russia’s tactical impasse and what strategic escalation means it may not be what we think.

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We are seeing an escalation in both rhetoric and action; the war is escalating strategically, however there is complex interaction between the tactical level and the strategic level of operations that will drive Russian strategic decisions in the next few days.  The crux of this interaction is Russia’s current tactical impasse.  The world is starting acknowledge that within the parameters of their ‘special military operation’ the Russians are likely to have culminated.  Russian ground forces simply do not have the ‘boots on the ground’ to win.  

Specifically, they are short of infantry, the tough soldiers that actually close with the enemy and drive them out of defensive positions.  The Russians started their invasion of Ukraine with about a third of their standing army deployed in the invasion, roughly 120 ‘battalion tactical groups’.   Yesterday the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence published a report stating that a quarter of Russia’s battalion tactical groups are ‘combat ineffective’. This adds credibility to earlier reports that indicated similar levels of Russian casualties (see Russian plans in Donbas explained)

Russia’s battalion tactical groups were designed to provide a great deal of impact with minimal manpower.   With lots of artillery, sometimes as much as a NATO brigade (with two-three battalions) and about thirty tanks they look good on paper. Designed to move and operate independently for short periods of time they seemed like powerful asset and early in the war the Russia army looked formidable. Further, in recent conflicts the battalion tactical group concept appeared to work well. In the 2014 invasion of Ukraine and Crimea, battalion tactical groups were successful, defeating larger Ukrainian units. Combined with Russian claims of improved technology the prospect of a 120 ‘network enabled’ battalion groups swarming across Ukraine was frightening.  

However, the war has demonstrated two key flaws that cannot easily be solved, unlike logistics concerns.  The first is the lack of devolved authority and ‘mission command’ doctrine, the battalion tactical group could be a powerful battlefield asset if commanders at all levels were well-trained and able to make decisions quickly.  The second weakness is the lack of infantry, this war is proving that even in age of network enabled armies, precision strike and drones the ‘trunk monkeys’, ‘grunts’ or ‘footsloggers’ are still an essential part of any successful operation.  The poor old infantry ‘slogging it out’ either attacking or defending a piece of ground are still the most important people on the battlefield.  At the start of the war most battalion tactical groups had about 300 infantrymen and two months of tough fighting later they have even less. 

Doing some back of ‘cigarette packet’ analysis, the Russians started the war with about 36,000 deployable infantry soldiers.  Normally, about 40% of casualties in a battle are in the infantry. Therefore if we take British Defense Secretary George Wallace’s conservative figure of 15,000 Russians dead then it is likely that approximately 6,000 dead infantrymen (or roughly 1 in 6 Russian infantrymen) are dead.  Combine this with wounded and we can see the problem that the Russians have to manage. 

That is why the latest Institute for the Study of War’s daily summary (May 2) stated simply that across the whole front there were no Russian attacks that day. Some commentators will read into this that the Russians are being deceptive and preparing for a larger move.  Perhaps, that evacuation of civilians from Mariupol ties in with a broader strategy to deceive NATO before major attack is launched? 

 I prefer to apply Ockham’s Razor and based on what we know the hypothesis that Russia is running out of infantry soldiers so can’t take the offensive is the simplest option.  

Russia’s artillery fire and long-range missile attacks on places like Lviv and Odessa help to colour the picture that is emerging.  Lviv is suffering because it is a key point in the supply chain that brings forward weapons to Ukrainian forces in the south and east.  The Russians are trying to stop the flow of new weapons to Ukraine, history demonstrates that this will not work, but they are trying. Odessa is on the list because it is a logistics hub and because bombing it keeps people guessing about whether the Russians will push in that direction.  None of this activity requires infantry soldiers though.  If the Russians had the manpower, then they would be continuing their probing and reconnaissance.

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In the last article we discussed Russian Chief of General Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s visit to Ukraine, obviously to ‘smell the battle’ as Arthur Wellesley described the role of a senior commander, to find out what is going on especially the morale and state of the soldiers ‘on the ground’.  Unfortunately, his visit coincided with a Ukrainian strike on the Russian headquarters running the Izyum battle.  There are reports that General Gerasimov was wounded.  The Institute for the Study of War assessed that this strike may even have temporarily paralysed Russian command and control in this area which is the only area the Russians are progressing.  Most importantly, this incident adds to the overall picture of an army culminating tactically, its manpower being depleted both on the frontline or at its most senior levels.

Last week there were credible reports of Russian battalion battle groups being hastily reformed and re-organised, essentially two or three combat ineffective battlegroups being ‘jammed’ together to create new one.  In military terms this is a last resort, think of a military unit being like a sports team, it trains together for years developing its own culture, drills and ways of doing things within the team.  Bringing two battered battalion battlegroups is like putting half of the Blues rugby team on the field at short notice, after a string of crippling defeats, with half of the Crusaders rugby team and expecting them to play well.  It is likely that the coaching staff are arguing about who was in charge and what tactics to use, there would be too many players in some positions and not enough in others, key specialists may not be there and most important – Who is the captain? 

In summary, the Russians are in real trouble at the tactical level and this problem is likely to be driving their strategy.  A first sign of Russian acknowledgement of this situation may be last week’s strategic escalations, cutting of gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, bombing Kiev during the UN Secretary General’s visit and using lots escalatory rhetoric.  Threatening behaviour deliberately designed to test NATO’s strategic resolve. NATO has met this escalation ‘head on’ and did not flinch. 

Last week also saw attacks on infra-structure by ‘unknown actors’ in both Transnistria and Russia.  At this stage we don’t know exactly who is behind these attacks, but it is likely that Russians are behind the Transnistria attacks.  Using special forces to mount small false flag operations in this area is a ‘cheap’ way to divert attention from the fight in the east and creates concerns about the war spreading into Transnistria or Moldova.  However, Russian forces in Transnistria are tiny and likely to be keeping a low profile at the moment hoping that the Ukrainians and Moldovans do not decide to remove the Russian ‘peace keeping’ force however the attacks may be part of a bigger political manoeuvre. 

Likewise, responsibility for attacks on Russian supply infra-structure in places like Belgorod is uncertain.  It could be a Ukrainian operation, local saboteurs or a false flag operation. We simply do not know.  But combined with the attacks in Transnistria these attacks on Russian soil may be an attempt by Putin to create a casus belli for full-scale mobilisation.  Full-scale mobilisation is one of the few options that Putin has left to win the war at the tactical level. In time it would provide the infantry soldiers that he needs to take cities and control the countryside.  However, it is big political and economic risk.  Mobilisation is enormously expensive and an admission to the Russian public that he has failed so it will need to ‘pitched’ carefully.

Which leads to Russia’s activities this week that started with their Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov walking back the previous week’s escalations.  Then over the last few days the Russians have allowed the evacuation of some civilians from Mariupol.   Another gesture likely designed to de-escalate the situation at a strategic level.  Meanwhile, Russian military resources are being diverted to creating a new republic of Kherson, free of ‘Nazi tyranny’.  

This all leads us to what we can expect in the next few days before Russia’s May 9th Victory Day celebrations.  I suspect the Russian’s know that they are in trouble and can no longer force an offensive in either the east or in the south. Instead of aggressive action it is likely that the Russians will consolidate and take a quick propaganda victory. Bidding their time and resources and preparing for the next move.

Kherson provides a fine natural boundary for a new pro-Russian territory; it sits on the Dnieper River a strong defensive flank for the new territory.  Clearing the civilians out of Mariupol is a PR victory. Further, when the Russians do pump poison gas into the Azovstal Steel Factory’s underground network of tunnels and bunkers to kill the defenders the world will not be watching as closely or as shocked as if there were civilians in the factory.   So far, the Ukrainians have not been able to mount large offensives so the Russians can safely assume that they can hold the land they have taken to date.  A picture is building of a quick PR ‘victory’ being claimed. However, it is also likely that there will be a ‘call to arms’ based on the ongoing struggle in Ukraine expanding into attacks on Russian and Transnistrian soil.  Putin, will tell the Russian people that they are fighting a proxy war against NATO and that pacifying Ukraine and ‘protecting’ their fellow Russians in Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea and Kherson requires more soldiers and that larger mobilisation is required.  

On the ground the war is likely to slow down this week, the Russians in Ukraine protecting what they have taken because if the Ukrainians do have the capacity, then May 9th is the perfect day to launch an attack.  The Russians need to be ready so that if that happens, they defeat the Ukrainians. So it is unlikely that between now and Victory Day, we are going to see large and risky commitments by Russia in Ukraine.  Instead it is more likely that they will be bidding their time, they will take a PR victory in Kherson then mobilise to get the resources for a long war, hoping that NATO’s resolve will weaken over time.  

 

Ben Morgan is a tired Gen X interested in international politics. He is TDB’s Military analyst.

24 COMMENTS

  1. I just cannot see general mobilisation being effective. The mood of the young people would not appear to be conducive to becoming cannon fodder in an “old” persons war. Even if Putin (if he survives his medical operation) could enlist 1 million, he cannot train them in a short period of time to be effective soldiers. It is also questionable if the army has enough equipment to outfit the new recruits. Nor will they have a management/command structure large enough (and trained) to herd the conscripts into a battle zone.

    Does Putin need to declare war to enable this general mobilisation? If so he opens up the strategic possibility that the EU, NATO, Sweden and Finland, the USA entering the war. Can Putin afford this? First hint will be a no fly zone over the Ukraine. Not sure if Russia has the capacity to rule the air. Without air cover their ground and naval forces will be cannon fodder.

    I think Russia is in a bind. A bind that can only be broken by Putin being removed. Then there is the split in the Orthodox Church.

    Worth a read for a backgrounder:

    https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-kyiv-europe-nationalism-ff22c6c17784674a5eaad0f0a1ff17ca

    “With Russia growing in strength and the Constantinople church weakened under Ottoman rule, the Ecumenical Patriarch in 1686 delegated to the Patriarch of Moscow the authority to ordain the metropolitan (top bishop) of Kyiv.

    The Russian Orthodox Church says that was a permanent transfer. The Ecumenical Patriarch says it was temporary.

    For the past century, independent-minded Ukrainian Orthodox have formed separate churches which lacked formal recognition until 2019, when current Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew recognized the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as independent of the Moscow patriarch — who fiercely protested the move as illegitimate. “

    • I am pretty certain that NATO countries won’t enter the war as such. Their strategy is to equip the Ukraine Army to fight the war.

      In the face of it you would think 140 million trumps 45 million any day. However, Russia would have to train a whole lot of new conscripts, as well as calling upon all those who have been trained in the last 10 years or so. That will take a minimum of months. In contrast Ukraine has already mobilised a large percentage of their fighting age population, and will almost certainly have more commitment from their soldiers. So the balance is much closer than the population statistics would indicate. Is it really likely that Russian will be able (or want to) to mobilise to the extent that Ukraine has done so? That level of mobilisation occurs in a existential war. This is not such a war, at least it is not for Russia.

      Nevertheless, NATO needs to be careful. It will be dangerous to completely humiliate Russia. There needs to be a way for Russia to extricate itself without looking utterly defeated. Would formal acceptance of Russian sovereignty over the Donbas and Crimea be enough to stave off such a humiliation?

      It is quite likely that Ukraine will now want to join NATO, given the value of the Article 5 guarantee. But that might be an over reach. Instead, neutrality with a NATO security guarantee might have to apply. This would prevent a future Russia attack, but also would not have NATO forces in Ukraine. It won’t be unarmed neutrality. Ukraine will want a powerful military with western equipment. A bit like Austria. A solution I advocated on this site back in January.

      • With Finland and Sweden joining NATO the question of Ukraine joining is mute. Whilst Ukraine may well not join NATO, she will almost certainly join into a similar “understanding” defense wise that Sweden and Finland have had.

        The two eastern Ukraine republics are most likely to become Russian protectorates with their own governments. However I cant see Ukraine giving up any further territories.

        Am surprised no effort has been made yet to destroy the bridge from Russia to the Crimea. That would certainly cause a major supply problem for Russian troops trying to reach Odessa and fight Moldova for Transnistria.

        Another question will be the repatriation cost Ukraine will levy on Russia.

      • Agree that the formal relinquishing of the Donbass and Crimea to Russia would afford the Russians with the ability to extradite themselves from this conflict without losing too much ‘face’ and of course it also means that those in the current / former Ukraine who would rather be amalgamated into Russia can be (i.e. those areas where ethnic Russians / Russian speakers / Russophiles etc are either in a majority or very close to it) . . and an independent (and more unified Ukraine) can then retain its independence and engage with the West to whatever extent it wishes to do so (and in time possibly even joining NATO etc).

        • I am not an experts James but there could be several problems with that. The areas worth the most to the Ukraine economy are all in the West and South. Russia already seized 80% of Ukraine’s massive gas fields and the Donbas is heavily industrialised with coal and shale fields.

          The areas they have moved into are not all russophile. The figures in Crimea are roughly 50/50, cant remember exactly but one area, Donbas perhaps is 46% Russian leaning but even then, if its credible I dont know but a 2018 survey showed only 27% were in favour of Russian intervention. Luhansk is only 24% pro Russian. Again Kherson only has 20% Russians and 90% voted with huge turnout for democracy in 1991

          Real issues for democracy if you throw them to the wolves. Mariupol was the most Russian leaning city in the Ukraine supposedly. Now it has been bombed into oblivion, how many are those pro Russians are going to welcome their overlords after losing homes, jobs and family? Most will never return.

          On the economic side if Russia takes all the South up to the river Dneiper? then effectively Ukraine loses all of their mining and energy assets and have limited access for their grain shipping, their next biggest asset. Also I’d be interested to know where the Russian and Ukrainian trans national gas pipes run? I imagine that may also be a part of it.

          What Russia is doing is far more about economic might and advantage than Nationalism. Ukraine will need their resources if they are to have any chance of rebuilding the country. IMO, Russia is using the old east west tensions to claw back resources and is only too happy to have a broken, ailing, gutted Ukraine heaped into Europe to be another milestone around Europe’s neck (financially).

          But as I said, not an expert and it is inevitable Ukraine will ultimately need to concede territory.

        • I have read that blog.

          That is why the Ukrainians are being supplied with 155 mm guns. With base bleed ammunition it has a longer range than the Russian 152 gun, so it can be used for counter battery fire. With the Excalibur smart round the range is over 40 km.

          The 155 mm track or truck mounted gun is specifically a counter battery weapon.

          The Ukrainians will also have more drones than the Russians.

          • Wayne, the word is “being”. The questions are when, training, how much? Our old mates logistics no less.
            On greater range, great, so the Russians call in rockets, air strikes.
            I’d hate to be a reservist called up to the front to face Russian artillery.

  2. Excellent precis. Just a few comments:

    “However, the war has demonstrated two key flaws that cannot easily be solved, unlike logistics concerns.”
    – I am not sure that the log concerns are easily solved either. Certainly a lot of them have been solved by consolidating their forces into an area that is not too far from the border. But in terms of solving their log problems by actually enhancing their log capabilities, I am not convinced.

    I also think that Ukraine will likely not launch an all out offensive on Russia in ANY area as this would place the onus on Ukraine to provide the 3:1 superiority that is required of an offensive force.
    Much better to continue play the the hybrid guerilla game whereby they:

    * Entrench and defend, slowly giving up territory, in order to make Russia pay the 3:1 price that they clearly cannot afford to.
    * Hunker down for the long haul, weakening Russian resolve, armaments supplies and manpower as NATO continues to bolster Ukrainian armaments and capabilities.

    I have no doubt that if Putin senses an existential threat (to him not Russia), that he will find a way to spin a mass mobilisation as necessary and may do this as early as May 9th in order to play on jingoistic fervour.

    However, I agree that this will only be mildly effective for the following reasons:

    * Just as armaments don’t create military capability, not do conscripts. They must be trained even if doing the most basic things and it has been demonstrated pretty clearly that even their current crop are pretty poorly trained. A classic example of this is that their tanks and infantry RUN from an ambush rather than advance on it as is American doctrine.
    * Following on from this, it is all very good having an extra 200K “soldiers” but can they operate the much vaunted Russian tank fleet? Simple answer: No – it is NOT like driving a car.
    * There is reason to believe that Russian stocks of munitions and armaments that are actually DEPLOYABLE are far lower than expected, with examples being:
    – Russian 4th+ gen planes having to fly low in order to drop dumb bombs (and getting shot down as a result) seemingly because Russia doesn’t have sufficient stocks of smart bombs.
    – A seeming lack of smart, guided, rocket assisted munitions required to achieve military effect at stand off ranges.
    – Speculation that of the total 10K+ tanks, only about 2.5K were deployable at the commencement of the war, which looks to have reduced to about 1.8K.
    – Furthermore it seems that a lot of those tanks destroyed are their better T90 models (not mentioning the Aramata models as they have very few of these).

    Finally I would speculate that given Russia seems to have plenty of dumb artillery armaments and munitions, they will revert to their old play book more and more and start targeting cities more and more in an attempt to level them and start engaging less and less with the Ukrainian armed forces.

  3. If one in six infantry have been killed, that is rather like the whole of World War One in two months. As for putting together the scratch units, that was what the Germans were doing in 1945.

    In spite of Putin’s bans, there’s stuff being published quite openly in Russia, on semi-official websites to boot, suggesting that the attack was a strategic blunder of the first magnitude, that if the war drags on there may be revolution, and that Russia should sue for peace urgently. These critics, whose position is no doubt richly informed by Russian history (in the sense that parallels with the blunders of Nicholas II are screamingly evident) are, of course, careful to call the war a special military operation, but it does not inhibit them otherwise. See https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/no-time-for-fatalism/ and
    https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/search-for-a-compromise-or-demand-for-surrender/

  4. Watch ‘the Duran’ channel on Youtube and Telegram for a much more balanced view of what is most probably going on.

      • Heres the question Gerrit. Given that since Ben started writing these columns, you and he have constantly stated that Russia is taking a pasting, how can they? Surely the Russians cannot move west against so many high moral Western equipped defenders? Didnt you declare they’d lost?
        I will watch the map, seems to indicate one way traffic to me.

  5. ok I have to say this..after years of interest in a certain mid C20th conflict I know probably more than is necessary and certainly more than is healthy…part of my interest has been propaganda and how each nations PR differed
    Part of this is complete bound collections of 2 UK different wartime weekly magazines ?(both sold here and in OZ at the time) a gold mine not necessarily what people really thought but a record of the official messaging and I can tell you one thing for free, most of the opinion pieces by ‘contemporary military experts’ where either outright lies or complete horse shit…it takes 20 yrs for a coherent narrative to gel and new research leads to old myths falling every year….reading ‘the japanese can’t fly, they all wear glasses’ ‘the japanese can’t design anything of their own they just steal from the west’…and whoops is that a zero in the clouds mother?…’the USSR will crumble and the nazis will be in moscow by the end of the month’ all from the mouths of respected ‘contemporary experts’, all sadly familiar today, and all wrong….in fact I suspect the few articles that do still stand up today are more accident than design.
    I could go on but I’ll resist that particular self indulgence.

    another example when the berlin wall fell, none of the experts, political scientists, kremlin watchers or soviet experts predicted it….opinions varied from ‘a ride of the tankies’ to peaceful reform of state capitalism….no one including myself saw the wall coming down, no one…not even the west germans I happened to be working with on the day.

  6. We both have the power of God’s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UJKQu8bmwPs&t=2279s

    Victory Nuland from our NATOstan team-leaders is a Ukraine Nation expert ,,,she will help us defeat Putin by calling his bluffs,,, to our continual escalation after escalation.

    Even better is that Victory Nulands husband is a genius who has solved the way to use Nuclear weapons safely ,,, he’s studied it.

    So we in NATO have other ways to win,,, when we run out of our best trained well experienced Proxy fighters,,, and the forcibly conscripted less able replacements get routed ,,, We can pull out the big Ace.

    Maybe careful use of Nukes to win, would be big enough to distract from the destruction of our economies ,,,, it’s all on the same path they are walking us down. https://youtu.be/W2QjDGvQU2Y?list=TLPQMDQwNTIwMjIPbQTZl565kg&t=774

    • Funny that Tiger. In the words of Manstein after Kursk in 1943 “All hell is loose on the Eastern front”.

      Seems that the armchair generals got it badly wrong.

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